Les technologies de stimulations transcrâniennes – tel que la tDCS ou la TMS – présentent à l’heure actuelle d’intéressantes perspectives thérapeutiques, tout comme diverses améliorations cognitives chez le sujet « non-malade » dont découlent des applications neuroamélioratives, plus ou moins imminentes, en dehors du cadre clinique ou investigatoire. Est proposé ici d’analyser les risques associés à ces applications, détournées des objectifs premiers de recherche, et aux préoccupations éthiques qui les accompagnent (autonomie, justice, intégrité physique), via un concept généralement associé aux recherches avec des perspectives de sécurité nationale et associées à un niveau de risque élevé. Révisant la trivialité d’une définition dichotomique aux usages « bons » et « mauvais », est proposé d’étendre le concept de « double-usage » pour l’appliquer à la neuroamélioration comme un mésusage de la recherche en neurosciences. Faisant référence au conflit entre, d’une part, le respect de la liberté académique et, d’autre part, la protection de la sécurité et de la santé publique, ce concept s’avère être un outil diagnostique pertinent pour l’évaluation des risques associés à l’usage mélioratif desdites technologies, et plus particulièrement de la tDCS, afin d’alimenter la réflexion sur la régulation de ces dispositifs en amont de leur utilisation, selon un principe de précaution inhérent au double-usage de la recherche. Ce concept permet ainsi de réfléchir à la mise en place d’une gouvernance proactive et contextualisée impliquant une responsabilité partagée d’un large panel d’acteurs, nécessaire au vu des avancées rapides du domaine des neurosciences et de l’imminence de l’arrivée sur le marché de ces dispositifs. / Transcranial stimulation technologies – such as tDCS and TMS – currently provide promising therapeutic outcomes, as well as various cognitive improvements in healthy individuals, leading to different and relatively prospective neuroenhancement applications outside clinical or research contexts. In this thesis, a concept that has typically been associated with research regarding national security implications and prospects associated with a high level of risk – i.e., the concept of “dual-use” – will be deployed to analyze the risks of neuroscience applications being diverted from their primary research objectives, along with the related ethical concerns (e.g., autonomy, justice, physical integrity). By revising the dichotomous definition of dual-use research as involving either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ uses, I propose to extend the concept in order to consider neuroenhancement as a misuse of neuroscience research, with reference to the conflict between, on the one hand, protecting academic freedom and progress, and on the other, promoting security and public health. This concept is a pertinent diagnostic tool for the evaluation of risks associated with a neuroenhancement use of those technologies – and more especially tDCS – when considering how best to regulate these devices prior to the appearance of their utilisation, due to the precautionary principle inherent in dual-use research. This concept can also help to set out proactive and contextualized governance mechanisms based on the shared responsibility of a broad range of stakeholders, something that is necessary given the rapid advances in neuroscience research and the imminence of such devices coming onto the market.

This thesis explores the politics of biosecurity and the governance of dual-use research. It focuses on life sciences, whose rapid development brings together the issues of biological weapons, terrorism, and the dangers of scientific innovations. The thesis has three goals: first, to situate the dilemma of dual-use research historically and conceptually, second, to analyse how the attempts to govern biosecurity and regulate dual-use research in life sciences affect the relations between science and security, and third, to discuss what implications this science-security nexus has for the politics of (in)security. Approaching the subject from critical security studies, the thesis looks at how the nexus between science and security is constructed. It does so, first, by exploring the dominant political and expert discourses on biosecurity and by looking at two distinct empirical sites, which exemplify how a regime of biosecurity governance evolves at a boundary of science and security in a 'global' and 'local' context: the international biological weapons regime and the Czech system of biosecurity management. The thesis finds that the attempts to govern dual-use research in life sciences focus not only on materials and technologies but also on scientific knowledge. It conceptualizes dual-use as a problem of...