Thesis (Ph. D.)--Princeton University, 1935. / Bibliography: p. 91.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Leaf 329 is folded. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 363-393).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1961. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas State University Libraries

Abstract: This dissertation asks: Why do autocrats expand the freedoms enjoyed by their domestic media outlets when it would seem to be against their interests to do so? Some research suggests that private capital investments and other non-state sources of revenue are crucial to expanding the bounds of media discourse. I argue that private money alone cannot produce such developments, instead, increased press freedom can be observed when the economic reforms create the opportunity for a new class of entrepreneurs, interested in funding media ventures, to enter government. From this position they may push for opportunities to expand the media environment. Hosni Mubarak’s presidency in Egypt provides a useful lens to study changes in press freedom under autocracy. The introduction of private capital into the Egyptian newspaper industry in two recent decades resulted in different levels of press freedom. In the 1990s press freedom was unaffected by the influx of private money into this sector, but there was a marked increase in press freedom in the 2000s when a wave of new privately-owned dailies joined their state-owned counterparts on Egyptian newsstands. The introduction of economic reforms, especially privatization of state industries, created the opportunities for the expanded class of entrepreneurs to enter politics and the economic incentives to increase the freedom of the press. The dissertation expands our existing understandings of the political and economic context under which economic liberalizations can lead to political liberalizations. It suggests that political science can improve its understanding of these dynamics by considering individual political liberalizations, rather than just democratization, when seeking to understand the impact of economic reforms. / text

This thesis examines technological and social mechanisms of British imperial water control as created and managed by British irrigation engineers in Egypt between 1882 and 1914. In the aftermath of the British military conquest of the Ottoman colony, irrigation engineering was lauded as a way to make Egypt prosperous and financially solvent through the growth and sale of cash-crop cotton on the global market. The irrigation engineers who transferred into Egypt in the wake of the British occupation to enact this revivification of irrigation were Indian-experienced military engineers; these Royal Engineers officers and their British superiors in Egypt and the Foreign Office enacted the principles of late nineteenth century liberal economy, including the construction of large-scale public works. The British engineers imported their Indian experiences when they transferred to the Egyptian Irrigation Department. Their engineering epistemologies included economic frugality, an emphasis and reliance on hydraulic science, and skepticism of the viability of local irrigation practices. Permanent dams were built or reconstructed across the Nile at Cairo (Delta Barrage, 1887-1890) and at Aswan (Aswan Dam, 1898-1902). With these structures, among other major projects, the engineers created a system of water control that extended their abilities to manage the Nile and local irrigation practices. Always chaotic, contingent, and geographically and temporally specific, the engineers forced Egyptian peasants, cash crop cotton, and the Nile into the interconnected web of politics, economics, and science that was transnational British imperialism. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2013-01-04 12:28:11.274

This thesis examines technological and social mechanisms of British imperial water control as created and managed by British irrigation engineers in Egypt between 1882 and 1914. In the aftermath of the British military conquest of the Ottoman colony, irrigation engineering was lauded as a way to make Egypt prosperous and financially solvent through the growth and sale of cash-crop cotton on the global market. The irrigation engineers who transferred into Egypt in the wake of the British occupation to enact this revivification of irrigation were Indian-experienced military engineers; these Royal Engineers officers and their British superiors in Egypt and the Foreign Office enacted the principles of late nineteenth century liberal economy, including the construction of large-scale public works. The British engineers imported their Indian experiences when they transferred to the Egyptian Irrigation Department. Their engineering epistemologies included economic frugality, an emphasis and reliance on hydraulic science, and skepticism of the viability of local irrigation practices. Permanent dams were built or reconstructed across the Nile at Cairo (Delta Barrage, 1887-1890) and at Aswan (Aswan Dam, 1898-1902). With these structures, among other major projects, the engineers created a system of water control that extended their abilities to manage the Nile and local irrigation practices. Always chaotic, contingent, and geographically and temporally specific, the engineers forced Egyptian peasants, cash crop cotton, and the Nile into the interconnected web of politics, economics, and science that was transnational British imperialism. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2013-01-04 12:28:11.274

Proefschrift--Groningen. / "Stellingen" ([2] p.) laid in. Includes bibliographical references. "Afkortingen": p. [128]-130.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Hamburg. / Includes bibliographical references (p. xi-xiv).