Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2014. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 135-140). / Chapter 1 (co-authored with Ali Choudhary) exploits exogenous variation in the amount of public information available to banks about a firm to empirically evaluate the importance of adverse selection in the credit market. A 2006 reform introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) reduced the amount of public information available to Pakistani banks about a firm's creditworthiness. Prior to 2006, the SBP published credit information not only about the firm in question but also (aggregate) credit information about the firm's group (where the group was defined as the set of all firms that shared one or more director with the firm in question). After the reform, the SBP stopped providing the aggregate group-level information. We propose a model with differentially informed banks and adverse selection, which generates predictions on how this reform is expected to affect a bank's willingness to lend. The model predicts that adverse selection leads less informed banks to reduce lending compared to more informed banks. We construct a measure for the amount of information each lender has about a firm's group using the set of firm-bank lending pairs prior to the reform. We empirically show those banks with private information about a firm lent relatively more to that firm than other, less-informed banks following the reform. Remarkably, this reduction in lending by less informed banks is true even for banks that had a pre-existing relationship with the firm, suggesting that the strength of prior relationships does not eliminate the problem of imperfect information. Chapter 2 examines the provision of public goods in developing countries is a central challenge. This paper studies a model where each agent's effort provides heterogeneous benefits to the others, inducing a network of opportunities for favor-trading. We focus on a classical efficient benchmark - the Lindahl solution - that can be derived from a bargaining game. Does the optimistic assumption that agents use an efficient mechanism (rather than succumbing to the tragedy of the commons) imply incentives for efficient investment in the technology that is used to produce the public goods? To show that the answer is no in general, we give comparative statics of the Lindahl solution which have natural network interpretations. We then suggest some welfare-improving interventions. In chapter 3 (co-authored with Robert Townsend) we present a tractable model of platform competition in a Walrasian equilibrium. Rochet and Tirole (2003) sparked a decade of extensive study on two-sided markets. However, the analysis of two-sided markets with multiple platforms has been largely ignored. We endogenize the size of each platform for different utility functions, different types of agents, and different levels of capital. Contrary to the prior literature, our economy is efficient - platforms internalize the network effects of adding more users by offering bundles which state both the number of users and the price to join the platform. Further, we show that the first and second welfare theorems are still able to be applied. Our model suggests how the equilibrium characterization of two-sided markets changes when we alter the cost structure or wealth of agents and subsequently we analyse the welfare implications of various placebo interventions. / by Anil Jain. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 128). / by Lars Andreas Stole. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2016. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 223-231). / This thesis consists of three chapters on microeconomic issues of firms in developing countries and the impact of government policies on business growth. The first chapter examines firms' incentive to establish a reputation for quality. A key problem in developing countries is the lack of reliable provision of high quality goods and services. I designed an experiment to understand this phenomenon in a setting that features typical market conditions in a developing country: the retail watermelon market in a major Chinese city. I begin by demonstrating empirically that there is substantial asymmetric information between sellers and buyers on sweetness, the key indicator of quality for watermelons, yet sellers do not sort and price watermelons by quality. I then randomly introduce one of two branding technologies into 40 out of 60 markets-one sticker label that is widely used and often counterfeited and one novel laser-cut label. I track sellers' quality, pricing and sales over an entire season and collect household panel purchasing data to examine the demand side's response. I find that laser branding induced sellers to provide higher quality and led to higher sales profits, establishing that reputational incentives are present and can be made to pay. However, after the intervention was withdrawn, all markets reverted back to baseline. To rationalize the experimental findings, I build an empirical model of consumer learning and seller reputation. The results indicate that information frictions and fragmented markets lead to significant under-provision of quality in this setting. Though there is a high demand for quality, trust could take a long time to establish under the existing branding technology, which makes reputation building a low return investment. While the new branding technology enhances consumer learning, small individual sellers do not have the incentive to invest in this technology due to their small market size and market competition. The second chapter (co-authored with Seema Jayachandran, Edmund J. Malesky and Benjamin Olken) considers how local governments' bribe extraction could interact with firms' growth. We propose a model in which government officials' choice of how much bribe money to extract from firms is modulated by inter-jurisdictional competition. The model predicts that economic growth decreases the rate of bribe extraction under plausible assumptions, with the benefit to officials of demanding a given share of revenue as bribes outweighed by the increased risk that firms will move elsewhere. A second prediction is that the negative effect of growth on bribery is larger if firms are more mobile. We find empirical support for these predictions. In particular, we employ two instrumental variables strategies-one based on growth in a firm's industry in other provinces within Vietnam and another based on industry growth in neighboring China and find that growth causes a decrease in bribe extraction. Our results suggest that as poor countries grow, corruption could subside on "its own." Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that the effect is for firms whose property rights to their land are transferable and who have operations in multiple provinces, two proxies for geographic mobility. The third chapter examines the impact of internal trade barriers on firms' performance and export activities. It is well known that various forms of non-tariff barriers exist among Chinese provinces. However, empirically, it is difficult to measure these barriers because they can take many forms. I take advantage of an export VAT rebate policy reform in 2004 as a natural experiment to identify the existence of internal trade barriers and study the impact on TFP and resource allocation. In particular, as a result of shifting tax rebate burdens, the 2004 reform leads to a greater incentive for the provincial governments to block the domestic flow of non-local goods related to exporting. I find that foreign trade companies in the coastal region become more "inward-looking" in the years after the reform, consistent with rising local trade barriers. The value of exports through intermediaries grows less in the inland region relative to the coastal region, and the negative effect is larger in inland provinces with greater exposure to the reform, measured using baseline reliance on trade through intermediaries. I extend the standard open-economy heterogeneous firm model by adding an intermediary sector as in Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei (2011) but with a new focus on the intermediary's role of domestic sourcing. The model can be used to analyze general equilibrium effects, examine firms' entry and exit into exporting, and quantify the distortion on TFP. / by Jie Bai. / Ph. D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 189-198). / This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies the interaction between the ex-ante production of assets and ex-post adverse selection in financial markets. Positive shocks that increase market liquidity and prices exacerbate the production of low-quality assets and can increase the likelihood of a financial market collapse. An increase in government bonds increases total liquidity and reduces the incentives to produce bad assets, but can exacerbate adverse selection in private asset markets. Optimal policy balances these two effects, requiring more issuances when the liquidity premium is high. I also study transaction taxes and asset purchases, showing that policy should lean against the wind of market liquidity. Chapter 2, joint work with David Colino and Pascual Restrepo, studies how consumer durables amplify business cycle fluctuations. We show that employment in durable manufacturing industries is more cyclical than in other industries, and that this cyclicality is amplified in general equilibrium. We provide evidence of three mechanisms that generate amplification. First, employment changes propagate through input-output linkages. Second, the reduction of employment in durables negatively affects employment in non-tradable sectors. Third, workers do not completely reallocate to other less cyclical tradable industries. Chapter 3, joint work with Dejanir Silva, studies how the level, maturity structure and characteristics of government debt affects the severity of crises and the effectiveness of stabilization policies. We find that both fiscal and monetary policies become less powerful in high debt economies, and that in response to a preference shock that pushes the economy into a liquidity trap, high debt economies experience larger and more prolonged recessions. Long-term bonds and indexed debt improve the effectiveness of stabilization policies. / by Nicolás Eduardo Caramp. / 1. Sowing the Seeds of Financial Crises: Endogenous Asset Creation and Adverse Selection -- 2. Durable Crises (joint with David Colino and Pascual Restrepo) -- 3. Fiscal Fragility (joint with Dejanir Silva). / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-100). / by Daniel Anthony LaGattuta. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-139). / by Lucia Andrews Nixon. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references. / In this dissertation, I provide evidence of the causal impact on mortgage supply of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the "Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) Act", laws requiring banks and the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), respectively, to help improve credit access for low-income households and neighborhoods. While financial markets evolved rapidly since the early 1990's, I use discontinuities in the laws' eligibility rules to identify their effects. To implement the analyses, I use a census of mortgage applications collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Overall, these programs appear to have had limited impact. I first analyze CRA's effect on mortgage lending in targeted neighborhoods: census tracts with a median family income (MFI) under 80% of MSA MFI. The regression discontinuity (RD) estimates suggest an overall credit supply shift of at least $6 billion ($2007) from 1994 and 2002 in targeted neighborhoods. In addition to CRA's direct effect on bank lending, I also find that unregulated institutions lend more in targeted tracts ("crowd-in"). Further analysis suggests that information spillovers from increased bank lending helps generate crowd-in. In Chapter 2, I examine CRA's effect on home purchase mortgage lending to households with income under 80% of the MSA MFI. In both Chapters 1 and 2, I find CRA's impact is concentrated in the largest MSAs, where enforcement is most intense. The RD estimates indicate that CRA caused a 6% increase in large MSA bank home purchase lending at the cutoff. / (cont.) Unlike in Chapter 1, there is no theoretical basis for crowd-in and none is found. Nor do I find that banks crowd-out unregulated institutions. Finally, I measure the impact of one of the three goals established under the GSE Act. Under this goal the GSEs target census tracts with MFI under 90% of MSA MFI. The RD estimates suggest this goal led to a 3-4% increase in GSE purchases, and increased GSE-eligible originations by 2-3% at the cutoff. Unlike previous research, I find no evidence that the GSEs crowd-out FHA and subprime loans. The results imply a lower bound of the goal's impact of $2.4 billion between 1997 and 2002. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2014. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-207). / This thesis consists of three chapters on optimal tax theory with endogenous wages. Chapter 1 studies optimal linear and nonlinear income taxation when firms do not know workers' abilities, and competitively screen them through nonlinear compensation contracts, unobservable to the government, in a Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium. Adverse selection changes the optimal tax formulas because of the use of work hours as a screening tool, which for higher talent workers results in a "rat race," and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross-subsidies. If the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals, welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not. The model has practical implications for the interpretation, estimation, and use of taxable income elasticities, central to optimal tax design. Chapter 2 derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a dynamic life cycle model with risky human capital formation through monetary expenses and training time. The government faces asymmetric information regarding the stochastic ability of agents and labor supply. When the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital, the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base, and falls with age. The optimal tax treatment of training time also depends on its interactions with contemporaneous and future labor supply. Income contingent loans, and a tax scheme with deferred deductibility of human capital expenses can implement the optimum. Numerical results suggest that full dynamic risk-adjusted deductibility of expenses is close to optimal, and that simple linear age-dependent policies can achieve most of the welfare gain from the second best. Chapter 3 considers dynamic optimal income, education, and bequest taxes in a Barro- Becker dynastic setup. Each generation is subject to idiosyncratic preference and productivity shocks. Parents can transfer resources to their children either through education investments, which improve the child's wage, or through financial bequests. I derive optimal linear tax formulas as functions of estimable sufficient statistics, robust to underlying heterogeneities in preferences. It is in general not optimal to make education expenses fully tax deductible. I also show how to derive equivalent formulas using reform-specific elasticities that can be targeted to already available estimates from existing reforms. / by Stefanie Stantcheva. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-134). / by Haralabos E. Gakidis. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / The essays in this thesis study the implications of weak financial institutions for economic growth, allocation of resources, and economic development. Methodologically, the essays draw on a broad range of theoretical and empirical tools from both macro and microeconomics. Many currently and previously developing countries have adopted industrial policies that push resources towards certain "strategic" sectors, and the economic reasoning behind such polices is not well understood. In Chapter 1, I construct a model of a production network where firms purchase intermediate goods from each other in the presence of credit constraints. These credit constraints distort input choices, thereby reducing equilibrium demand for upstream goods and creating a wedge between the potential sales ("influence") and actual sales by upstream sectors. I analyze policy interventions and show that, under weak functional form restrictions, the ratio between a sector's influence and sales is a sufficient statistic that guides the choice of production and credit subsidies. Using firm-level production data from China, I estimate my sufficient statistic for each sector and show that it correlates with proxy measures of government interventions into the sector. Using a panel of cross-country input-output tables and sectoral production tax rates, I show that the tax rates for developing countries in Asia also correlate with the model-implied intervention measure. In joint work with Benjamin Roth, Chapter 2 offers a new explanation for why microcredit and other forms of informal finance have so far failed to catalyze business growth among small scale entrepreneurs in the developing world, despite their high return to capital. We present a theory of informal lending that highlights two features of informal credit markets that cause them to operate inefficiently. First, borrowers and lenders bargain not only over division of surplus but also over contractual flexibility (the ease with which the borrower can invest to grow her business). Second, when the borrower's business becomes sufficiently large she exits the informal lending relationship and enters the formal sector-an undesirable event for her informal lender. We show that in Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium these two features lead to a poverty trap and study its properties. The theory facilitates reinterpretation of a number of empirical facts about microcredit: business growth resulting from microfinance is low on average but high for businesses that are already relatively large, and microlenders have experienced low demand for credit. The theory features nuanced comparative statics which provide a testable prediction and for which we establish novel empirical support. Using the Townsend Thai data and plausibly exogenous variation to the level of competition Thai money lenders face, we show that as predicted by our theory, money lenders in high competition environments impose fewer contractual restrictions on their borrowers. We discuss robustness and policy implications. Motivated by the explosive growth of microfinance in India and the eventual collapse of the industry following the default crisis in 2010, my joint work with Daniel Green in Chapter 3 provides a theory that explains how institutional weakness in credit markets can fail to stimulate development even when there is ample credit supply. We show that when borrowers lack credible mechanisms to commit not to borrow further from other lenders in the future, not only does the increasing availability of lenders raise the interest rate on loans and reduce the amount of funds that entrepreneurs can borrow, but perversely it is those entrepreneurs with more profitable investment opportunities that will end up raising fewer investments precisely because they have stronger desires to seek out additional lenders in the future. This effect further discourages entrepreneurs from initiating the most efficient and productive endeavors, generating persistent underdevelopment. / by Siyuan (Ernest) Liu. / Ph. D.