This thesis proposes a multi-theoretical framework based on information asymmetry and institutional theories by focusing on the period of change in OFR regulation from 2004-2006. As a means of examining various aspects of the proposed framework, this thesis carries out an empirical investigation to find the extent of forward-looking information for a sample of 690 UK non-financial firm-year observations which are drawn from the top 500 UK listed firms by total market capitalization as listed by Financial Times on 30 March 2007. The investigation concentrates on three aspects: (1) the association between the extent of voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information and both information asymmetry and institutional characteristics; (2) the association between changes in disclosure and information asymmetry and institutional characteristics; and (3) the association between disclosure of cash flow forecasts and industry behaviour. Before examining the extent of FL information, another subsidiary objective arises: to investigate the impact of alternative methods choice on the measurement of information. Different methods of disclosure indices and content analysis (an un-weighted index, a weighted index, a frequency count, a manual content analysis, and a computerised content analysis using coding by text unit as a unit of analysis and coding by sentence as a unit of analysis) are conducted on a sample of 30 UK non-financial companies for 2006. Once the disclosure scores are computed, several set of analyses are performed (descriptive analysis, correlation matrix, multiple regression analysis, and ranking). The results of analyses reveal that, on average, alternative methods of measurements provide quite similar inferences; hence, a trade-off should be made to decide upon a method by which to measure the extent of FL for a large sample. Computerised content analysis using a text unit as a unit of analysis is chosen to perform coding for the large sample. For the purpose of testing the study hypotheses, both parametric and non-parametric tests are undertaken to examine how firm characteristics affect the level of forward-looking information. The results of regression analysis indicate that the extent of voluntary disclosure of FL information is positively and significantly related to growth opportunities, leadership, audit committee, competition rate, corporate size, and cross-listing. However, the extent of FL information is negatively and significantly associated with blockholding of 5% or more. In terms of changes in the extent of disclosure, the results show that changes in capital need is positively and significantly related to changes in disclosure, whereas changes in analyst following, blockholding of 5% or more, and corporate size are negatively and significantly related to changes in the extent of disclosure among consecutive years. In order to examine the relationship between industry behaviour and the extent of forward-looking information, disclosure of cash flow forecasts is chosen as a proxy for forward-looking information. This is done, because of the difficulty of measuring the disclosure practices of other companies in the same industry by means of a scoring sheet. The results of logistic regression analysis document that operating cash flow, industry behaviour, cross-listing, and company size are positively and significantly related to disclosure of cash flow forecasts, whereas performance and competition rate are negatively and significantly related to disclosure of cash flow forecasts

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of New South Wales, 2001. / Also available online.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2007. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 46-06, page: 3070.

Rijksuniv., Diss.--Groningen, 2004. / Zsfassung in engl. Sprache.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. James S. Ang, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept of Finance. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 16, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 92 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-283).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-52). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of corporate voluntary disclosure of predecision information. The first essay entitled, "Disclosure Choice in a Duopoly", focusses on the phenomenon of partial disclosure, where the manager of the firm discloses selected signals and withholds the rest. The manager may or may not receive private information which is related to both firm-specific and industry-wide common factors. The motivation for disclosure (non-disclosure) is derived from the proprietary nature of the manager's private information. The cost (benefit) of disclosure is modelled in an imperfectly competitive product market, where an uninformed opponent’s reaction to a disclosure affects the manager's expected profit. Our results indicate that the nature of the manager's optimal disclosure policy is crucially dependent on whether the signal is more informative about firm-specific or industry-wide common factors. Unfavourable news is disclosed and favourable news withheld if the signal is more informative about common factors. On the other hand, favourable news is disclosed and unfavourable news is withheld if the signal is more informative about firm-specific factors. Comparative statics show that the sensitivity of the optimal disclosure policy and the probability of disclosure to some key parameters are also dependent on this characteristic of a signal. The empirical implications of our results suggest that when testing hypotheses involving voluntary disclosures, failure to take the above characteristic into account may confound the results. The second essay entitled, "Disclosure and Reputation in Credit Markets", deals with a different aspect of voluntary disclosures. A reputation game is modelled in the absence of credible disclosure. The manager's ability with respect to obtaining predecision information is of interest to the firm's creditors. The manager's future nominal interest charges depend on the creditors' belief about the manager's ability, i.e., on his reputation. Hence, the manager attempts to communicate this ability through sub-optimal production choice and creditors learn about the manager by observing the end of period revenue realization. If credible disclosures are possible the manager may make direct disclosures to communicate his information gathering ability to the creditors. This alternative mechanism avoids the cost of reputation building incurred by selecting a suboptimal project. However, it is shown that if these two mechanisms for reputation acquisition are not "independent", then the possibility of disclosure increases the manager's incentive to select a sub-optimal action. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate