This study begins with the observation that three similar states - Denmark, Norway and Sweden - have had different EC/EU policies, and that one of the foreign policy literature's most interesting approaches, domestic structures analysis, does not shed light on this variation. The goal of the study is to develop an understanding of the different policies by analyzing the question of EC/EU membership using an approach in which issue area, defined in terms of both substance and impact, is linked to policy process and policy choice. Substantive issue area is studied by analyzing parliamentary debates in the three countries. An issue area typology with four substantive categories - economic, political/ policy, international/security, and other — is used to classify arguments made in the debates. The analysis shows that the question was an economic and political issue in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 1990s. It was a security issue in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s. It is argued that this variation helps explain variation in EC/EU policy. In particular, the findings support the argument that the importance of the substantive definition of the EC/EU question is related to the coalitional possibilities it creates. The size of the coalition has, in turn, an impact on policy process and outcome. When the coalitions are large, the process moves more quickly, and parliaments and political parties tend to be consulted or informed rather than active participants. The question of EC/EU membership is also analyzed using an impact typology in which questions are classified as generating one of three types of conflict: none, managed and unmanaged. The EC/EU membership question is classified on the basis of public opinion data and conflict or agreement within political parties. The analysis shows that there were three cases in which the EC/EU question created managed conflict: Denmark and Sweden in the 1960s and Sweden in the 1970s. In other cases, conflict was unmanaged. In an analysis of the importance of variation with regard to type of conflict, it is argued that the data support the hypothesis that the existence of unmanaged conflict is related to decisions to call referenda to decide the membership question. In the face of unmanaged conflict political elites were encouraged to give authority for decision making over to voters. This was, in turn, linked to the emergence of ad hoc organizations dedicated to influencing public opinion for or against membership. This study suggests that the issue areas approach can offer important contributions to the analysis of foreign policy. A challenge for future research is to analyze how issue areas and domestic structure interact to generate policy process and outcome. Central questions should include the relative importance of the two and analyses of the conditions under which one or the other is likely to dominate. / digitalisering@umu

Réinscrivant le processus d’intégration européenne dans une Histoire de la Guerre froide et post-Guerre froide et plus généralement dans une histoire européenne plus longue que le seul XXe siècle, cette thèse explore l’histoire des relations de la Commission européenne avec la périphérie sud-orientale du continent. La longue période chronologique étudiée permets de mettre en exergue les « forces profondes » qui se tiennent derrières les actions de l’exécutif de la CEE/UE dans une région critique pour l’Europe. Pour se faire, nous nous sommes basés sur les archives de la Commission européenne, du Conseil, du Département d’État américain, des Ministères des affaires étrangères français et britannique, de la bibliothèque de Cluj-Napoca en Roumanie et d’entretiens.Divisée en quatre parties, chacune se centrant sur une période chronologique, ce travail analyse l’action de la Commission face aux changements qui ont bouleversé l’Europe du Sud-est entre 1960 et 2010. L’adaptation constante de la politique de la Commission, de la « doctrine de l’Association » à la Synergie de la Mer Noire, nous ont amené à développer l’idée d’une Süd-ost politik qui se met en place dès le début des années 1960. Cependant, contrairement à l’Ostpolitik de Bonn, il ne s’agit pas pour Bruxelles d’aller vers les États communistes du Sud-est européen ou l’Union soviétique, mais plutôt de lutter contre leur influence. La Süd-Ost politik communautaire est clairement anticommuniste et antirusse.La Communauté fait barrage à Moscou en étendant le modèle de la démocratie libérale capitaliste dans la zone autour des Détroits. La situation stratégique d’Athènes, d’Ankara et plus tard de Tbilissi ou Kiev n’est pas oubliée par Bruxelles. Ainsi, la Commission s’inscrit dans une plus longue histoire, son action fait écho à la lutte entre Paris, Londres et Saint-Pétersbourg pour le contrôle des Détroits, aux tentatives des États de la région de copier les modèles nationaux d’Europe de l’Ouest et à la politique orientale des Puissances occidentales après 1918.Cependant, la Commission doit ménager des État membres qui lui rappellent sans cesse que ces actions doivent rester limitées aux traités. L’Avis sur la Grèce en 1976 marque le point culminant de ce débat entre Conseil et Commission. Parallèlement, au cours des années 1970, Bruxelles veille à ne pas laisser émerger dans sa périphérie des organisations qui pourraient la concurrencer. Il en sera ainsi