This thesis explores the relationship between private industrialists and the state in Egypt since 1974. What is the nature of the local bourgeoisie? How capable is the state and how far does the East-Asian model of benevolent state autonomy apply to the case of Egypt? How has the adoption of economic liberalization affected business state relations? To address these questions, the industrial sector is analyzed as a case study. The approach adopted here is that of political economy and involves a comparison across the last three decades. Based on developments in the industrial policy, the distribution of private investment, the institutional environment and the structure of the manufacturing sector, the study demonstrates that state capacity in Egypt is low and the fundamental division among the bourgeoisie is size-based. The state's autonomy has not contributed to its ability to direct and undergo structural transformation. Further, its accommodation of the business sector has not been accompanied by private sector growth since discriminatory incentives favouring large enterprises and the prevalence of a system of 'crony capitalism', have impeded smaller firms from access to the available opportunities. Indeed, the leaders of the business power center, who contribute most to private investment, have been maneuvered by the state to support the political status quo.

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The problem with which this paper is concerned is that of examining the role that the Egyptian Banking System had to assume during the transition period, 1952 - 1964. This paper is divided in four parts; the first part is an introduction and it is composed of Chapter I. Part two is a brief survey of the economic and monetary developments in Egypt during this transition period and it is composed of Chapters II and III. Part three examines the reconstruction of the banking system and it is composed of Chapters IV and V. Part four presents a conclusion and some implications for other developing countries. The Egyptian experience's lack of success was due to non-realistic and uncoordinated planning.

This study analyzes the impact of the political changes on labor unions in Egypt in the period from 1960 to 1967. In 1960-1961 Egypt became a socialist country with one political party, the Arab Socialist Union. As a result of that development in the political arena, a wave of socialist laws were introduced by the government, affecting not only the labor unions' traditional functions, but also the industrial relations system in general. The study came to the following conclusions. 1. The role of the labor unions in the industrial relations system and especially in formulating the socialist laws was minimized in Egypt in the 1960-1967 period. 2. From an economic point of view, the socialist laws in the 1960-1967 period had restrained economic development process by reducing savings, not supplying the economy with skilled productive workers, causing inflation, and the wage structure did not work as an incentive system to stimulate productivity. 3. The socialist laws did not achieve any of their expected objectives partly because no one except the government was involved in these laws' formulation and implementation. 4. Except for the small increase in wages, the average worker did not achieve any tangible benefits that could improve his economic and social status. 5. The existence of political control over labor unions and over the industrial relations system will continue and persist as long as labor unions do not have effective leadership and as long as there is no political opposition to the government.