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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

A Study of financial statements of Hong Kong listed companies in relation to discourse requirements.

January 1988 (has links)
by Kwok Chak Man, Maurice and Lau Wah Ching. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references.
2

Securitization and disclosure in China: a comparison between US, EU, and China's securitization disclosure regimes in light of the 2007-09 global financial crisis. / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection

January 2013 (has links)
金融危机中发达证券化市场出现的信息披露问题给新兴市场敲响了警钟。这些新兴市场意识到在引入证券化的有关结构性改革措施的同时,增加信息披露和市场透明度也十分重要。 / 首先,本文就金融危机中证券化所暴露的问题和危险进行分析。在证券化过程中存在的一系列结构和制度性问题中,有关基础资产质量和风险转移的信息披露和透明度不足。这个问题在金融危机中尤其突出,美国次贷市场中低质量的抵押贷款得以通过证券化将这些贷款的风险以一种复杂且不透明的方式散布到整个金融体系。 / 第二,本文首先回顾了信息披露在现代金融监管中的角色和作用。接着分析了证券化产品的信息披露的特殊性以及美国和欧盟采用的不同披露监管制度。次之,本文介绍了金融危机后各国就证券化信息披露制度的缺陷进行的改革措施。 / 第三,本文重点分析了中国证券化市场中的信息不对称问题,以及信息披露制度的严重缺陷。鉴于从金融危机中所获取的经验和教训,以及中国证券化市场的特点,本文通过对比分析来探讨一个健全的信息披露制度对新兴的中国证券化市场潜在的影响,以及该制度是否能支撑这个市场的健康和可持续发展。本研究最后提出具体建议来改进中国现有的证券化信息披露制度,这些建议将有助于减少证券化本身固有的风险。 / Disclosure failures exposed in mature securitization markets during the global financial crisis sent warnings to emerging markets. Those emerging markets learned that it is critical to improve disclosure and market transparency in addition to the introduction of broad structural reforms into the securitization process. / First, an investigation into the dangers associated with asset securitization shows a number of structural and institutional flaws in the securitization process. The lack of adequate disclosure and the poor level of transparency regarding asset quality and risk transfer were paramount. This became obvious during the 2007-09 financial crisis as the risks associated with low-quality residential mortgage loans in the United States were distributed along the securitization process to the entirety of the financial sector in a complex and relatively opaque way. / Second, I review of the role of disclosure in financial regulation. There will be an assessment of the special features of securitization-related disclosure regulation and the different disclosure regulatory systems adopted in the US and the EU. This will be followed by an introduction of post-crisis disclosure reform initiatives. / Thirdly, I will examine the poor level of market transparency and the lack of adequate disclosure requirements. This leads to an analysis of the consequent information asymmetry problems that are endemic to the Chinese securitization market. Based on lessons drawn from the financial crisis and the unique characteristics of the Chinese securitization market, I then explore from a comparative point of view the potential impact of a comprehensive and sound disclosure regime and examine whether it can support a sustainable and healthy development for the emerging Chinese securitization market. This study concludes with specific proposals that aim to promote the effectiveness of disclosure and transparency for the purpose of curtailing risks inherent in securitization in the Chinese Context. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Tan, Fugui. / "November 2012." / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / Table of Abbreviations --- p.v / List of Diagrams and Tables --- p.vii / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Rationale and Research Questions --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- General --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Information Problems in Securitization Processes and Markets --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- Disclosure and Securitization --- p.4 / Chapter 1.1.4 --- Securitization Disclosure Regulation in China --- p.5 / Chapter 1.1.5 --- Research Questions --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2 --- Organization --- p.9 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Methodology --- p.10 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Securitization and Its Evolution --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- An Overview of Securitization --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- General --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Definition and Transaction Structure --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Transaction Parties and Structural Issues --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2.3.1 --- General --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2.3.2 --- Originator / Sponsor --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2.3.3 --- The Issuing Entity - SPV --- p.20 / Chapter 2.2.3.4 --- Credit Rating Agencies --- p.22 / Chapter 2.2.3.5 --- Arranger / Underwriter --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2.3.6 --- Servicer --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.3.7 --- Trustee --- p.25 / Chapter 2.2.3.8 --- Legal Counsel --- p.26 / Chapter 2.2.3.9 --- Structural Issues --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3 --- Main Legal Issues and Challenges --- p.31 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- General --- p.31 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- The Validity of the Asset Transfer --- p.32 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- True Sale --- p.32 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- Alternatives to True Sale --- p.35 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- Re-characterization --- p.39 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Bankruptcy Remoteness --- p.40 / Chapter 2.3.3.1 --- Bankruptcy Remoteness of the SPV --- p.40 / Chapter 2.3.3.2 --- Risk of Substantive Consolidation --- p.41 / Chapter 2.4 --- Legal Documentation in the Securitization Process --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- General --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Transfer Agreements --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Trust Deeds --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- Servicing Agreements --- p.45 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Offering Circulars and Prospectuses --- p.45 / Chapter 2.4.6 --- Other Documentation --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Rationale of Securitization --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- General --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Balance Sheet Considerations --- p.47 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Cheaper