Thesis (MMil (Military Sciences. School for Security and Africa Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis explores the feasibility of the concept Developmental Peace Missions (DPMs). It seeks to answer the question whether DPMs is an ambitious construct or a feasible ideal and whether DPMs could be effectively applied during peace missions. The study takes the form of a descriptive analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of DPMs, and includes the analysis of various relevant case studies in terms of the application of the concept of DPMs. The study further explores the evolution that has taken place in terms of United Nations peace missions, in that most modern peace missions include both peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. The study also illustrates the modern approach to peace missions, based on an integrated systems-thinking approach by means of which the activities of all relevant role-players are integrated and fused towards a common end state: that of sustained security and development. In order to analyse the concept of DPMs, the theoretical underpinnings of the concept human security, the security-development nexus and peacebuilding were researched in depth. These concepts were then coupled to the concept of DPMs in terms of their utility during current complex peace missions, both internationally and on the African continent. The concept of DPMs was studied in the context of contemporary peacekeeping in terms of three case studies, namely the peace missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC. The DPMs concept was applied to these case studies and analysed in terms of the extent to which the peace interventions in these countries were conducted in accordance with the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of DPMs. The study concludes that DPMs, in terms of its theoretical basis, is indeed a feasible ideal for peace missions, as it is based on and in line with the approved current UN- and AU-integrated planning processes. However, in terms of its practical utility in Africa, it currently remains an ambitious construct, given the limited capacity and resources of the AU and regional organisations. Therefore, DPMs should not be viewed as a short-term solution to, or panacea for, all intra-state wars. The study proposes that the UN, the AU, as well as relevant regional organisations will have to adjust and make changes in terms of their institutions, structures, funding and the provision of resources in order to operationalise the concept of DPMs successfully. This is especially true as far as the AU is concerned, as the AU currently experiences severe limitations in both material and human resources. However, the fact that both the UN and the AU have adopted the Integrated Mission Planning Process concept as planning tool for their respective missions is an indication that progress is being made towards the achievement of establishing a more holistic and integrated approach to finding sustainable solutions to global conflict. Ultimately, the success of DPMs will be determined by the will and commitment of all the relevant role-players involved in finding a lasting solution to intra-state conflicts. The concept itself cannot provide sustainable peace and development. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Dié tesis verken die lewensvatbaarheid van die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings. Daar sal gepoog word om ‘n antwoord te kry op die vraag of Ontwikkelingsvredesendings ‘n ambisieuse konstruk of ‘n haalbare ideal is. Verder sal gepoog word om te bepaal of dit effektief tydens vredesoperasies toegepas kan word. Die studie neem die vorm aan van ‘n beskrywende analise van die teoretiese grondbeginsels van die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings en sluit die analise van verskeie relevante gevallestudies ten opsigte van die begrip in. Die studie ondersoek die evolusie wat plaasgevind het ten opsigte van vredesendings wat deur die Verenigde Nasies (VN) onderneem word, naamlik dat die meeste moderne vredesendings, vredesbewarings, sowel as vredesbou (nasiebou) inisiatiewe insluit. Die studie illustreer ook die moderne benadering wat ten opsigte van vredesendings toegepas word, naamlik dat die aktiwiteite van al die betrokke rolspelers geïntegreer word en op ‘n gedeelde einddoel gefokus word. Die teoretiese grondstelllings van die begrippe veiligheid en ontwikkeling, die veiligheid-ensekuriteit- neksus, sowel as die begrip van vredesbou (nasiebou) is in diepte ondersoek ten einde die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings te analiseer. Hierdie begrippe is daarna in verband gebring met die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings soos wat dit tans tydens moderne komplekse vredesendings toegepas word – beide internasionaal sowel as op die Afrika kontinent. Die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings is bestudeer teen die agtergrond van eietydse vredesbewaring ten opsigte van drie gevallestudies, naamlik die intervensies in Kosovo, Sierra Leone en