Between 1931 and 1960, Salvadoran praetorian regimes combined repression and reward to convince the public, nationally and internationally, that they were best equipped to rule the tiny nation. Shortly after taking power, in 1932 the military repressed a peasant rebellion, killed 10,000 people and blamed rural oligarchs and Liberal demagogues and communist agitators for the revolt and massacre. Both the regimes of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (1931-1944) and those of Colonels Oscar Osorio and José María Lemus (1948-1960) of the Revolutionary Party for Democratic Unification (PRUD) provided rewards for their political clients and repressed their enemies, who they often labeled Communists and subversives and linked with the chaos of the 1932 rebellion. In order to marginalize political opponents and centralize rule, they aggressively repressed "plots" against the regimes to reassign, exile, beat and sometimes kill their enemies. By manipulating newspaper coverage they also portrayed a social order that despite not matching the lived reality of Salvadorans contrasted with the chaos of 1932. Because the country changed dramatically, growing in population and rapidly urbanizing, political leaders under the PRUD allied themselves with different groups than did Martínez, or in the martinato,. Under the martinato, peasants and indigenous Salvadorans provided tacit support but the Revolutionary Party was much more focused on the cities. Fearing an urban opposition, they reorganized the police, but neither regime convinced the public of their goodwill. Despite their inability to substantively reduce crime or juvenile delinquency, the military convinced people that they made genuine efforts to provide social justice to the majority of Salvadorans. Embracing traditionalism and patriarchy, as well as social order, the military built alliances with, and glorified the image of the women of the urban markets. In contrast, prostitutes and street peddlers did not meet the standards of the praetorian social order and were demonized and repressed. Although the military was unable to provide effective social services, successfully repress dissent and criminality, or eliminate dissent, they nonetheless convinced a substantial majority that the costs of opposition were greater than the benefits of working with the regime.

This thesis posits that Christian Democracy arose in Central America because of its emphasis on basic reforms and social justice, and that its messianic appeal and charismatic leadership propelled it to national political power in El Salvador and Guatemala. The study continues by examining the presidencies of Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, concluding that their economic, political, and foreign policy agendas did not resolve the basic social conflicts which fuel both countries civil wars and economic crises. The findings of the study indicate that these Christian Democrats' alliances with their countries' armed forces and their inability to tap the potential of the movement's messianic, reformist vigor, prevented their administrations from ending the political violence and achieving a national unity capable of launching equitable development.

A comparative study of the cycles of military-political power in El Salvador between 1931 and 1979 indicates that the country was convulsed six times by political struggle. A pattern emerged wherein the military asserted itself as maintainer of the status quo each time that repression of, or concession to, the masses threatened the economic and political balance.

This study analyzes economic and governmental factors in political violence, using both a cross-national quantitative analysis and an historical case study of El Salvador. Since at least the time of Aristotle, political violence has been a concern of social philosophers and social scientists. While it has often been seen primarily as revolutionary, political violence can be reconceptualized to include violent acts for political purposes carried out by an established regime as well as by its opponents. Such a broadening of the concepts facilitates neutral measurements of political violence, such as by death rate per population from domestic political conflict. For convenience, useful theories of political violence may be broken down into two main types. The first type, which may be called inequality theory, postulates some type of inequality, generally economic inequality, as a major cause of political violence. The second type of theory, which may be referred to as collective action theory, generally emphasizes the influence of the political interaction of competing actors. Other theories stress factors such as land inequality and population density. The cross-national analysis of this study found that income inequality and government sanctions were two of the more robust independent variables contributing to political violence. Similarly, the historical case study of El Salvador, particularly a comparison of the outbreaks of political violence occurring in 1932 and in 1979-84, suggests an important role in political violence was played by both income inequality and government sanctions. The findings that both of these variables contribute significantly and simultaneously to political violence implies that inequality theory and collective action theory may be partly compatible with each other. Also, the relationship between income inequality and political violence was found to be much stronger than the relationship between land inequality and political violence. This finding suggests that attempts to prevent political violence solely by addressing land inequality, as in many government land reform programs, will likely fall as long as they do not address the more fundamental factor of income inequality.

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With the success of a leftist revolution in Nicaragua and a civil war against a strong revolutionary movement in El Salvador, Central America has become one of the flash points of world politics. The two revolutionary movements, which adhere to similar ideologies, emerged in countries with similar historical roots and similar socio-economic background. This thesis analyzes the question why the Nicaraguan revolution was successful after one and a half years of general insurrection, whereas the Salvadorean revolutionary movement has failed so far in gaining power. The author looks at four major factors which seem crucial for revolutionary success: Breadth of the Revolutionary Coalition, Military Strength and Strategies, Role of the Church, and External Influences. The comparative analysis shows that three of these four factors favor the Nicaraguan revolutionaries. In contrast to El Salvador, the Nicaraguan revolutionary coalition included all major classes, not only the lower classes and parts of the middle class. When compared to the government forces, the Nicaraguan guerrillas were stronger than the Salvadorean. Furthermore, the counterstrategy of the Nicaraguan government was not as systematic and sophisticated as in El Salvador. In contrast to Somoza, the Salvadorean government has gotten strong U.S. support and the Salvadorean movement does not get the same support from other states that the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement received. Only the role of the Church is in favor of the Salvadorean revolutionaries. The Salvadorean Church was more active in promoting Liberation Theology and thereby helped to make the people conscious about the social injustices prevailing in the country and to organize the lower classes. / Master of Arts

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