Funding --- p.51 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- Matching Assets and Liabilities --- p.52 / Chapter 2.5.5 --- Obtaining A Varied Investor Base --- p.53 / Chapter 2.5.6 --- Risk Management --- p.53 / Chapter 2.5.7 --- Making Profits through Arbitrage --- p.54 / Chapter 2.6 --- The Evolution of Securitization --- p.54 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- General --- p.54 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Securitization and Structured Finance --- p.55 / Chapter 2.6.3 --- The Variety of Asset Types and Securitized Products --- p.56 / Chapter 2.6.3.1 --- General --- p.56 / Chapter 2.6.3.2 --- MBSs --- p.57 / Chapter 2.6.3.3 --- ABSs --- p.57 / Chapter 2.6.3.4 --- CDOs --- p.58 / Chapter 2.6.4 --- Static and Dynamic Securitization Structures --- p.61 / Chapter 2.6.4.1 --- Static Structure --- p.61 / Chapter 2.6.4.2 --- Dynamic Structure --- p.61 / Chapter 2.6.5 --- International Diffusion of Securitization --- p.64 / Chapter 2.7 --- Conclusion --- p.68 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Information Failures in Securitization: the Example of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis --- p.71 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.71 / Chapter 3.2 --- From the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown to the Financial Crisis --- p.73 / Chapter 3.3 --- Information Asymmetries in Mortgage Securitization Markets --- p.83 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- General --- p.83 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Information Asymmetries at the Loan-Origination Level --- p.84 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Originator’s Information Advantage --- p.84 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Problems of the Originate-To-Distribute Model --- p.86 / Chapter 3.3.2.3 --- Moral Hazard in the Mortgage Markets --- p.91 / Chapter 3.3.2.4 --- The Failure of Preventive Mechanisms --- p.93 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Information Asymmetries in the Securitization Process --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3.3.1 --- General --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3.3.2 --- Information Asymmetries between Securitizers and Investors --- p.97 / Chapter 3.3.3.3 --- Information Asymmetries between Servicers and Investors --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.3.4 --- Limitations of US Disclosure Regulation --- p.101 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Information Failures Caused by the Complexity of Securitized Products --- p.107 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Information Failures in the Credit Rating Process --- p.111 / Chapter 3.3.5.1 --- General --- p.111 / Chapter 3.3.5.2 --- The Role of Credit Ratings in the Securitization Industry --- p.112 / Chapter 3.3.5.3 --- Information Failure in the Credit Rating Industry --- p.114 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- The Impacts of Insufficient Disclosure during the Financial Crisis --- p.119 / Chapter 3.4 --- Conclusion --- p.121 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Disclosure and Securitization --- p.124 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Role of Disclosure in Financial Markets --- p.125 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- General --- p.125 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Protection of Investors --- p.128 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Promotion of Market Efficiency --- p.129 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Reduction of Systemic Risk --- p.132 / Chapter 4.2.5 --- Disclosure Based Regulatory System versus Merit Based Regulatory System --- p.133 / Chapter 4.3 --- Securitization Disclosure Regulation --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- The Characteristics of Securitization Disclosure Regulation --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1.1 --- General --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1.2 --- Assets versus the Issuing Entity --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1.3 --- Vertical versus Horizontal --- p.138 / Chapter 4.3.1.4 --- Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure --- p.139 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- US and EU Disclosure Requirements for Public Offerings of Asset-Backed Securities --- p.141 / Chapter 4.3.2.1 --- General --- p.141 / Chapter 4.3.2.2 --- US Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure --- p.142 / Chapter 4.3.2.3 --- EU Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure --- p.144 / Chapter 4.3.2.4 --- Information on Transaction Parties in US and EU ABS Prospectuses --- p.147 / Chapter 4.3.2.5 --- Information on Transaction Structures in US and EU ABS Prospectuses --- p.152 / Chapter 4.3.2.6 --- Information on the Underlying Assets in US and EU ABS Prospectuses --- p.154 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Post-Issuance Disclosure: EU Post-Issuance Reporting and US Ongoing Reporting --- p.155 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- A Comparison between the EU and US Disclosure Regulations --- p.157 / Chapter 4.4 --- Policy Initiatives for the Improvement of Securitization Disclosure --- p.160 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- An Overview of Policy Initiatives --- p.160 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Enhancing Disclosure on the Underlying Assets --- p.163 / Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- Asset-Level Information --- p.163 / Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- Enhancing Disclosure for the Due Diligence Efforts of the Issuer --- p.166 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Enhancing Disclosure on Transaction Structures --- p.167 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Efficient and Smart Disclosure --- p.168 / Chapter 4.4.5 --- Improved Disclosure on Credit Ratings --- p.170 / Chapter 4.4.6 --- Disclosure in Private Markets --- p.172 / Chapter 4.5 --- Interaction between Disclosure and Other Policy Initiatives --- p.173 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- General --- p.174 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Reducing Conflict of Interests --- p.174 / Chapter 4.5.3 --- Product Standardization and Simplification --- p.177 / Chapter 4.5.4 --- Improving Credit Ratings --- p.178 / Chapter 4.5.5 --- The Interaction