This dissertation claims that from 1879 until the early 1970s organized baseball players labored under a unique form of slavery. An analysis is provided of the economics surrounding organized baseball, the culture interpreting and describing the treatment of players, and the laws and rules structuring organized baseball to argue that the baseball industry resembled slavery more than it resembled any other social structure. The dissertation also discusses the struggle that took place within and outside of this slavery to liberate the “boys of summer” from their contractual bondage. This struggle culminated in 1976 with the introduction of free agency and the elimination of the reserve clause in organized baseball, setting in motion a transition to capitalism from this slavery. Ironically, ballplayers had previously labored under capitalism in the nineteenth century until escalating labor costs and player movement from team to team led to a transition to the slavery from which the players would not be liberated until 1976. Following this discussion, the dissertation turns to a careful analysis of this new capitalist economic structure that emerged after 1976. It examines how clubs become complex sites of revenue flows not only from baseball, but also from broadcasting, the state, concessions, luxury seating, etc. The dissertation then examines the impact of these flows on the actors and structures inside and outside of organized baseball. Through its study of organized baseball, this dissertation allows for a new way of thinking about the organization of an industry and the struggles between labor and management within that industry. It also offers a new way to conceptualize the relationship between the law, culture, and economics. By studying organized baseball, this dissertation provides a new and unique understanding of the labor struggles in organized baseball, the relationship between baseball and the state, and the relationships between individual clubs. It thus allows for a more generalized understanding of labor-management conflicts as well as conflicts between industry and the state.

My dissertation research is motivated by the growing participation of African women in migration streams long dominated by men. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence from my field research on the rural-urban migration of women in Ghana, I explore the role of social norms in shaping migration and remittance behavior in developing countries. Existing studies of the impact of migrant remittances on intra-household allocation are based on datasets that assume that remittances flow to a unified household, in which the household head receives remittances and makes decisions about their use. In contrast, this study makes use of a unique dataset generated during my field research that provides detailed information not only on migration, remittances and household expenditures, but also on the identities of the remitters and recipients of remittances in 181 rural households in northern Ghana. The study also draws on in-depth interviews with migrants, household and community members to understand how social norms influence migration and remittance behavior. I find that gendered social norms play an important role in migration and remittance decisions, so that gender becomes an important determinant of who migrates and who sends remittances, to whom, and why. In particular, I find that female migrants often direct their remittances to other women, thereby creating female-centered networks of remittance flows within the household. To determine the effect of this on intra-household resource allocation, I analyze the impact of remittances from female migrants on education expenditure. I find that migrant households in which women are the primary remitter or recipient of remittances spend significantly more on education per child of school-going age than do other migrant households. By taking an intra-household approach to the analysis of migration and remittances that emphasizes the role of gendered social norms in migration and remittance decisions, this research contributes to the growing body of knowledge of how gender shapes migration outcomes. More importantly, by drawing attention to the positive development outcomes that could result from the migration of women, this research strengthens the case for formulating policies to improve the working and living conditions of women migrants around the world.

This dissertation explores the impact of the “threat effects” of foreign direct investment on labor markets in the United States. In this context, the term “threat effect” refers to the use by employers of the implicit or explicit threat that they will move all or part of their production to a different location, even if they do not actually do so. Some economists have argued that increased capital mobility, by making such threats more credible, enhances the bargaining power of employers relative to workers through this threat effect channel. Using game theoretic and econometric analysis I found that the threat effect of capital mobility exerts a large and statistically significant negative influence on wages.

This dissertation inspects the underlying reasons of demand for social protection policies. It investigates the relationship between labor market risks and preferences for social insurance with a particular emphasis on unemployment insurance. Redistributive and social insurance motives are analyzed jointly. To that end, income, and occupational unemployment risk are considered as the key determinants. The occupational unemployment rate is treated as an estimate of labor market risk, and it is concluded that this explains the political preferences towards social protection policies. A model of optimal choice with heterogeneous workers, which encompasses both redistribution and social insurance incentives, has been presented. It has been showed that the direction of the relationship between the desired levels of transfer payments and each key determinant depends on the transition probabilities. The claimed positive link between specific human capital investment and social insurance holds only with several restrictions on transition probabilities. Moreover, income inequality, measured as deviation from mean income, has a direct impact on preferences for transfer payments. Then, by employing an ordered-probit estimation procedure, empirical tests both examining cross-country and over time developments have been conducted. The results suggest that risk exposure measured as occupational unemployment rate along with income levels is explanatory for preferences for social insurance, and hence the cross-country variations and developments over time in social protection policies cannot be attributed to the differences in types of human capital investment.

Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of a series of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (e.g. Coase, (1937), Williamson, (1985)). The ultimate right to make decisions that are not subject to a pre-existing contractual arrangement - hereafter referred to as decision-control rights, are assigned to some person or group associated with the enterprise. The entity with decision-control rights has the final say over how to organize essential firm operations that range from the determination of production techniques, to deciding how to monitor or compensate the firm's members. To the extent that firm members have competing interests or are asymmetrically affected by such decisions, those members with decision-control rights may be confronted with important normative issues regarding which firm objectives should be pursued. In my dissertation, I employ a behavioral economic perspective in order to examine how workplace governance practices interact with both the level of satisfaction and motivation of workers. In the first essay of the dissertation, I collected data from a real-effort experiment to compare changes in the performance of research participants that were subjected to an identical set of wage incentives that were either implemented (1) endogenously by the group to which subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only one member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random process completely exogenous to the group. The 3 (3 distinct decision-control rights regimes) X 2 (2 distinct incentive contracts) between-subjects design allows for a clean comparison of performance under different decision-control rights treatments. I report evidence suggesting that the decision-control rights arrangement used to select the compensation contract can significantly influence the subsequent level of performance of research subjects. The second essay (co-authored with Michael Carr), analyzes the relative effects of voice, autonomy, and wages in explaining job satisfaction using subjective evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004 wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). We show that the amount of autonomy and voice that a worker has over the firm is an important omitted variable, biasing the estimated coefficient on the wage upwards. And, conditional upon having a job, voice and autonomy are considerably more important determinants of job satisfaction than the wage. The final essay offers a critique of the traditional economics of work organization in consideration of the literature developed in behavioral and experimental economics. I argue that many models of worker motivation developed using the rational choice model (RCM) carry the cost of ignoring common sentiments and behaviors that have been systematically demonstrated in experimental studies. After providing an extensive review of the experimental economics literature as it may inform various workplace organizational faculties, I conclude that the literature suggests that establishment of work teams and incentive schemes that reward teams for collective success would carry the expectation of sustained satisfaction and productivity of workers more than firm environments that rely on employee competition as a motivational device.

<p> This dissertation continues the tradition of identifying the unintended consequences of the US health insurance system. Its main contribution is to estimate the size of the distortions caused by the employer-based system and regulations intended to fix it, while using methods that are more novel and appropriate than those of previous work. </p><p> Chapter 1 examines the effect of state-level health insurance mandates, which are regulations intended to expand access to health insurance. It finds that these regulations have the unintended consequence of increasing insurance premiums, and that these regulations have been responsible for 9&ndash;23% of premium increases since 1996. The main contribution of the chapter is that its results are more general than previous work, since it considers many more years of data, and it studies the employer-based plans that cover most Americans rather than the much less common individual plans. </p><p> Whereas Chapter 1 estimates the effect of the average mandate on premiums, Chapter 2 focuses on a specific mandate, one that requires insurers to cover prostate cancer screenings. The focus on a single mandate allows a broader and more careful analysis that demonstrates how health policies spill over to affect the labor market. I find that the mandate has a significant negative effect on the labor market outcomes of the very group it was intended to help. The mandate expands the treatments health insurance covers for men over age 50, but by doing so it makes them more expensive to insure and employ. Employers respond to this added expense by lowering wages and hiring fewer men over age 50. According to the theoretical model put forward in the chapter, this suggests the mandate reduces total welfare. </p><p> Chapter 3 shows that the employer-based health insurance system has deterred entrepreneurship. It takes advantage of the natural experiment provided by the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate, which de-linked insurance from employment for many 19&ndash;25 year olds. Difference-in-difference estimates show that the mandate increased self-employment among the treated group by 13&ndash;24%. Instrumental variables estimates show that those who actually received parental health insurance as a result of the mandate were drastically more likely to start their own business. This suggest that concerns over health insurance are a major barrier to entrepreneurship in the United States.</p>

How have the neoliberal concept of "comparative advantage" and the neostructuralist concept of "systemic competitiveness" interacted with State and capitalist efforts to exert control over labor during the transition from ISI to export-oriented accumulation? How have neoliberal and neostructuralist modes of conceptualizing export competitiveness impacted upon the organization of production, the labor process and the reproduction of labor power in Chile? Grounded on these questions, this dissertation examines how these two schools conceive export-competitiveness and make it operational through different export-promotion policies. Particular attention is placed on the neostructuralist claim that there exist two distinct and separate paths to reach competitiveness: a spurious form attained at the expense of workers' wages and a genuine form rooted in the absorption of technical change. Based on aggregate macroeconomic and macrosocial data, ISIC data at the 3 digit level for manufacturing, as well as three case studies--in textile and metal-working--this dissertation examines whether productive efficiency and export-competitiveness has been attained through a reduction of labor costs, technological innovation, or a combination of both that defies the clear-cut dichotomy posited by neostructuralism. Based on the study of manufacturing exports--where allegedly a 'virtuous circle' would allow for concomitant increases in wages, productivity and the establishment of social accords at the enterprise-level--this dissertation concludes that export competitiveness is rooted in socially constructed relations of power ignored by both neoliberal and neostructuralist theories.

