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Equality of arms and aspects of the right to a fair criminal trial in BotswanaCole, Rowland James Victor 03 1900 (has links)
Thesis (LLD (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The guarantee of a fair trial is fundamental to the criminal process of every modern
society. Like all civilised nations, Botswana’s legal order provides for the protection of
accused persons through the guarantee of a fair trial. But equality of arms, a central
feature of medieval trial by combat, seems to have disappeared from modern criminal
procedural systems. The question arises, therefore, whether criminal justice systems
sufficiently cater for the fair trial of accused persons. This thesis will argue that the
present legal and institutional framework for the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana
falls short of guaranteeing procedural equality and that this severely compromises
fairness. The institutional framework does not support equality of arms and therefore
leaves procedural rights in a basic state of application. The thesis, therefore, seeks to
analyse the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana in light of the principle of equality
of arms.
The thesis explores the origins and theoretical foundations of the principle. It recognises
that the present application of the principle occurs by implicit countenance. The absence
of any constitutional recognition of the principle leaves procedural rights in a basic state
of application. The thesis discusses the practical implications of an express recognition
and constitutional application of the principle in the adversarial system.
Equality of arms should be central in the criminal process and no party should have an
unfair advantage over the other. The thesis recognises that the prosecution is in a position
of advantage in that it has the support of the state. This advantage manifests itself in the
form of vast resources regarding expertise, investigatory powers and legislative powers.
Disparities in resources, the ability to investigate and access to witnesses create an
inequality of arms between the state and the accused. This can only be balanced and
countered by empowering the accused with constitutional and procedural rights that
specifically protect the accused in the face of the might of the state. These procedural
rights include the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation and the right
to disclosure. It is argued, however, that though accused-based rights and constitutional
rules of procedure generally protect the accused and ensure that the process is fair, they
mainly remain theoretical declarations if they are not applied in line with equality of
arms. In other words, the meaningful enjoyment of these rights by the accused, demands
the strengthening of resources and legislative and institutional governance. Fairness in
criminal trials is epitomised in the balance between the overwhelming resources of the
state and the constitutional protection of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional
protection afforded to the accused is compromised.
The first part engages the reader with the development of accused-based rights and
introduces the constitutionalisation of procedural rights in Botswana. It discusses the
scope and application of the principle of equality of arms, develops its relevance to the
adversarial system and justifies an application of the principle in Botswana domestic law.
It makes a comparison between the adversarial and inquisitorial models while
recognising the growing tendency towards convergence. It highlights the adversarial
system as interest-based, and recognises the indispensability of the principle of equality
of arms to such a system. While recognising that inquisitorial procedures often offend
equality of arms, the role of the inquisitorial system in ensuring equality of arms is also
recognised. It measures and analyses the normative value, application and recognition of
equality of arms in Botswana’s legal system, arguing for express recognition and a
conceptual application of the principle by the courts. It is reasoned that express
recognition of the principle will result in fuller protection and better realisation of
accused-based rights. Exploring the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy, it recognises the
need for convergence, but emphasises the principle of equality of arms and the right to
adversarial proceedings as the foundation for fair trials.
The second part analyses the investigation process and generally bemoans the great
inequalities at this stage of the criminal process. It discusses procedural and evidential
rules that serve to minimise the imbalances and the role that exclusionary rules play in
ensuring fair trials and reliable verdicts.
The third part identifies specific trial rights which are relevant to the principle of equality
of arms. Central to the discussion are the right to legal representation and the
presumption of innocence which are discussed in chapters 7 and 8 respectively. These
two important rights are central to the protection of the accused but unfortunately are the
most compromised due to lack of resources and legislative intervention. Chapter 9 deals
with other rights that are relevant to the principle as well as the ability of the accused to
present his case and effectively defend himself. It emphasises the need for the courts to
engage in the trial, thereby enabling the unrepresented accused.
The fourth part contains final conclusions which argue that the principle of equality of
arms forms the basis for the full realisation of individual procedural rights and advocates
for the recognition of the principle in the Botswana legal order. It is concluded that the
constitutional enshrinement of fair trial rights and their basic application by the courts,
without actual measures to ensure their realisation, are insufficient. Suggestions include
legislative and institutional reforms, as well as a constitutional recognition of the
principle of equality of arms. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die waarborg van ‘n billike verhoor is fundamenteel tot die strafprosesregstelsel van elke
beskaafde gemeenskap. Soos in ander beskaafde lande, word die beskuldige in Botswana
ook beskerm deur die reg op ‘n billike verhoor.
In die Middeleeue was gelykheid van wapens (“equality of arms”) die sentrale kenmerk
van die tweegeveg as geskilberegtigingsmetode. Dit blyk egter dat hierdie sentrale
kenmerk afwesig is in moderne strafprosesregstelsels is. Die vraag ontstaan of hierdie
toedrag van sake ‘n beskuldige se reg op ‘n billike verhoor op risiko plaas. In hierdie tesis
word betoog dat die posisie in Botswana van so ‘n aard is dat “ongelyke bewapening”
veroorsaak dat die reg op ‘n billike verhoor belemmer word. Die plaaslike institusionele
bedeling onderskraag nie die beskerming van gelykheid van wapens nie en veroorsaak
derhalwe dat prosessuele regte in “a basic state of application” is, met ander woorde, op
‘n eenvoudige en meganiese toepassingvlak is. Met die norm van gelyke bewapening as
vertrekpunt, ondersoek hierdie tesis die beskerming van die reg op ‘n billike verhoor in
Botswana.
