O crescente interesse em prover uma maior autonomia a agentes articiais, além da sua capacidade de adaptação, racionalidade limitada, heterogeneidade, e necessidade de interação e cooperação podem fazer com que Sistemas Multiagentes (MASs) apresentem comportamentos globais indesejáveis. Esse cenário pode agravar-se, em especial quando esses sistemas envolvem a participação de humanos, uma vez que esses agem de forma menos controláveis e previsíveis, por exemplo, Sistemas Sócio-Técnicos (STSs). Essas características tornam a governaça desses sistemas um aspecto essencial para sua ecácia. A abordagem normativa é considerada uma proposta promissora para o atendimento desse requisito em tais sistemas. Nesse, normas fornecem uma visão socialmente realista das interação entre agentes autônomos abstraindo os detalhes de baixo nível. Suportada pelas normas está a noção de sanção como uma reação a potencialmente qualquer violação ou cumprimento de uma expectativa. Embora as normas já tenham sido extensamente investigadas no contexto de MASs, o conceito de sanção ainda carece de uma melhor inspeção. Esse carência é suprida nesse trabalho, primeiramente, propondo uma tipologia de sanções que captura as características relevantes de STSs, segundo, um processo adaptativo de sancionamento com a descrição das funções de seus componentes e inter-relacionamentos, e terceiro, um modelo adaptativo de avaliação de sancionamento que permite aos agentes decidirem qual sanção aplicar em cada situação. Em particular, esse model de avaliação permite a seleção entre sanções formais e informais dependendo de quanto o agente pode inuenciar o grupo social do agente objeto da sanção. Esse modelo é usado na avaliação de políticas de sanção única ou múltiplas em um estudo de caso de transação de energia elétrica no contexto de uma rede elétrica inteligente. Conclui-se dos resultados obtidos que sistemas que disponibilizam políticas de sancionamento com múltiplas sanções não aumentam em todos os casos o nível de cumprimento das normas quando comparado com políticas de sancionamento com sanção única. Entretanto, políticas com multíplas sanções são menos custosas. / The increasing interest on greater agents autonomy in addition to its adaptability, bounded rationality, and heterogeneity features, and the necessity of interaction and cooperation may bring Multiagent Systems (MASs) to exhibit undesirable global behaviors. It may become even worse especially when they involve human agents who are less manageable and predictable in their actions, like in Sociotechnical Systems (STSs). These characteristics renderaneffectivegovernanceanessentialaspectofthesesystems.Thenormativeapproach has been proposed as a prominent means to achieve this effectiveness, wherein norms provide a socially realistic view of interaction among autonomous parties that abstracts away low-level implementation details. Overlaid on norms is the notion of a sanction as a reaction to potentially any violation of or compliance with an expectation. Although norms have been well investigated in the context of MASs, sanctions still lack a more comprehensive inspection. We address the above-mentioned gap by proposing, rst, a typology of sanctions that reects the interplay of relevant features of STSs, second, a sanctioning enforcement process describing the functions of the diversity of components and their relationships, and third a sanctioning evaluation model that enables agents to evaluate and choose the most appropriate sanction to apply depending on a set of factors. In particular, this evaluation model enables the selection between formal or social sanctions based on how much the sanctioner can inuence the social group of the sanctioned agent. This model is used to evaluate mono-type and multi-type sanctioning policies in a Smart Grid energy trading case study. Our results show that multi-type sanctioning policies do not always increase the level of norm compliance compared to mono-type sanctioning policies, yet multi-type policies are less costly.

Law / LL.D.

The thesis examines the enforcement of consumer rights in South Africa, and is set against the backdrop of the underlying principles and theories on the enforcement of consumer protection law. It then analyses the various forms of consumer protection law enforcement mechanisms that were in place prior to the implementation of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, and sets out why there was a need for the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act. The thesis then critically discusses the consumer protection law enforcement mechanisms introduced and/or catered for by the Consumer Protection Act. The in-depth comparative analysis against the consumer protection law enforcement dispensations in both India and the United Kingdom culminates in a critical analysis of the successes and shortcomings of consumer protection law enforcement regime in present-day South Africa; as well as recommendations (in the form of legislative amendments and practical solutions) on how the South African consumer protection enforcement framework can be improved in order to facilitate the realisation of consumer rights. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.

Law / LL.D.

LLM / Department of Mercantile Law / This research examined the mechanisms that were employed by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in order to protect the interests of creditors in company affairs. At the preamble of the aforementioned Act lies an undertaking from legislature to provide appropriate redress to investors and third parties/creditors. It was on that basis that the researcher sought to establish whether legislature had indeed fulfilled its commitment to provide appropriate redress to creditors. Traditionally, companies have been run to promote the interests of shareholders with little attention given to the interests of other stakeholders such as creditors. It is this research`s findings that South African company law has moved from the traditional view, that is the shareholder value approach, to the enlightened shareholder value approach: a model of corporate governance which permits directors to have regard, where appropriate, to the interests of other stakeholders but with shareholders’ interests retaining primacy. It is thus found that creditors cannot be protected by contract laws alone but that their protection should be enhanced by mandatory corporate laws which regulates the manner and conduct of company controllers in a way that ensures that the interests of all stakeholders, including creditors, are given due regard. Finally, it has been found that much work has been done by legislature in developing the re-enacted creditor protective mechanisms and also in statutorily adopting new mechanisms which are aimed at advancing creditor interests. Recommendations have thus been made to legislature for possible amendments to refine its corporate laws. / NRF