between Disclosure and other Policy Initiatives --- p.179 / Chapter 4.6 --- Conclusion --- p.180 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Securitization Practices and Laws in China --- p.182 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.182 / Chapter 5.2 --- An Overview of the Economic Reforms in China --- p.183 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Economic Reforms in China since 1978 --- p.183 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- SOE Reforms --- p.185 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Banking Reforms --- p.190 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- The Development of Capital Markets --- p.195 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Introduction of Securitization in China --- p.201 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- General --- p.201 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Stage I (1990s -2004): From Offshore Securitization Deals to Domestic Experiments --- p.202 / Chapter 5.3.2.1 --- General --- p.202 / Chapter 5.3.2.2 --- Offshore Securitization Deals --- p.202 / Chapter 5.3.2.3 --- Domestic Securitization Experiments - NPL Deals --- p.205 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Stage II (2005- present): Pilot Securitization Programs in China --- p.207 / Chapter 5.3.3.1 --- The Emergence of the Interbank Securitization Market --- p.207 / Chapter 5.3.3.2 --- Securitization by Non-Financial Institutions: Special Asset Management Plan (SAMP) --- p.215 / Chapter 5.4 --- Legal Framework for Securitization in China --- p.220 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- General --- p.220 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Stage I: (1990s -2004) --- p.221 / Chapter 5.4.2.1 --- Specific SPV Issues --- p.221 / Chapter 5.4.2.2 --- True Sale --- p.223 / Chapter 5.4.2.3 --- Transfer of Security Interests --- p.224 / Chapter 5.4.2.4 --- Tax and Accounting Issues --- p.227 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Stage II: 2005 - Present --- p.228 / Chapter 5.4.3.1 --- The Legal Framework for the Interbank Securitization Market --- p.228 / Chapter 5.4.3.2 --- The Legal Framework for SAMPs --- p.249 / Chapter 5.5 --- Problems of A Sustainable Development of Securitization in China in Light of --- p.the / Chapter Global --- Financial Crisis --- p.254 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- General --- p.254 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Insufficient Information Disclosure --- p.255 / Chapter 5.5.3 --- Overreliance on Rating Agencies --- p.257 / Chapter 5.5.4 --- Moral Hazard Problem --- p.259 / Chapter 5.6 --- Conclusion --- p.260 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Sustainable Securitization Disclosure Regulation in China: Status, Problems, and Suggestions --- p.262 / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.262 / Chapter 6.2 --- Disclosure Regulations in China’s Interbank Securitization Market --- p.264 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- General --- p.264 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Parties Responsible for the Information Disclosure --- p.267 / Chapter 6.2.2.1 --- The Legal Framework --- p.267 / Chapter 6.2.2.2 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.271 / Chapter 6.2.2.3 --- Suggestions --- p.272 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Disclosure Requirements related to Prospectuses --- p.273 / Chapter 6.2.3.1 --- General --- p.273 / Chapter 6.2.3.2 --- Information on Transaction Parties --- p.275 / Chapter 6.2.3.3 --- Information on Transaction Structures and Asset-Backed Securities --- p.277 / Chapter 6.2.3.4 --- Information on the Underlying Assets --- p.281 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Ongoing Reporting --- p.289 / Chapter 6.2.4.1 --- General --- p.289 / Chapter 6.2.4.2 --- The Legal Framework --- p.290 / Chapter 6.2.4.3 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.291 / Chapter 6.2.4.4 --- Legal Practice and Problems --- p.292 / Chapter 6.2.4.5 --- Suggestions --- p.293 / Chapter 6.2.5 --- Disclosure in Relation to Credit Ratings --- p.295 / Chapter 6.2.5.1 --- General --- p.295 / Chapter 6.2.5.2 --- The Legal Framework --- p.295 / Chapter 6.2.5.3 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.296 / Chapter 6.2.5.4 --- Legal Practice and Problems --- p.296 / Chapter 6.2.5.5 --- Suggestions --- p.297 / Chapter 6.2.6 --- General Principles --- p.297 / Chapter 6.2.6.1 --- General --- p.297 / Chapter 6.2.6.2 --- The Legal Framework --- p.298 / Chapter 6.2.6.3 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.299 / Chapter 6.2.6.4 --- Legal Practice and Problems --- p.300 / Chapter 6.2.6.5 --- Suggestions --- p.302 / Chapter 6.3 --- A Feasible Disclosure Approach for China’s Securitization Regulation --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- General --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- The Transferability of Foreign Disclosure Models to China --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.2.1 --- Legal Transplants --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.2.2 --- Transplanting Foreign Disclosure Models to China --- p.315 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- A Hybrid of Disclosure Based and Merit Based System --- p.319 / Chapter 6.3.3.1 --- General --- p.319 / Chapter 6.3.3.2 --- Merits of Merit Based Approach for China’s Securitization Regulation --- p.320 / Chapter 6.3.3.3 --- Excursus: Improving Current Merit Based System --- p.323 / Chapter 6.4 --- The Implementation of Disclosure Regulation --- p.325 / Chapter 6.5 --- Conclusion --- p.328 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Final Remarks --- p.330 / Reference List --- p.336 / Chapter Part I. --- Chinese-Language Literature and Legal Instruments --- p.336 / Chapter 1. --- Books, Book Chapters and Articles --- p.336 / Chapter 2. --- ABS Prospectuses, Trustee Reports, and Credit Rating Reports --- p.341 / Chapter 3. --- Chinese Laws and other Legal Instruments --- p.342 / Chapter a. --- Laws by the National People’s Congress and Its Standing Committee --- p.342 / Chapter b. --- Administrative Regulations by the State Council and Departmental Administrative Rules by the Ministries --- p.344 / Chapter Part II. --- English-Language Literature and Legal Instruments --- p.348 / Chapter 1. --- Books, Book Chapters and Articles --- p.348 / Chapter 2. --- Laws and Other Legal Instruments --- p.375
3

