Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-07T14:27:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 2044681 bytes, checksum: 09d18643545c26dd327be8c0d35cd1d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / It is a study focused on the medicament patent from the analysis of the existing tensions among the pharmaceutical industry and the population necessities regarding medicine access. It is well-known the inner nature of the fundamental rights the condition of its social function. In this context, reasoning regarding the protection limits conferred to human nature property is posed, the so-called intellectual property, particularly in the health field, in a concentrated pharmaceutical industry context in the hands of transnational economic conglomerates. Drug Patent-letters are industrial property titles of core application in this universe, as they confer the temporal exclusivity right of exploration in the registered invention. The exercise of the patent right confronts itself with the necessity of the drug access of the population. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Intellectual Property Act rise as rigid diplomas for protecting these rights. The tenet of intellectual property shows a path for a well limited protection, from its technical requisites. In the Mercosur context, a need for enhancement on the mechanisms of regional protection, and the political articulation maintenance is seen, in the sense of avoiding the adherence to bilateral instruments which foresees more rigid protective conditions than the existing ones at the TRIPS. Data stress the importance of a severe protection for an innovation process, at the same time that it is questioned. The drug access becomes more important in situations for the AIDS and other epidemics treatment. At the same time, the sense of investments of the pharmaceutical industry points to the negligence of the P&D on tropical diseases, privileging researches on the high incident diseases of cold countries, or global diseases. The fall on the drug prices is shown, due to the introduction of the generics, and also the way the piracy implies into barrier towards the population access to the drugs. The necessity of a more objective legal mechanism definition is stated aiming to avoid the me-too drug patenting, with a consequent time gap lag on the temporal exclusivity patent right. The formation of the PPP for the realization of P&D of medicament in the industrial phase and the concession technology transferring definition in one of the requisites to form partnerships and international acquisitions, is also shown as relevant. The creation of a new useful capitalism to the reduction of the regional inaqualities passes for the process to endow with flexibility the rights on the pharmaceutical patents. / Trata-se de um estudo sobre as patentes de medicamentos a partir da análise de tensões existentes entre os interesses da indústria farmacêutica e as necessidades das populações no tocante ao acesso aos remédios. Sabe-se ser inerente ao direito de propriedade uma função social, devendo servir à promoção de justiça social. Neste contexto, são tecidos questionamentos sobre os limites de proteção conferidos à propriedade decorrente da criação humana, a chamada propriedade intelectual, particularmente na área da saúde, em um contexto de concentração da indústria farmacêutica nacional em poder de conglomerados econômicos transnacionais. Cartas-patentes de medicamentos são títulos de propriedade industrial de utilidade chave neste universo, pois conferem o direito de exclusividade temporal de exploração da invenção registrada. O exercício do direito patentário defronta-se com a necessidade de acesso das populações a medicamentos. O Tratado sobre os Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual Relacionados com o Comércio (TRIPS) e a Lei de Propriedade Industrial despontam como diplomas rígidos de proteção destes direitos. Os princípios da propriedade intelectual fornecem um caminho para uma proteção bem delimitada, a partir de requisitos técnicos. No contexto do Mercosul verifica-se a necessidade de aprimoramento dos mecanismos de proteção regional e da manutenção de uma articulação política no sentido de não ser realizada a adesão a instrumentos bilaterais que prevejam condições mais rígidas de proteção do que as previstas no TRIPS. Dados enaltecem a importância de uma severa proteção para um processo de inovação, ao mesmo tempo que a põe em dúvida. O acesso aos fármacos torna-se mais premente em situações de medicamentos para o trato de epidemias, como a AIDS. Ao mesmo tempo, o sentido dos investimentos da indústria farmacêutica indica a negligência de P&D sobre doenças tropicais, privilegiando pesquisas sobre doenças de maior incidência em países de clima temperado, ou doenças globais. Demonstra-se a queda de preços de medicamentos em função da introdução de genéricos e como a pirataria implica em uma barreira ao acesso da população aos fármacos. Constata-se a necessidade de definição de mecanismos jurídicos objetivos com a finalidade de evitar-se o patenteamento de drogas ―me-too‖, com o consequente prolongamento do lapso temporal do direito de exclusividade patentário. A formação de Parcerias Público-Privadas (PPPs) para a realização de P&D de medicamentos em fase industrial e a definição da concessão de transferência de tecnologia como um dos requisitos para a formatação de parcerias e aquisições internacionais, mostra-se igualmente relevante. A criação de um novo capitalismo útil à redução das desigualdades regionais passa pelo processo de flexibilização dos direitos sobre as patentes de medicamentos.