die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo. Hierdie drie gevallestudies is gekies aangesien dit die eerste sendings was waartydens die VN die nuwe geïntegreerde benadering tot vredesendings, soos in die Brahimi-verslag aanbeveel, toegepas is. Die studie het bevind dat Ontwikkelingsvredesendings, wat betref die teoretiese grondstellings inderdaad uitvoerbaar is, aangesien dit gebaseer is op en in ooreenstemming is met die huidige aanvaarde beplanninsprosesse van die VN en die AU. Maar, wat betref die praktiese bruikbaarheid van die begrip in Afrika, bly dit tans ‘n ambisieuse konstruk, gegewe die beperkte vermoë en hulpbronne van die AU en streeksorganisasies. Die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings moet dus nie as ‘n korttermynoplossing vir alle interne oorloë beskou word nie. Die studie het bevind dat die VN, die AU, sowel as die betrokke streeksorganisasies, ingrypende veranderings sal moet ondergaan ten einde die begrip Ontwikkelingsvredesendings suksesvol te kan toepas, veral ten opsigte van strukture, befondsing en die voorsiening van hulpbronne. Dit is veral waar in die geval van die AU, aangesien die AU tans geweldige uitdagings in die gesig staar wat betref menslike sowel as materiële hulpbronne. Ten spyte van laasgenoemde uitdagings dui die aanvaarding van die Geïntegreerde Sendingbeplanningsproses as besluitnemings-meganisme deur beide die VN en die AU op die vordering wat gemaak word ten opsigte van die daarstelling van ‘n meer holistiese en geïntegreerde benadering vir volhoubare oplossings vir konflik. Die sukses van Ontwikkelingsvredesendings sal uiteindelik bepaal word deur die wil en toewyding van alle betrokkenes by die soeke na langdurige vrede – die begrip op sigself kan nie volhoubare vrede en ontwikkeling bewerkstellig nie.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is die grootste nederlae wat Suid-Afrika in sy militêre geskiedenis ervaar het. Ten spyte van hul omvang, word daar min van Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk verstaan of onthou. Na ‘n hewige interne debat wat tot konflik tussen Afrikanernasionaliste en pro-Britse Suid-Afrikaners gelei het, het Suid-Afrika op 6 September 1939 oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar. Suid-Afrika se politieke verdeeldheid het saamgeval met die Unie se totale onvoorbereidheid vir oorlog, wat gestrek het van kritieke tekortkominge in kusverdediging, tot die ontoereikende grootte van die leër en lugmag en die totale afwesigheid van ‘n vloot. Gedurende die eerste ses maande van 1941 het Suid-Afrika ‘n beduidende rol gespeel om die Italiaanse koloniale magte in Oos-Afrika te verslaan. Dié veldtog was egter nie effektiewe voorbereiding vir die uitdagings waarteen die Suid-Afrikaners kort daarna in Noord-Afrika te staan sou kom nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe het daarby hul tyd daaraan bestee om vestings in Egipte te herbou in plaas daarvan om noodsaaklike opleiding te ondergaan om hul “bosoorlog”-leër vir ruwe woestynoorlogvoering voor te berei. ‘n Huiwerige, teensinnige politieke besluit het die onvoorbereide Suid-Afrikaners tot Operasie Crusader verbind. Die onervare Suid-Afrikaners het op 23 November 1941 by Sidi Rezegh teen die geharde Afrika Korps te staan gekom, waar oorweldigende magte hulle verpletter het. ‘n Heroorweging van hierdie vergete veldslag aan die hand van primêre en sekondêre bronne het aan die lig gebring dat die Suid-Afrikaners ‘n hoë tol van die Duitse pantser geëis het, wat besmoontlik die ware keerpunt in Operasie Crusader gebring het. In Mei 1942 het Rommel se Afrika Korps deur ‘n reeks blitsige bewegings wat die greep van die Spilmagte op gekombineerde operasies gedemonstreer het, daarin geslaag om die kritiese hawe van Tobruk, waar die onervare Suid Afrikaanse generaal-majoor H.B. Klopper in bevel was, te isoleer. Sy oorgawe binne ‘n enkele dag word dikwels vergelyk met die vorige beleg van Tobruk toe die Australianers Rommel onder vergelykbare omstandighede vir 244 dae teruggehou het totdat die beleg opgehef is. Klopper se oorgawe het ‘n politieke krisis vir Winston Churchill en Jan Smuts geskep, deurdat dit aansienlike spanning binne sowel die Gealieerde kamp as Suid-Afrika veroorsaak het. Die herevaluering van die gebeure het interessante feite uit die primêre bronne na vore gebring ten opsigte van die toestand van Tobruk se verdedigingstellings, die ongelukkige bevelvoerder, en hoe die Verenigde Koninkryk in samewerking met Suid-Afrika die ware feite wou toesmeer. Die onmiddellike naoorlogse geheuebeeld van die gebeure by Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is geskep en verwring deur sensitiewe politieke oorwegings wat die verhouding tussen Suid-Afrika en die Verenigde Koninkryk beïnvloed het. Sedertdien het ‘n nasionalistiese Afrikaner-regering en daarna ook die demokraties-verkose, post-apartheid-regering die herinneringe aan Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk tot die vergetelheid verdoem; nie een van die twee het die nut daarvan gesien om dié twee mylpale in die nasionale geheue te verewig nie. 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