[Truncated abstract] The finding that less time is needed to evaluate the valence of a target when it is preceded by a prime of the same valence, as opposed to one of the opposite valence, has become known as the affective priming effect. The research reported here investigated a new model of the mechanisms underlying affective priming effects, which focuses on the role of specific emotions within global valence categories. Specifically, this model stipulates that when presented with a stimulus that elicits particular emotions, the area of the brain corresponding to that emotion is automatically stimulated. This in turn will produce a diffuse activation of meaning nodes that are associated with that emotion. This emotion-based priming model departs from previous spreading activation accounts of affective priming, as it suggests that the facilitation effects observed in such studies may be due primarily to spreading activation via emotion-congruent, rather than valence-congruent, nodes. The overarching goal of the empirical research programme reported here was to test predictions based on this model. In three studies, facilitation effects ascribable to specific emotion-based congruence (e.g., fear-fear) were compared with those ascribable to global valence-based congruence (e.g., negative-negative) alone (i.e., in the absence of emotion-based congruence). Participants made valence judgements on targets which represented one of five basic human emotions: one positive (happy) and four negative (disgust, fear, sad, and anger). ... The fundamental design elements were the same across all three studies: the only difference was in the stimulus format of the prime-target pairs: emotion-laden scenes were used in Study One; facial expressions in Study Two; and emotion-laden words in Study Three. Results showed that, in comparison to the neutral and incongruent baselines, there were significant emotion-based priming effects across all stimulus formats. This result was also consistent across all of the negative emotions employed. Significant valence-based priming effects were, however, also obtained in each of the three studies, although these effects were more inconsistent than those obtained for emotion-based priming. That is, reaction times were significantly shorter on valence-congruent than on neutral and incongruent baseline trials, but only for a portion of the tests performed across the three studies. In Studies One and Two, reaction times were consistently shorter for emotion-congruent prime-target pairs than for valence-congruent prime-target pairs. This trend was absent in Study Three, in which word stimuli were used. These results indicate that while reaction times were facilitated, albeit inconsistently, for valence-congruent prime-target pairs, they were facilitated significantly further for emotion-congruent pairs when picture-based stimuli were used. The emotion-based and valence-based priming effects obtained across the three studies are discussed in terms of three competing theories: (i) spreading activation via global valence nodes, (ii) spreading activation via emotion centres, and (iii) expectancy-based processes. A dual-process hypothesis of affective priming is then proposed. The plausibility of the hypothesis is then explored through a synthesis and re-examination of results reported in previous affective priming research. Directions for future research to elaborate and extend on this work are discussed.

[Truncated abstract] It has consistently been found that individuals who are more highly vulnerable to anxious mood selectively attend to emotionally negative stimuli as compared to those lower in anxiety vulnerability, suggesting that such anxiety-prone individuals possess an attentional bias favouring negative information. Two of the most consistent tasks used to reveal this bias have been the attentional probe and emotional Stroop tasks. It has been noted, however, that these tasks have not been capable of differentiating the relative role of attentional engagement with, and attentional disengagement from emotionally valenced stimuli, suggesting that either of these attentional processes could account for the attentional bias observed in individuals with high levels of anxiety vulnerability on the attentional probe and emotional Stroop tasks. A number of resent studies have claimed support for the operation of biased attentional disengagement in anxiety using a modified attentional cueing paradigm, concluding that individuals more vulnerable to anxious mood have a selective difficulty disengaging attention from emotionally negative stimuli. The current thesis highlights the possibility, however, that the structure of the modified cueing paradigm could allow individual differences in initial attentional engagement with differentially valenced stimuli to be interpreted as a selective disengagement bias. ... The modified emotional Stroop task employed in the current research measured participant's ability to engage with the emotional content of differentially valenced stimuli having initially processed non-emotional information (stimulus colour), and measured their relative ability to disengage attention from such emotional content to process non-emotional stimulus information. Results using this modified Stroop task suggested that those with high vulnerability to anxious mood were disproportionately fast to engage with the content of negative as compared to non-negative stimuli whereas those with low vulnerability to anxious mood did not display this pattern. The results provided no support for presence of an anxiety-linked bias in attentional disengagement from the content of differentially valenced stimuli. Results derived from the modified emotional Stroop task therefore provided support for the presence of an anxiety-linked bias in attentional engagement with the content of emotionally negative stimuli, but no support for a bias in attentional disengagement from the content of such material. The final study in the present series of experiments was designed to address the novel possibility that a bias in attentional disengagement could result in ongoing semantic activation of negatively valenced stimuli which would not necessarily be indexed by previous tasks assessing biased attentional disengagement. The results of this final study, however, provided no evidence to suggest the presence of anxiety-linked differences in ongoing semantic activation of differentially valenced stimuli. The present series of studies therefore provide support for the presence of an anxiety-linked bias in attentional engagement with the content of emotionally negative stimuli, while providing no support for the presence of an anxiety-linked bias in attentional disengagement from negative stimuli.

[Truncated abstract] Attentional and interpretive biases are important dimensions of individual difference that have been implicated in the etiology and maintenance of a range of clinical problems. Yet there has been no systematic investigation into the relationship between these dimensions of individual difference. The current research program tested predictions derived from two competing theoretical accounts of the relationship between attentional and interpretive biases. The Common Mechanism Account proposes that cognitive biases represent concurrent manifestations of a single underlying selective processing mechanism. The Independent Mechanism account proposes that independent mechanisms underlie each bias. . . An apparent contradiction is that the manipulation of one bias served to also modify the other bias, despite the observation that the magnitude of the resulting change in both biases was uncorrelated. Neither the Common Mechanism nor the Independent Pathways accounts can adequately explain this pattern of results. A new account is proposed, in which attentional and interpretive biases are viewed as representing mechanisms that are related but that are not the same. Theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed, including the possibility that the two biases each may best predict emotional reactions to quite different stressful events and that training programs designed to attenuate allocation of attentional resources to threat may serve to reduce both attentional and interpretive selectivity in emotionally vulnerable individuals.

Thesis (M.(Augmentative and Alternative Communication))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Summary in English and Afrikaans. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-157).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 46-52).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-134). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2007. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 3306.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 2, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 257-264).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-152).