Globalization in clinical research and development has increased since the 1990s. Products approved in the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) include increasing numbers of research participants from low- and middle-income countries. The purposes of this quantitative correlational study were to investigate the lag time, or drug lag, between U.S. approval and the approval of selected drugs in all countries that hosted their pivotal clinical trials. The study population was limited to products approved first in the U.S. between 2006 and 2015. The health capability model and research for health justice framework were the theoretical frameworks for the study. Data were collected from public reports and websites of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), European Medicines Agency, National Institutes of Health, local ministries of health, National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, New York Stock Exchange, the World Bank, and a subscription-based report from Springer Publications. Data were analyzed descriptively, with inferential statistics performed via Wilcoxon and chi-square tests. Independent variables were FDA approval year, drug indication, FDA review type, orphan indication, host country World Bank income category, sponsor market capitalization, and sponsor headquarters country. The dependent variable was drug lag, in months. The U.S. to EU drug lag was significantly shorter than U.S. to last host country drug lag. Lower host country income was also associated with longer drug lag. Reducing drug lag may create justice for research participants, improve health outcomes, and yield positive social changes.

Statement of the issue: Facing large HIV-infected populations, Sub-Saharan African countries are producing antiretroviral (ARV) drugs under provisions of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Article 7 states that the protection of intellectual property should increase technology transfer to developing countries. This clause and the debate over domestic manufacturers’ ability to provide low-cost ARVs need examination. Methods: Case studies from ARV manufacturing initiatives in Tanzania and South Africa analyzed conditions affecting two outcomes: the type of technology transfer arrangement entered (voluntary license or imitation) and the affordability of ARVs. Data were collected and analyzed from documents, key-informant interviews, and observation. Chi-squared and phi correlation statistics were then conducted across developing countries to test the association of voluntary ARV licensure with TRIPS-compliant patents and domestic firm ownership (state or private). Results: Tanzania’s weak patent system and poorly-financed, partially state-owned firm dissuaded industry investment, but attracted a non-government organization to transfer technology through imitation. Donor-financed ARV tenders, however, restrict competition to international quality-accredited products not produced by the firm. Without large volumes and manufacturing capacity, it cannot achieve economies of scale to reduce prices below imported ARVs. In South Africa, civil society challenged the strong patent system and poor government commitment that inhibited an ARV rollout. This and a well-financed, publicly-traded firm leveraged voluntary licenses. With international quality approval, the firm increased first-line ARV affordability; however, limited domestic competition keeps treatment prices above those of neighbouring countries. A multi-country analysis found 321 generic ARV manufacturing initiatives in 86 firms across 25 developing countries. Voluntary ARV licenses had a strong positive association with TRIPS-patent compliance (ф=.56, p<.0001) and a weak negative association with state-ownership (ф=.19, p<.0001). Firms in South Africa and India were granted 77% of licenses and accounted for most quality accredited generic ARVs. Conclusion: Despite positive association, technology transfer does not readily result from patent protection, particularly to state-owned firms. Developing countries must enact policies to enable affordable ARVs; yet, they must be cautious using local production to increase ARV access, as most initiatives cannot compete with high-volume generic manufacturers.

Statement of the issue: Facing large HIV-infected populations, Sub-Saharan African countries are producing antiretroviral (ARV) drugs under provisions of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Article 7 states that the protection of intellectual property should increase technology transfer to developing countries. This clause and the debate over domestic manufacturers’ ability to provide low-cost ARVs need examination. Methods: Case studies from ARV manufacturing initiatives in Tanzania and South Africa analyzed conditions affecting two outcomes: the type of technology transfer arrangement entered (voluntary license or imitation) and the affordability of ARVs. Data were collected and analyzed from documents, key-informant interviews, and observation. Chi-squared and phi correlation statistics were then conducted across developing countries to test the association of voluntary ARV licensure with TRIPS-compliant patents and domestic firm ownership (state or private). Results: Tanzania’s weak patent system and poorly-financed, partially state-owned firm dissuaded industry investment, but attracted a non-government organization to transfer technology through imitation. Donor-financed ARV tenders, however, restrict competition to international quality-accredited products not produced by the firm. Without large volumes and manufacturing capacity, it cannot achieve economies of scale to reduce prices below imported ARVs. In South Africa, civil society challenged the strong patent system and poor government commitment that inhibited an ARV rollout. This and a well-financed, publicly-traded firm leveraged voluntary licenses. With international quality approval, the firm increased first-line ARV affordability; however, limited domestic competition keeps treatment prices above those of neighbouring countries. A multi-country analysis found 321 generic ARV manufacturing initiatives in 86 firms across 25 developing countries. Voluntary ARV licenses had a strong positive association with TRIPS-patent compliance (ф=.56, p<.0001) and a weak negative association with state-ownership (ф=.19, p<.0001). Firms in South Africa and India were granted 77% of licenses and accounted for most quality accredited generic ARVs. Conclusion: Despite positive association, technology transfer does not readily result from patent protection, particularly to state-owned firms. Developing countries must enact policies to enable affordable ARVs; yet, they must be cautious using local production to increase ARV access, as most initiatives cannot compete with high-volume generic manufacturers.

