Lee Man Fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-37). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Propositions --- p.v / List of Appendices --- p.vi / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.3 / Chapter 3. --- Money-in-the-Utility Function Models --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1 --- Simple Sidrauski Model --- p.11 / Chapter 3.2 --- Augmented Sidrauski Model --- p.12 / Chapter 4. --- Cash-in-Advance Models --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1 --- Separable Utility Functions --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- The Clower-Lucas CIA Model --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- The Stockman CIA Model --- p.17 / Chapter 4.2 --- Non-Separable Utility Functions --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- The Clower-Lucas CIA Model --- p.21 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- The Stockman CIA Model --- p.22 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Special Case --- p.24 / Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.27 / Chapter 6. --- Appendices --- p.29 / Chapter 7. --- References --- p.34

by Lo Ting Shek = 複雜適應系統中的個體為本模型 / 盧庭碩. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-107). / Text in English; abstracts in English and Chinese. / by Lo Ting Shek = Fu za shi ying xi tong zhong de ge ti wei ben mo xing / Lu Tingshuo. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Minority game --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1 --- The model --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Review on selected work on MG --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Market efficiency and Phase transition --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Crowd effect in MG --- p.17 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Hamming distance between strategies --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents --- p.21 / Chapter 3 --- Theory of the minority game --- p.23 / Chapter 3.1 --- Formalism --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2 --- Discussion --- p.31 / Chapter 4 --- Evolutionary Minority Game --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1 --- Model --- p.33 / Chapter 4.2 --- Results --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Discussion --- p.38 / Chapter 5 --- Theory of the Evolutionary Minority game --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- The theory of D'hulst and Rodgers [1] --- p.44 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Discussion on the D'hulst and Rodgers's theory --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2 --- Theory of EMG [2] --- p.54 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Formalism --- p.55 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Results --- p.60 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Discussion --- p.66 / Chapter 6 --- Evolutionary Minority Game with arbitrary cutoffs --- p.68 / Chapter 6.1 --- Model --- p.68 / Chapter 6.2 --- Results --- p.69 / Chapter 6.3 --- Theory --- p.76 / Chapter 6.4 --- Discussion --- p.85 / Chapter 7 --- Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution --- p.88 / Chapter 7.1 --- Model --- p.89 / Chapter 7.2 --- Results --- p.90 / Chapter 7.3 --- Discussion --- p.99 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.103

Lao Man-hoi. / Thesis submitted in: December 2001. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-54). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract (English) --- p.i / Abstract (Chinese) --- p.ii / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Objectives of the Thesis --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Organization of the Thesis --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- A Model with Perfect Competition --- p.18 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Model --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3 --- Income Distribution --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Changes in the Relative Price --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Income Distribution --- p.24 / Chapter 3.4 --- WelfareAnalysis --- p.26 / Chapter 4 --- A Model with Imperfect Competition --- p.28 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.28 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Model --- p.29 / Chapter 4.3 --- Outputs and Income Distribution --- p.33 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Short-Run Capital Specificity --- p.35 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Long-Run Capital Mobility --- p.38 / Chapter 4.4 --- Welfare Analysis --- p.42 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Short-Run Capital Specificity --- p.43 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Long-Run Capital Mobility --- p.44 / Chapter 5 --- Summary and Concluding Remarks --- p.47 / Appendices --- p.50 / Bibliography --- p.52

by Tsang Wai-Hung. / Thesis sumbitted in: December 1997. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 46-48). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Acknowledgements --- p.ii / Abstract --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- Model and Main Results --- p.8 / Chapter III. --- Proofs --- p.16 / Chapter IV. --- Correlated Equilibrium and Myopic-Consistent Equilibrium --- p.29 / Chapter V. --- Application --- p.33 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusion --- p.36 / Chapter VII. --- Appendix --- p.37 / Reference --- p.46

Moy Hon-man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 62). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction and Literature Review --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Literature Review --- p.4 / Chapter 2 --- Non-optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1 --- One-sector Non-optimizing Model --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Illegal Migrants --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Production --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants in Consump- tion Sector --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Production --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3 --- Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants in Invest- ment Sector --- p.17 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Production --- p.17 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.18 / Chapter 2.4 --- Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants in both Sectors --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Production --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.22 / Chapter 2.5 --- Parameterizing the Two-sector Non-optimizing Models --- p.24 / Chapter 2.6 --- Simulation Results: Two-sector Non-optimizing Models --- p.25 / Chapter 3 --- One-sector Optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.28 / Chapter 3.1 --- One-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage --- p.28 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Production --- p.28 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.29 / Chapter 3.2 --- One-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: The Hazari Sgro Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Basic Structure --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.34 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Parameterizing the Model --- p.36 / Chapter 4 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.38 / Chapter 4.1 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in Consumption Sector --- p.38 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Production --- p.38 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.39 / Chapter 4.2 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: Illegal Mi- grants in Investment Sector --- p.42 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Production --- p.42 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.43 / Chapter 4.3 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: Illegal Mi- grants in both Sectors --- p.45 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Production --- p.46 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.46 / Chapter 4.4 --- Analytical Insights --- p.49 / Chapter 4.5 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in Consumption Sector --- p.50 / Chapter 4.6 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in Investment Sector --- p.52 / Chapter 4.7 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in both Sectors --- p.53 / Chapter 4.8 --- Parameterizing the Models --- p.55 / Chapter 4.9 --- Simulation Results --- p.55 / Chapter 4.9.1 --- Simulation Results: Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage --- p.55 / Chapter 4.9.2 --- Simulation Results: Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage --- p.57 / Chapter 5 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.60 / Figures and Tables --- p.64

Pan, Jutong. / "August 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 23-24). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Basic Model --- p.4 / Chapter 3 --- Analysis --- p.6 / Chapter 3.1 --- Starrett Theorem with Labor Productivity Differences --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2 --- A Simple Case: Indivisible Labor --- p.9 / Chapter 3.3 --- Divisible Labor and Partial Labor Mobility --- p.12 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Scenario 1: high transportation costs and no trade across regions --- p.13 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Scenario 2: low transportation costs and inter-regional trade --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- The parameter conditions for Scenario 1/2 --- p.20 / Chapter 4 --- Conclusion --- p.21

Li, Xu. / Thesis submitted in: December 2008. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-43). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.ii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Background Study --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- Model Formulation --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Trading Cost Function --- p.9 / Chapter 3.2 --- Notations and Optimality Equation --- p.11 / Chapter 4 --- Optimal Policy --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1 --- Preliminary Assumption and Results --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- "Generalized (s, 5, H) Policy" --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Polya Distribution and Quasi-K-convex --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Assumptions --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2 --- Single Period Problem --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3 --- Finite-Period Problem --- p.30 / Chapter 4.4 --- The Algorithm --- p.36 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.39 / Bibliography --- p.41

Graduation date: 2005

This dissertation describes two theories of risky choice based on a normatively axiomatized partial order. The first theory is an atemporal alternative to von Neumann and Morgenstern's Expected Utility Theory that accommodates the status quo bias, violations of Independence and preference reversals. The second theory is an extension of the Inter-temporal von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of Kreps and Porteus (1978) that features a normatively deduced preference for flexibility. A substantial part of the thesis is devoted to examining equilibrium implications of the inter-temporal theory. In particular, a multi-agent multi-period Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium is shown to exist under certain conditions. Implications to asset pricing are then investigated with an explicit parameterization of the model.

Thesis (Ph. D. in Economics)--Vanderbilt University, Aug. 2008. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.