Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-40). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-40). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 275-285).

As the economy of the international community becomes consistently more integrated, states and international organizations often look toward economic methods to serve as alternative policy options in resolving international disputes. The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the use of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. The increase in the number of economic sanction regimes and the question of their efficacy in achieving political goals has become a key issue for policymakers and political analysts. Statistical research based upon case studies reports that sanctions are often limited in achieving primary foreign policy goals. Why then, if sanctions are commonly reported to be unsuccessful in achieving their primary political objectives do policymakers continue to use them at such a high rate? The purpose of the study is to show that the traditional criteria for defining success has been too narrow. Success has often been determined by compliance with immediate primary goals. The thesis will argue that economic sanctions are effective in achieving important secondary goals such as signaling or bargaining incentives, and therefore may have a higher success rate than previously assumed.