Decisions to reform pharmaceutical policy often involve trade-offs between competing social and commercial goals. Canada's Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), a reform that permits compulsory licensing for the production and export of medicines to developing countries, aimed to reconcile these goals. Since it was passed in 2004, only one order of antiretroviral drugs, enough for 21,000 HIV/AIDS patients in Rwanda for one year, has been exported. Future use of the regime appears unlikely. This research aimed to examine the politics underlying the formation of CAMR. Parliamentary committee hearing transcripts from CAMR's legislative development (2004) and from CAMR's legislative review (2007) were analyzed using a content analysis technique to identify how stakeholders who participated in the debates framed the issues. These findings were subsequently analyzed using a framework of framing, institutions and interests to determine how these three dimensions shaped CAMR's final policy design. In 2004, policy debates were dominated by two themes: intellectual property rights and TRIPS compliance. Promoting human rights and the impact of CAMR on innovation were hardly discussed. With the Departments of Industry Canada and International Trade as the lead institutions, the goals of protecting intellectual property and ensuring good trade relations with the United States appear to have taken priority over encouraging generic competition to achieve drug affordability. The result was a more limited interpretation of patent flexibilities under the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision. The most striking finding is the minimal discussion over the potential barriers developing country beneficiaries might face when attempting to use compulsory licensing, including their reluctance to use TRIPS flexibilities, their desire to pursue technological development and the constraints inherent in the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision. Instead, these issues were raised in 2007, which can be partly accounted for by a greater representation of the interests of potential beneficiary country governments. While the Government attempted to strike a balance between drug affordability and intellectual property protection, it designed CAMR as a last resort measure. Increased input from the developing country beneficiaries and shifting to institutions where the right to health gets prioritized may lead to policies that better achieves affordable drug access.

Decisions to reform pharmaceutical policy often involve trade-offs between competing social and commercial goals. Canada's Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), a reform that permits compulsory licensing for the production and export of medicines to developing countries, aimed to reconcile these goals. Since it was passed in 2004, only one order of antiretroviral drugs, enough for 21,000 HIV/AIDS patients in Rwanda for one year, has been exported. Future use of the regime appears unlikely. This research aimed to examine the politics underlying the formation of CAMR. Parliamentary committee hearing transcripts from CAMR's legislative development (2004) and from CAMR's legislative review (2007) were analyzed using a content analysis technique to identify how stakeholders who participated in the debates framed the issues. These findings were subsequently analyzed using a framework of framing, institutions and interests to determine how these three dimensions shaped CAMR's final policy design. In 2004, policy debates were dominated by two themes: intellectual property rights and TRIPS compliance. Promoting human rights and the impact of CAMR on innovation were hardly discussed. With the Departments of Industry Canada and International Trade as the lead institutions, the goals of protecting intellectual property and ensuring good trade relations with the United States appear to have taken priority over encouraging generic competition to achieve drug affordability. The result was a more limited interpretation of patent flexibilities under the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision. The most striking finding is the minimal discussion over the potential barriers developing country beneficiaries might face when attempting to use compulsory licensing, including their reluctance to use TRIPS flexibilities, their desire to pursue technological development and the constraints inherent in the WTO Paragraph 6 Decision. Instead, these issues were raised in 2007, which can be partly accounted for by a greater representation of the interests of potential beneficiary country governments. While the Government attempted to strike a balance between drug affordability and intellectual property protection, it designed CAMR as a last resort measure. Increased input from the developing country beneficiaries and shifting to institutions where the right to health gets prioritized may lead to policies that better achieves affordable drug access.