Why do some workers who apparently perform similar tasks and exercise similar job skills get paid very different wages? And, why do firms have the boundaries we observe; in particular, why do firms using closely related production technologies and serving closely related markets specialize instead of merging? That is, how do labor and product market segments emerge, and why might they persist in a competitive economy? I offer an integrated explanation for the striking case of the emergence of such market segments in for-hire motor freight, after its deregulation in 1980. Using firm-level data, I provide econometric evidence of the survival value of carrier specialization, as a result of either original status or strategic change, into one of two types. I also document the associated bimodal segmentation of the labor market for drivers/freight handlers. I argue that a difference in optimal human resource policies between the two types of firms is an important cause of the parallel segmentations. Differences in how similar production technologies are used to serve the two markets mean that firms have different optimal solutions to the agency problem they face in motivating employees, leading to high powered incentives at reservation wages in one case, and low powered incentives with positive rents in the other. But this difference in compensation schemes sharply increases the agency or transaction costs involved in bringing both types of production under common hierarchical control, due to pay equity effects, while the corresponding benefits are modest, leading most firms to specialize. To formalize this account, I extend a simple version of the standard “risk-sharing” principal agent framework by adding a reciprocity component, producing a new model with endogenous segmentation of the specified type. The new model also provides new hypotheses about the source of union wage differentials, and details a mechanism by which technological change can lead to increasing inequality in labor incomes that is distinct from the usual differential returns to skills account.

This dissertation is constituted by three distinctive chapters or essays, but the unifying theme is how a more careful consideration of female labor supply may better inform assessments of economic growth and structural change. In chapter I, I use the insights of both cooperative and noncooperative bargaining theory to develop a household model of female labor supply. Particular attention is given to how this model applies to the developing world, including how the effects of larger social shifts such as technological change and fertility decline are mediated by bargaining and inequality in the family. In chapter II, I develop a theoretical foundation for analyzing how gender roles in the household affect foreign direct investment in a developing country context. It is argued that the extent to which women and men share the costs of social reproduction at the household level is a central determinant of female labor supply and the profitability of investment. I combine a model of family structure with a structuralist macromodel to investigate the effects of various public policies on women's wages and employment. A major goal is to specify the constraints imposed by international capital mobility on the prospects for increased equality and living standards for women. In chapter III, I reevaluate economic growth in Taiwan between 1965 and 1995 by developing an alternative measure of economic production that accounts for both market and nonmarket production in the form of domestic services provided by women in the home. I find that social services, a category that includes social services provided in the market and the home, is the lead employer of Taiwanese labor between 1965 and 1995. Another key finding is that many of the factors driving growth in the market sector also shape growth in the nonmarket sector. Despite trend declines in the relative size of the nonmarket domestic sector, it has probably continued to grow throughout this period, primarily because of productivity gains in household production and the effects of demographic change.

<p> This dissertation is mainly concerned with the distribution of between individuals in the economy. </p><p> The first chapter (Chapter 1) examines the various problems with Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) as a measure of economic welfare. The chapter proposes the Vast Majority Income (VMI) as a new measure of economic welfare that combines both national income and income distribution in a single, intuitive measure. The VMI measures the average income per capita of the vast majority of the population, defined as the first 80 percent of the population within the income distribution. </p><p> Chapter 2 proposes a model of the labor market that has a statistical equilibrium wage rather than a single point equilibrium wage as in the standard microeconomic model of wage equalization. Using heterogeneous agent-based modeling techniques, the chapter presents a labor market model where wages equalize around an exponential distribution of wages. Compared to previous models of statistical equilibrium in economics, this model does not require a fixed average wage levels. </p><p> Chapter 3 proposes a measure of inclusive growth that is based on the concept and methodology of the VMI discussed in Chapter 1. The growth rate of the VMI across time is proposed as a measure of the inclusivity of growth. We then compare and contrast the growth rate of the VMI to the growth rate of GDP per capita, economic growth. The Chapter shows how the last thirty years were mostly a period of non-inclusive growth in the majority of developing economies. Growth in developing nations was accompanied by a worsening of the equality of income distribution and as a result the growth in the incomes of the vast majority (the bottom 80% of income earners) was 1% less than the growth in GDP per capita for the population as a whole in developing countries. </p>