‘n Ondersoek word geloods na die oorsprong en toereriese basis van die beginsel van
gelyke bewapening. Die afwesigheid van uitdrukklike grondwetlike erkenning van die
beginsel, word vergelyk met die praktiese implikasies en uitdruklike grondwetlike
erkenning en toepassing in ‘n adversatiewe stelsel.
Gelykheid van wapens behoort sentraal tot die strafproses te wees en geen party behoor
‘n onbillike voordeel bo die ander te geniet nie. In hierdie tesis word erken dat die
vervolging bloot vanweë die feit dat dit deur die staatsmasjienerie ondersteun word,
wesenlik bevoordeel word bo die individu as aangeklaagde. Dit gaan hier om toegang tot
hulpbronne soos deskundigheid, asook die rol wat misdaadondersoekmagte en ander
wetgewing speel. Ongelykhede byvoorbeeld in hulpbronne, in die vermoë om misdaad te
ondersoek en in die toegang tot getuies, dra alles daartoe by dat ‘n wanbalans tussen die
staat en die individu ontstaan. Die verlening van prosessuele regte aan die beskuldigde is
‘n metode om die balans te probeer herstel. Voorbeelde van sulke regte is die reg om
onskuldig vermoed te wees, die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger en die reg op insae in
verklarings. In hierdie tesis word egter betoog dat alhoewel hierdie regte en ander
grondwetlike strafprosedures die beskuldigde kan beskerm en die billikheid van die
proses kan bevorder, dit absoluut noodsaaklik is dat voormelde regte en prosedures in lyn
met die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens geïnterpreteer en toegepas moet word.
Betekenisvolle afdwinging en toepassing van ‘n beskuldigde se regte verg versterking
van bronne en die institusionele bedeling. Billikheid in die strafverhoor word gekenmerk
aan die graad van balans wat bereik kan word tussen die oorvloedige hulpbronne van die
staat teenoor die grondwetlike beskerming van die beskuldigde. In die afwesigheid van ‘n
balans, word die beskuldigde benadeel.
Die eerste gedeelte van hierdie tesis behandel die ontwikkeling van die beskuldigde se
regte en bevat ‘n inleiding tot die konstitusionalisering van prossuele regte in Botswana.
In Deel Een word die omvang en toepassing van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens
bespreek en word die relevantheid van hierdie beginsel in die adversatiewe proses
identifiseer, veral wat Botswana betref. Die adversatiewe en inkwisitoriese modelle word
vergelyk en bespreek met erkenning aan die moderne neiging dat die twee modelle besig
is om in een te vloei – die sogenaamde verskynsel van “convergence”. Daar word
aangetoon dat gelykheid van wapens die adversatiewe model onderlê. Hierteenoor is dit
so dat die inkwisitoriese model ook erkenning aan gelykheid van wapens verleen. Daar
word betoog dat gelykheid van wapens ‘n normatiewe waarde het en uitdruklik in
Botswana deur die howe erken moet word. Uitdruklike erkenning sal tot groter
beskerming en realisering van ‘n beskuldigde se regte lei. In Deel Een word ook tot die
slotsom geraak dat alhoewel daar ‘n behoefte aan “convergence” is, dit onvermydelik tog
ook so is dat gelykheid van wapens en die reg op ‘n adversatiewe proses die grondslag
van ‘n billike verhoor vorm.
In Deel Twee word die misdaadondersoekproses ontleed en word die grootskaalse
ongelykhede wat hier onstaan en bestaan, bespreek. Daar word gelet op prosesregtelike
en bewysregtelike reëls wat hierdie ongelykhede kan minimaliseer. Die rol van
uitsluitingsreëls ter bevordering van ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n betroubare bevinding, word
ook aangespreek.
Deel Drie identifiseer spesifieke verhoorregte wat in ‘n besondere direkte verband met
die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens staan. Hier is veral twee regte van besondere
belang: die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger (hoofstuk 7) en die reg om onskukdig
vermoed te wees (hoofstuk 8). Ongelukkig is dit so dat hierdie twee regte erg ondermyn
word. Die reg op resverteenwoordiging word ingekort deur ‘n gebrek aan finansiële
bronne terwyl die vermoede van onskuld deur wetgewing ondergrawe word. In hoofstuk
9 word ander relevante regte bespreek en word die noodsaak van ‘n aktiewe hof in die
geval van ‘n onverteenwoordigde beskuldigde bepleit
Deel Vier bevat finale gevolgtrekkings. Daar word betoog dat die beginsel van gelykheid
van wapens die basis vorm in die volle relisering van individuele regte en, verder, dat
hierdie beginsel ten volle in die regstelsel van Botswana erken behoort te word. Blote
grondwetlike verskansing van die grondwetlike reg op ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n blote
basiese interpretasie daarvan deur die howe, is onvoldoende wanneer daar geen maatreels
is om die haalbare realisering af te dwing nie. Wetgewende en institusionele hervorming
is nodig, asook ‘n grondwetlike erkenning van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens. / Research funds made available by Prof. S. E. van der Merwe
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