Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Economics, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Feb. 8, 2010). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-05, Section: A, page: 1743. Adviser: Eric M. Leeper.

<p> <b>Employee Ownership and Corporate Governance:</b> I find that firms that actively promote employee ownership through profit sharing and equity ownership plans pay their executives less and adopt more provisions favorable to shareholders. Furthermore, my empirical evidence shows that the shareholders in firms with higher employee ownership tend to be more active in corporate governance through the execution of proxy voting. The corporate boards in firms with higher employee ownership are younger, more diverse, and more representative of employees. My findings suggest that in the shareholder-manager conflict, employee ownership tends to shift power in the direction of shareholders and could significantly mitigate existing agency problems in the firm. </p><p> <b>Leadership and Corporate Culture:</b> Evidence from Executive Migrations across Firms This paper examines the importance of leadership for corporate culture by studying changes in firm environmental policy around executive successions. I find that firms improve significantly their environmental performance following the arrival of executives from firms with strong pro-environmental culture and firms tend to decrease their environmental standards following the arrival of executives with poor environmental record. However, the economic impact is much weaker for an executive with poor environmental record. The findings provide insight into the formation of organizational culture and the diffusion of cultural norms in the economy.</p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 2006. / (UMI)AAI3248822. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-01, Section: A, page: 0291. Advisers: Stephen J. Brown; Edwin J. Elton.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on May 11, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: A, page: 3258. Advisers: Craig Holden; Konstantin Tyurin.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-11, Section: A, page: 4809. Adviser: Michael S. Weisbach. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 154-159) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Jul 22, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-10, Section: A, page: 4067. Adviser: Eric Rasmusen.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Lehigh University, 2010. / Adviser: Nandkumar Nayar.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Oct 5, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-02, Section: A, page: 0642. Advisers: Pravin K. Trivedi; Konstantin Tyurin.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2008. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-06, Section: A, page: 2373.

<p> The financial economics profession has determined that identical agents in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model does not provide price and trading dynamics realized in financial markets. There has been quite a bit of research over the last three decades extending heterogeneity to the Lucas asset pricing framework, to address this issue. Once the assumption of homogeneous agents is relaxed, the problem becomes increasingly complex due to a state space including the wealth distribution, continuation utilities, and wealth distribution dynamics. To establish a more computationally feasible model, specical modifications have been made such as heterogeneity in idiosyncratic shocks and not risk aversion, including aggregate or idiosyncratic risk (but not both), or assuming no growth in the economy (steady state). </p><p> In this research, I will define a DSGE model with heterogeneous agents. This heterogeneity will refer to differing CRRA utilities through risk aversion. The economy will have growth due to the assumed dividend process. Agents will face idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks in a complete markets setting. The framework of the provided algorithm will enable issues to be addressed beyond homogeneous agent models. </p><p> The numerical simulation results of this model provide considerable asset price volatility and high trading volume. These results occur even in the complete markets setting, where investors are expected to fully insure. Given these dynamics from the simulations of the algorithm, I demonstrate the ability to calibrate this model to address specific financial economic issues, such as the equity premium puzzle. More importantly this exercise will assume realistic agent parameters of risk aversion and discount factors, relative to economic theory.</p>