Ngan, Hoi Yee Meko. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-60). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Kent State University, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Mar. 26, 2010). Advisor: Adam Rapp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-113).

Tournament theory shows that a firm may motivate employees by running competitors for rewards either for a group or individualistic schemes. The empirical literature on Tournaments has been grown. However, many studies use no appropriate data. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on three key assumptions in these models using a special case surrounding the incentives for workers in public sector. The dataset contains information from the Coordenacao de Fiscalizacao (i.e., the Inspections Division) of the Secretaria da Receita Federal (SRF) on the bonus program created by the Brazilian government to compensate tax officials for their efforts in collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations. We constructed a larger unbalanced panel data Tax collection containing information upon 110 tax agencies distributed between 10 regions and 45 time period by month, which allowed us to support the predictions raised above. In order to examine the tournaments predictions we emphasize the dynamic of the process taking into account the unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems using appropriate GMM techniques. This enable us to pondered the possible inertia for time adjustments within tax agency, possibly in determining strategies to improve the tax agency performance on the sources most valuable for collection, which supports the hypothesis of learning by doing. The results also demonstrated evidence to support the following tournaments hypothesis: (1) prizes motivate agents to exert effort; (2) number of participants increased as the size of the prize increase; (3) differential in wages and bonus directly affect workers incentives.

Thesis (M. S.)--Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Committee Chair: Silva, Emilson; Committee Member: Kilic, Rehim; Committee Member: Li, Haizheng.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [101]-118).

Individual monetary incentive systems usually include performance feedback as part of the intervention package. However, there is no experimental evidence to suggest that feedback has any functional effect on work performance above and beyond the effects of the incentive systems. It may be that incentive systems have such powerful effects on work behavior that the additional contingencies provided by a feedback system are unnecessary. The present laboratory study investigated the supplemental effects of feedback on work performance under a monetary incentive system. Four subjects were hired to work seven hours a day for four and a half weeks. The experimental work task was a simulation of a proof operator’s job at a bank and involved typing dollar values of “checks” into a computer. Subjects were paid a base salary per session plus incentive money for performance above a criterion. The main dependent variable was the number of correctly completed checks per session. The amount of time off task and rate of responding were also investigated. Subjects were exposed to an ABA experimental design involving; (A) the monetary incentive system without performance feedback, (B) the incentive system with performance feedback, and (A) return to the incentive system without performance feedback. The introduction of feedback resulted in small to moderate performance improvements in two of the four subjects. Possible reasons for the small and inconsistent effects were explored with special attention paid to the functional role of feedback and monetary incentives. It was proposed that small amounts of incentive money and performance feedback may not improve productivity in the absence of other stimulus events inherent in real organizational settings, such as the possibility for pay raises, promotions, and/or the threat of being fired. These variables may have function-altering effects on incentive money and performance feedback. Future laboratory simulations might experimentally manipulate these variables to further investigate the efficacy of monetary incentive systems. / Graduate

Thesis (M.A.I.S.)--Oregon State University, 2007. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-58). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Perceived organisational support and organisational commitment plays a vital role in determining turnover intention. When employees feel that their organisation supports them levels of commitment can increase. Thus, employees feel more obligated because of favourable benefits such as organisational effectiveness and reduced turnover. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect perceived organisational support and organisational commitment have on turnover intention. The study followed a descriptive survey method. A questionnaire, measured on a Likert Scale was used to collect data from respondents. The sample comprised 98 academic staff at the University of Fort Hare and the response rate was 56.6 percent. The results indicated that perceived organisational support and organisational commitment are negatively and significantly related to turnover intention. The study also revealed perceived organisational support and organisational commitment on turnover intention did not account for a higher variance when put together, however moderate variance was found. Perceived organisational support in this study was identified as the most effective predictor of turnover intention. In addition to managerial implications and limitations of the study, direction for future research is also suggested at the end of this study. The findings of this study will help in terms of understanding the state of organisational commitment of academics and its relationship with their intentions to leave.