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A construção das representações de identidade latino-americana no telejornalismo brasileiro : enquadramentos da cobertura eleitoral no Repórter Brasil Noite e Jornal Nacional /Godoy, Jéssica Monteiro de. January 2018 (has links)
Orientador: Maria Cristina Gobbi / Banca: Antonio Francisco Magnoni / Banca: Dennis de Oliveira / Resumo: No conjunto da radiodifusão e da comunicação de massa brasileiros destacam-se duas emissoras de televisão com histórias diferentes e perfis teoricamente distintos: Rede Globo e TV Brasil. A primeira, comercial, inaugura suas transmissões em 1965, acompanhando um projeto de desenvolvimento e nacionalismo do regime militar. A última, pública, nasce com a criação da EBC, em 2007, após uma luta de setores da sociedade civil organizada e acadêmicos que remete à redemocratização em 1985. Quando associamos o jornalismo a essas emissoras, destacamos dois programas da grade: Jornal Nacional (JN) e Repórter Brasil Noite (RBN). Inaugurado em 1969, foi ganhando espaço e expressividade ao longo dos anos, o JN tornou-se o principal carro-chefe do jornalismo da emissora. Também principal telejornal da emissora pública, a segunda edição diária do Repórter Brasil, nasceu no mesmo ano da TV Brasil. O tema 'América Latina' muitas vezes é esquecido da pauta jornalística brasileira, quando não marginalizado. Desse modo, a pesquisa pretende explicar a forma como esses telejornais representam a identidade latino-americana ao público brasileiro, reforçando ou rompendo estereótipos, fortalecendo ou não a sociedade, a cultura, a política e a economia da região. Para isso, analisamos as últimas coberturas de eleição para presidente em quatro países: Argentina, Bolívia, Chile e Venezuela. São priorizadas as matérias sobre o desfecho da corrida eleitoral, o resultado eleitoral, uma vez que consideramos o... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Resumen: En el conjunto de la radiodifusión y de la comunicación masiva brasileros se destacan dos cadenas de televisión con historias diferentes y perfiles teóricamente distintos: Rede Globo y TV Brasil. La primera, privada, inaugura sus transmisiones en 1965, siguiendo un proyecto de desarrollo y nacionalismo del régimen militar. La última, pública, nace con la creación de EBC, en 2007, luego de una lucha de sectores de la sociedad civil organizada y académicos que remite a la democratización en 1985. Cuando vinculamos el periodismo a eses canales, destacamos dos programas de la grilla: Jornal Nacional (JN) y Repórter Brasil Noite (RBN). Inaugurado en 1969, ganó espacio y expresividad a lo largo de los años, el JN se volvió el principal telediario de la emisora. También principal telediario de la emisora pública, la segunda edición diaria del Repórter Brasil, nació en el mismo año que TV Brasil. El tema ―América Latina‖ muchas veces es olvidado de la agenda periodística brasilera, cuando no marginalizado. De este modo, la investigación pretende explicar la forma como esos telediarios representan la identidad latino-americana al público brasilero, reforzando o rompiendo estereotipos, fortaleciendo o no la sociedad, la cultura, la política y la economía de la región. Para tal, analizamos las últimas coberturas de elección para presidente en cuatro países: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile e Venezuela. Son priorizadas las noticias acerca del desfecho de la marcha electoral, el resultado electo... (Resumen completo clicar acceso eletrônico abajo) / Mestre
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Counting the vote : an interactive study of Electoral College reform /Hribar, Joe. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 25-26).
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Parties, process, and Nurani Hati how the Indonesian press constructed the 2004 elections /Reimers, Teresa M. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 144-156)
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An examination of the La Crosse press and the Republican Party in the Wisconsin election of 1904 : a seminar paper ... /McQuin, James M. January 1972 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, 1972. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 33-34).
