Understanding how change occurs in lesser developed countries, particularly in Latin America has been the subject of a prolonged theoretical academic debate. That debate has emphasized economics more that politics in general and predictability over unpredictability in the Latin American region. This paper challenges these approaches. Explaining change requires an examination of the politics of public policy as much as its economic dimensions. Second, change in the Latin American region may be less predictable than it appears. Scholars maintain that change in Latin America occurs when contending elites negotiate it. Their power comes from the various resources they possess. Change, therefore, is not expected to occur as a function of regime change per se. This paper considers the treatment of education policy in Nicaragua during the regimes of the dynastic authoritarianism of Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967-1979), the revolutionary governments of the Sandinistas (1979-1990), and the democratic-centrist government of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1996). The central research question is: When regimes change, do policies change? The methodology defines the independent variable as the regime and education policy as the dependent variable. It posits three hypotheses. The right-wing regime of Somoza was expected to restrict both the qualitative aspects and the financing of education; (2) the left-wing regimes of the Sandinistas were hypothesized to have expanded both; and (3) the democratic-centrist regime of Chamorro was expected to have both expanded and restricted certain aspects of education policy. Several chapters describe these regimes' expansive or restrictive education strategies. A comparative analysis of these 26 years demonstrates several variables' effect over time. An OLS regression and a times series analysis specifies the relationship between regime change and percent of GDP each regime devoted to education. Both the statistical and qualitative findings of this study confirm the hypotheses. The study reveals that, as regimes changed, education strategies and policies changed. Such findings challenge some current thought about political behavior with respect to Latin American development in particular and development theory in general.

The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade of 1980, carried out in the aftermath,of a long and destructive revolution, was able, in five months time, to decrease the nation's illiteracy rate from 50 percent to 13 percent. The newly fonned Nicaraguan government, recognizing the political nature of education, viewed its Literacy Crusade as a major step· in the development of a "new", post-revolutionary Nicaragua. As a means of comparison, two other literacy campaigns are also examined: the Cuban campaign of 1961, and the UNESCO-sponsored Experimental World Literacy Programme, in place from 1965-1973. The Cuban campaign served as a precursor to the Nicaraguan effort. It, too, occurred after a revolution, with education also,viewed as a key to the consolidation of a new 2 government. Likewise, the effort in Cuba depended upon an intense and massive effort by the public, to participate as students, teachers, or both. In less than one year, the illiteracy rate in Cuba decreased from 26 percent to 4 percent, with 700,000 Cubans achieving minimal literacy. In addition, the campaign was simply the first step in a series of educational changes. Follow-up campaigns, as well as increased emphasis on formal schooling, has continued in Cuba. The UNESCO effort proved to be much less successful. The EWLP was to include intensive and selective literacy projects in eleven designated nations. The literacy projects were based upon work-oriented definitions of literacy, and were, for the most part, planned and administered by international experts. The lack of involvement by national leaders or educators proved to be a great hinderance, especially since many of the nations were interested in mass literacy programs, not selective literacy projects. At the conclusion of the EWLP, thirty-two million dollars had been spent, but only 120,000 adults had been classified as new literates. UNESCO's own assessment of the EWLP pointed to a number of problems in organization, personnel, methods and materials that contributed to this lack of success. The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade was able to take the best parts of both of these previous efforts, and achieve some remarkable successes. The mass involvement of the people, and the commitment of time and resources at the national level made the Nicaraguan effort a national priority. While experts from other nations and international agencies participated in the Crusade, it was a decidedly Nicaraguan effort. Unlike the EWLP, the idea of literacy in both Nicaraguan and Cuba was tied to an overall change in the structures and attitudes of society; literacy was to be integrated into the people's lives, not to just be a way to improve job skills. For Nicaragua, the Literacy Crusade decreased the illiteracy rate, created 400,000 new literates, and led to follow-up efforts meant to further develop the educational and social process. From the comparison of these literacy efforts, three factors stand out as keys to successful increases in literacy in developing nations. Education must first be seen as part of an overall development strategy, created by and for a particular nation. A literacy campaign must also involve a majority of citizens in some way, especially those with no previous access to education. Finally, to enact these goals of overall development and mass participation, a literacy campaign must have support from all levels of government, who must be willing to sacrifice other goals in order to achieve long-term change.