This thesis aims to do what the poem Job 28 is trying to do in the Book of Job, which is to focus on prescribed biblical wisdom practice in order to ‘bring wisdom back down to earth’ within a discussion concerning divine justice (Job 22-31). Chapter 1 introduces what a “wisdom reading” is and why it is necessary. Chapters 2-5 of this thesis give a close reading of Job 28:1-28 and includes an intentional dialogue between how the words, phrase, and theological concepts are used in the poem and in the main three bible wisdom texts (Job, Proverbs and Qoheleth). Chapter 6 discusses the implications of reading Job 28 in light of its biblical wisdom tradition. Job 28 speaks of a hidden wisdom, but it is not obvious how this prescribed wisdom (“fear of God and avoiding evil”) is connected to divine justice until the poem is read within the of context of the three main biblical wisdom books (Job, Proverbs, Qoheleth). A close reading of Job 28:1-1 and 12-28 within the context of the biblical wisdom tradition, challenges the reader to redefine what the book of Job is saying about wisdom in ethical terms and, therefore, also provokes a redefinition of the divine gaze upon the earth in terms of divine justice. In this thesis, we shall see how wisdom and divine justice are both rooted in earthly matters. It is only when viewed as “down-to-earth” matters that we see that they are related to each other in sapiential literature, especially in Job 28. If ‘wisdom’ is understood as proper conduct on earth (avoiding evil action, Job 28:28b) prompted by an understanding that God gazes on this earth he created (fear of the Lord, Job 28:28a), then divine justice is to be understood as divine regulation of that proper conduct and attitude.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / This study, which is devoted to an investigation of the life and works of Karl Heinrich Waggerl, commences with an examination of the author's life and proceeds to a comprehensive discussion of the essential elements which form and condition Waggerl's Weltanschauung, which is based upon his concept of Divine Order. Like Friedrich Griese and Richard Billinger, Waggerl is classified as a "Heimatdichter." The man's life falls naturally into four determining periods which I have treated under the headings: childhood and boyhood; youth and World War I; the difficult years; and the period from the novel Brot to the present time [TRUNCATED].

Divine voluntarism (Divine command theory) is a series of theories that claim that God is prior to moral obligation and that moral obligation is determined by God's will. Divine voluntarism has to be formulated in a way that it does not have undesirable implications, e.g., that moral obligation is arbitrary and that God's goodness is trivial. Also, while it avoids these undesirable implications, divine voluntarism must not imply that God is, in some way, restricted by moral obligation which exists independently of Him. Divine voluntarism can admit God's sovereignty over moral obligation and avoid making moral obligation arbitrary or God's goodness trivial by admitting various aspects of God's will. Moral obligation is relevant to both God's will for human moral obligation and God's will for human moral good. After all, God's will for human moral obligation is God's willing that His own will for human moral good constitute moral obligation for humans.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1911. / Bibliography: p. [173]-181.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1911. / Bibliography: p. [173]-181.

Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [63]-67).

Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 1996. / This is an electronic reproduction of TREN, #029-0354. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [63]-67).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The editor's Thesis--Catholic University of America. / Latin and English on opposite pages. The weight of opinion is against ascribing authorship to Prosper. Cf. p. 18. Bibliography: p. xv-xxiv.

This thesis addresses the question of divine action in the mind: Is human consciousness a uniquely nonphysical causal joint wherein divine intentions meet natural realities without contravening lawlike physical processes? It is argued that consciousness is not uniquely spiritual but wholly natural (and possibly physical). However, this need not lead to the conclusion that divine action in the mind does not occur. Rather, this thesis argues that noninterventionist causal joint programs (such as those privileging the mind as uniquely open to divine action) are both scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, resting on questionable metaphysical presuppositions that are not necessitated by either theology or the natural sciences. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind (and elsewhere). It is argued that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind than that offered by standard causal joint theories. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God’s active presence, one is then free to affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One engages with the scientific and philosophical literature surrounding human consciousness, and uses debates about the nature of the mind to offer a sustained analysis and critique of what is termed the “standard model” of divine action. It is argued that the noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of divine action that has spurred the development of various causal joint theories is scientifically and theologically insufficient, and that this is seen particularly clearly in recent theories locating (and constraining) divine action in the emergent human mind. Chapter 2 analyses the contemporary divine action scene, arguing that the standard model presumes noninterventionism, incompatibilism, and a high view of the laws of nature. However, the God-world relationship implied by this model is theologically insufficient. Chapter 3 examines Philip Clayton’s divine action theory, which locates divine action in the emergent human mind and is the latest manifestation of the causal joint model described in Chapter 2. After using emergence theory itself to critique Clayton’s approach, the thesis then examines the philosophy and science of consciousness, in Chapters 4 and 5. It is suggested that a physicalist understanding of the mind is a well-supported position. Part Two of the thesis reframes divine action in the mind within an explicitly theological framework. The thesis does this by analysing what is termed the “theological turn” in divine action debates – the recent tendency to react against standard causal joint theories by rejecting the idea that science can say anything about how and whether divine action occurs. Proponents of the theological turn instead understand divine action from explicitly theological perspectives, affirming compatibilist models in which God is seen to work in, through, and with natural processes – precisely because God is never absent from nature in the first place. Such an approach allows theologians to accept physicalist explanations of the mind, precisely because all the natural world is necessarily involved with God. Chapter 6 introduces this theological turn by exploring various versions of naturalism, ultimately suggesting that neither philosophy nor science mandates the sort of metaphysical naturalism assumed not only by those who deny divine action, but (ironically) noninterventionist divine action theorists as well. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 then introduce, compare, and contrast three different versions of strong theistic naturalism: Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism. While each of these explicitly theological frameworks is distinctive, they share an affirmation of the intimate relationship between God’s immanent, active presence in the natural world, and suggest the naturalised mind as a relatively intense locus of divine action, as human minds actively participate in and with God. It is concluded that the participatory ontology supported by these theistic naturalisms does, after all, suggest the mind as a locus of intensified divine action – but for very different reasons than those motivating causal joint theorists.