de la Conférence pour la coopération et la sécurité en Europe et de son volet méditerranéen mais aussi de la Coopération Balkanique.Si la chute de l’Union soviétique fait naitre des hésitations sur la conduite à suivre vis-à-vis de l’Europe du Sud-est et sa nouvelle extension vers le Caucase et dans les anciennes républiques soviétiques. Bien vite la Commission revient à sa politique d’extension du modèle européen. Cependant, le centre des préoccupations communautaire n’est plus la Grèce ou la Turquie. Avec l’effondrement de l’Empire soviétique, le champ d’action de la Communauté -devenue Union- s’est élargi à l’ensemble de la Région Mer Noire.Pourtant, la non résolution du problème de Chypre, l’instabilité financière de la Grèce, les crises politiques turques, le maintien hors de Schengen de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie sont des exemples des difficultés rencontrées par la Communauté dans la région.La guerre en Géorgie et l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie à la suite de la révolution à Kiev illustrent que le processus « doux » d’inoculation des valeurs du Traité de Rome ne va pas de soi du moment que celui-ci rencontre une opposition « dure ». Nous achevons notre réflexion en nous posant la question de la capacité de l’Union et de la Commission à absorber à terme l’ensemble de la Mer Noire ce qui mettrait la Mésopotamie et l’Asie centrale en contact direct avec le processus d’intégration européenne.Il s’agit maintenant de savoir si la Mer Noire deviendra un " lac Européen". / Fitting the European integration process into the history of the Cold War and post-Cold War and more generally in European history longer than the “short” twentieth century, this thesis explores the history of relations between the European Commission and the South-Eastern outskirts of the continent. The long period studied allows to highlight the "deep forces" that stand behind the actions of the executive of the EEC / EU in such a critical region for Europe. To do so, we relied on the archives of the European Commission, the Council, the U.S. State Department, the British and French Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the library of Cluj-Napoca University in Romania and interviews.Divided into four parts, each focusing on a period of time, this work analyses the actions of the Commission to address the changes that have transformed the region between 1960 and 2010. The continuous adaptation of the policy of the Commission, from the "doctrine of Association” to the Black Sea Synergy, led us to develop the idea of a Süd-ost politik that was already designed in the early 1960s. However, unlike the Ostpolitik of Bonn, Brussels did not go toward the communist states of South-Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, but rather prevent their influence. The Community’ Süd-Ost politik was clearly anti-communist and anti-Russian.This is the main continuity: the European Community had to block Moscow by extending the model of capitalist liberal democracy in the area around the Straits. The particular strategic situation of Athens, Ankara and later Tbilisi or Kiev is never forgotten by Brussels. In this, the Commission is part of a longer history, its action echoes the struggle between Paris, London and St. Petersburg for the control of the Turkish Straits, attempts by states in the region to copy Western European domestic models and the Eastern policy of the Western powers after the First World War.However, the Commission had to deal with the Member States that constantly reminded Brussels that its actions should remain within the framework of the Treaties. The Opinion on Greece in 1976 marks the culmination of the debate between the Council and Commission. Meanwhile, during the 1970s, the EEC executive carefully took care to stop the emergence of organizations in its periphery that could compete with the Community. This will be the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Mediterranean component but also the Balkan Cooperation.In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the Commission was uncertain of what to do with South Eastern Europe and its new extension to the Caucasus and the former Soviet republics. The Commission quickly returned to its systematic policy of extending the European model. However, the centre of community concerns was not Greece or Turkey. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the scope of the Community –became Union- expanded to the entire Black Sea region.However, the failure to resolve the Cyprus problem, the financial instability of Greece that threatens the entire euro zone, political crises in Turkey, the decision to keep out of Schengen space Romania and Bulgaria are examples of the difficulties faced by the Community in the region.The war in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea by Russia following the revolution in Kiev illustrate that the “soft” inoculation process of the values of the Rome Treaty does not come by itself as long as it meets a “hard” opposition.We conclude our discussion by asking the question of the capacity of the Union and its Commission to absorb eventually the whole Black Sea basin, which would put Mesopotamia and Central Asia in direct contact with the European integration process.The question is now whether the Black Sea will eventually become a “European lake