Thesis--Leipzig. / Bibliography: p. 134-135.

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I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.

This thesis offers new philosophical and literary interpretations of Seneca's 'De ira'. It takes as its starting-point the observation that both the philosophical position on which the text relies and the way in which it is organised appear to be chaotic, and it investigates how far and why this is the case. It shows that a coherent philosophical position underlies the text but that the text presents it as incoherent, and that it does this for therapeutic purposes. Similarly, it shows that the text is organised in a far more orderly way than has been previously appreciated, and it explains how the (apparent) disruption of that organisational system serves the text's therapeutic function. In making these arguments, it presents new readings of the De ira that reveal the text's philosophical and literary qualities, arguing that it constitutes a more sophisticated response to Seneca's philosophical predecessors than previous accounts have claimed, and that the text, as it progresses, introduces new therapeutic strategies that provide 'safety nets' should its earlier principal strategies have failed. The thesis aims to be methodologically innovative in using Seneca's descriptions of emotional responses as well as more explicit theorising to reconstruct his philosophical position and in suggesting a new approach to interpreting the role of interlocutors and addressees in didactic and dialogic texts.

Thesis (Ph. D. in Philosophy)--Vanderbilt University, Aug. 2009. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-132). Also available in electronic version.

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No description available.

The purpose of this project is to develop a theory of collective resentment. Collective resentment, on my view, is resentment that is felt and expressed by individuals in response to a perceived threat to a collective to which they belong. This is particularly important for understanding resentments that arise from social vulnerability, resentments which are often about membership within a particular social group. In this thesis, I develop my theory of collective resentment and apply it to understand the resentments of indigenous and settler Canadians in response to the Indian Residential Schools. I then explore the relationship between resentment and different kinds of responsibility, including the responsibility to relinquish inappropriate resentment and the responsibility to give resentments uptake. I conclude that focusing on the resentments that persist in indigenous-settler relations, and specifically the collective resentments that dominate the political landscape, brings us a lot further in understanding how to move from hostility and hopelessness toward peaceful coexistence.

Zugl.: Karlsruhe, Univ., Habil.-Schr.