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What causes election-related conflict within democracies :a case study of LesothoTlohang Willie Letsie January 2009 (has links)
<p>This research sought to understand the nature of election-related conflict and what needs to be done to arrest the eruption of such conflict in Lesotho. It sought the opinions of selectively respondents who have been involved in the conflicts in different ways. The interviews and documented literature revealed that what constitutes a background to election-related conflict involves issues that are many and varied. Among others such issues include the following: weak political institutions, use of vulgar language by political leadership, and the weak economy that intensifies neo-patrimonial tendencies. The research concluded that all the factors associated with the eruption of illegitimate conflicts during and after general elections in Lesotho are a result of the politicians&rsquo / desire to retain or capture national resources to satisfy their selfish interests and those of their cronies. The conflicts could be minimised if the country&rsquo / s economy could be transformed to provide the politicians with alternatives of economic survival outside the structures of government. Furthermore, to minimise the conflict, the country should consider establishing electoral courts. These have the potential of speeding up the resolution of electoral grievances, in the process preventing them from graduating into serious conflicts.</p>
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Elections, Information, and Political Survival in AutocraciesRozenas, Arturas January 2012 (has links)
<p>Chapter 1: Forcing Consent: Information and Power in Non-Democratic Elections. Why do governments hold elections that lack credibility? What explains variation in repression levels across non-democratic elections? While the literature has suggested many explanations for elections in autocracies, it has not yet provided a theory that would explain both the incidence of non-democratic elections and the variation in their degree of competitiveness. In this paper, we build an informational model of non-democratic elections explaining when elections may stabilize an autocrat's rule and when they may fail to do so. We argue that to achieve stability, elections must yield a sufficiently high vote-share for the incumbent and be optimally repressive. The degree of optimal repression is shown to increase with the incumbent's expected popularity. The model is then applied to explain some stylized facts about non-democratic elections and to derive a set of novel research hypotheses about the effects of non-democratic elections, variation in electoral repression, and fraud technology. We test the chief implication of the model using an original dataset on political arrests in the Soviet Union. We find that even if elections present no choice, they reduce the expression of anti-government sentiments. </p><p>Chapter 2: A Ballot Under the Sword: Political Security and the Quality of Elections in Autocracies. What explains the democratic quality of elections outside established democracies? We argue that when a government does not have to convince the opposition of its wide support in the society, it holds repressive elections. Conversely, when a government needs to send a strong signal about its popularity, it takes a riskier strategy of holding more competitive, and hence more informative elections. Using cross-national panel data, we find that the incumbents facing political insecurity -- measured through the incidence of economic crises and coup threats -- tend to hold higher quality elections than their more secure counterparts. In addition, via structural equation modeling, we find evidence that economic crises affect the quality of elections only indirectly through increased political insecurity. These findings reject the conventional view that autocrats use electoral repression when they are afraid of losing due to low expected support. This analysis has important implications for modernization theory and for understanding the role of political and economic instability in the democratization process.</p><p>Chapter 3: The Calculus of Dissent: Rigged Elections, Information, and Post-Election Stability. Why do some elections result in concession speeches while others spiral into protests, riots, and conflicts? This paper draws attention to the informational content of the electoral process and its outcome. We argue that elections induce stability when they communicate that the winners are truly popular and derive several novel predictions as to when such communication can succeed or fail. First, unfair elections lead to instability only if they are won by slim margins. Second, excessively large victory margins increase instability \emph{irrespective} of the unfairness of elections. The theory is then applied to explain the incidence of post-election protests across the world and the patterns of mandate denial in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that structural conditions (e.g., poverty and ethnic diversity) contribute little to post-election instability. Instead, the quality of elections and their results affect post-election politics in an interactive and non-linear fashion as predicted by the model. </p><p>Chapter 4: An Experimental Study of Fraudulent Elections and the Post-Election Protests. How can a winner of elections marred by fraud and voter intimidation convince the loser that he has large support in the society? Using an experimental setting, this paper studies how the information about election results and the competitiveness of the electoral process affect citizens' beliefs about the true popularity of the government and, subsequently, the success of a protest. We theoretically derive and evaluate the following hypotheses: (1) There will be no information update if elections are sufficiently manipulative and are won with great margins; (2) There will be positive updating in elections with medium levels of manipulation and high vote margin for the government; (3) There will be negative information updating if elections are highly manipulative but do not yield high margin for the government. We find relatively strong support for the first two hypotheses but none for the last one. The study also points to difficulties in studying rigged elections experimentally. The first difficulty has to do with the heterogeneity of the experimental population and the second one with the operationalization of electoral manipulation in a laboratory environment.</p> / Dissertation
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Applying spatial theory to new democracies : a model for analyzing aggregate election data /Zhang, Chian-fan, January 1999 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-183). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.
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Increasing trust in Vancouver's municipal government /MacIver, Patricia. January 2006 (has links)
Project (M.P.P.) - Simon Fraser University, 2006. / Theses (Master of Public Policy Program) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.
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Range voting is resistant to control /Menton, Curtis. January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).
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Sociología electoral valenciana (1903-1923) (las elecciones en Valencia durante el reinado de Alfonso XIII) /Aguiló Lúcia, Luis, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis--Barcelona, 1975. / "Catedra Fadrique Furio Ceriol, Facultad de Derecho, Valencia, 8." Includes bibliographical references (p. 437-442).
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