As environmental protection problems become the global issues recently, China could not get rid of the responsibilities as being developing country. Thus, how to deal with the international regimes become more and more important toward Chinese government. How could China take balance between international regimes and domestic beneficial groups? In addition, it also briefly discusses how China deals with the environmental diplomacy through different international environmental regimes. In this thesis, it uses international environmental regimes as theory to discover the relations among countries and enterprises. Thus, in this thesis, it will divide into three parts which are the international environmental regimes such as Kyoto Protocol, China¡¦s environmental laws, and cases studying of chemical industries of China. The result of analysis implies that no matter the international environmental regimes or China¡¦s environmental laws are inefficient to avoid environmental crisis. The real power relies on the beneficial groups or other profit projects. Consequently, how China achieves its goal on environmental protection might be more and more important in the future.

Abstract As ecological deterioration getting worse and worse, the degree from global environment problem threat human life is more and more striking, and brings the rise of environmental diplomacy and global environmental politics. The PRC has wide territory, numerous population, and abundant natural resource, however after twenty years of modernizing, result in environment crisis. Since 1989, the PRC being forced to enhance her attention and participation in international environmental protection field by the pressure from domestic and foreign factors. The purpose of this thesis is to realize the details about the development of the PRC environmental diplomacy during the post cold-war era. The author try to combine domestic and international approaches, and use regime theory to analyze the actions of the PRC. The findings as follows: 1. The PRC make their objectives (ex : gain financial and technical assistance, improve the domestic environmental protection ability, modify her international image, etc. ) come true by holding the principles, including secure sovereignty, the unequal responsibilities between developed and developing countries, and developed countries should bare the major responsibilities of global environment problems. 2. The decision-making about the policy guide participation in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change origins from the result of the bargaining between bureaucracies. Besides, climate regime can change the options of environmental and science agencies, but the effect doesn¡¦t show in ultimate decisions. 3. Although the PRC still fear participation in regime will let her sovereignty invaded and economic potential repressed, try to make long-term plans and make capital of foreign firms to improve her environmental protection abilities.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.