Institutional environment, R&D spillovers and transparency: evidence from China. / 制度環境, 研究資訊溢出與透明度: 來自中國的證據 / Institutional environment, research and development spillovers and transparency / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection / Zhi du huan jing, yan jiu zi xun yi chu yu tou ming du: lai zi Zhongguo de zheng ju

January 2008 (has links)
This thesis extends the literature on institutional accounting by providing a new channel---proprietary information leakage between competitors---through which institutions affect accounting attributes and information disclosure. Weak property rights protection exacerbates outflow of proprietary information on operation, thus reduces managers' incentive to disclose financial information and other operation related information since the disclosed information will be helpful for competitors to learn more about proprietary information on operation of the firm. The channel is built with two links. One is the link between property rights protection and R&D spillovers, which proxy for proprietary information disclosure, and the other is the link between R&D spillovers and transparency. Empirical results show that R&D spillovers are negatively associated with regional property rights protection. In addition, I find that innovation output depends less on in house R&D investment and more on R&D spillovers from competitors in regions with weak property rights protection than in regions with strong protection and that the level of R&D expenditures is positively associated with property rights protection. Some evidence is found that firms with more R&D spillovers are more likely to have opaque earnings and disclose less firm-specific information. The relationship is stronger in regions with weak property rights protection than in regions with strong protection, indicating that firms are more likely to utilize opacity to prevent proprietary information leakage when R&D spillovers are large. / Yu, Xin. / Adviser: Joseph P. H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 72-79). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.
4

A study of the financial disclosure requirement change by banks in Hong Kong.

January 1997 (has links)
by Fung Pak-Wai Patrick. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-47). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.v / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.vii / CHAPTER / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- BANKING STRUCTURE AND THE DISCLOSURE CHANGE --- p.4 / Pre-1994 disclosure requirement --- p.5 / Reasons for Change --- p.9 / New Disclosure Requirement --- p.11 / Comparison with the disclosure requirement of IAS 30 --- p.13 / Chapter III. --- EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.18 / Chapter IV. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.21 / The Sample --- p.21 / The Data --- p.22 / The Models --- p.23 / Chapter V. --- FINDINGS --- p.26 / Comparison of Predicted with Actual Returns During the Issuance Period --- p.26 / Disaggregation of the Sample: Significance Tests --- p.30 / Interpretation of Results --- p.32 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.33 / APPENDIX --- p.34 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.45
5

Disclosure standards of Chinese companies: a comparative study of companies with both A and H shares Listings.

January 1997 (has links)
by Lee Pui-Wah, Josephine. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-42). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Purpose of Study --- p.3 / Chapter II. --- METHODOLOG --- p.4 / Approach --- p.4 / Time Horizon Covered in the Paper --- p.5 / Assumption --- p.5 / General Problems of Studies in China --- p.5 / Chapter III. --- CHINESE SHAREHOLDING REFORM AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENT --- p.6 / Chinese Legal System --- p.6 / Hong Kong Stock Market - H Shares Profile --- p.7 / Chinese Stock Market - A Shares Profile --- p.8 / Chapter IV. --- THEORIES RELATED TO STOCK MARKET REGULATION --- p.12 / Market Failure Theory --- p.14 / Public Choice Theory --- p.15 / COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS --- p.17 / Information Disclosure Related to Important Transactions --- p.18 / Information Disclosure Related to Takeover and Merger --- p.20 / Financial Information --- p.23 / Disclosure of Directors' and Substantial Shareholders' Interests --- p.24 / Chapter V. --- EVALUATION --- p.25 / Depth and Breadth of Information --- p.25 / The Quality of Information --- p.26 / Difficulties that Issuers Confront --- p.27 / Cultural Influence --- p.27 / Lack of Motivation --- p.28 / Lack of Education and standards --- p.28 / The Importance of Information in a Speculative Market --- p.29 / Nature of Reform --- p.30 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.31 / APPENDIX --- p.34 / BIBLIORGRAPHY --- p.41

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