This doctoral thesis contains three essays on equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism. In Chapter One, we study the impact of equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism on the policies of the regional governments. This chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a fiscal federalism in which two asymmetric regions provide their residents with non-productive public expenditures (a flow) and public capital (a stock). In our model, each regional government behaves strategically in choosing its policies to maximize the discounted welfare of its own residents, under the equalization transfer scheme. Our analysis indicates that the the tax on the use of the private capital input is equal to zero in the steady state. In addition, we observe that the only change induced by the equalization transfer scheme is an increase in the non-productive public expenditures in less-endowed region (Quebec) with an offsetting fall in the non-productive public expenditures in more-endowed region (Ontario). The results of the numerical exercise we carry out also suggest that an equalization scheme in a federal state lowers the welfare gap between a rich and a poor region. In Chapter Two, we investigate how the equalization transfer formula is determined and how the equalization transfer program affects a region’s policies. This chapter presents a political economy model of equalization payments in a fiscal federalism in which asymmetric regional governments, who care about the welfare of its own residents, lobby the (incumbent) federal government, who takes into consideration both the welfare of the federation and the political support it receives from the states when allocating equalization transfers. It is shown that if the federal government allows politics to distort its economic policy it actively implements an equalization transfer program that is different from the one it would implement if it behaved like a benevolent dictator. The equalization transfer scheme implemented by the federal government induces a fall in the investment of public capital in both regions, and if the political power of the poor region is sufficiently higher than that of the rich province, then the equalization transfer scheme induces a higher level of the non-productive public good in the poor region than in the rich region. A numerical example is provided to illustrate this result. Chapter Three presents a model of equalization transfers in a federation in which each regional government has private information on its own technology for public service delivery. The aim of the federal government is to design an equalization transfer scheme that is Bayesian incentive compatible and satisfies the interim participation constraint in order to achieve the goal of providing residents of a poor region with at least a certain level of utility without imposing an excessive burden on the giving region. We show that the equalization transfers allow the recipient region to raise its private consumption above the level it would have attained in the absence of equalization transfers because some of the transfer is allocated to raise private consumption. Furthermore, it is shown that the equalization transfers are also lower if the federal government can observe the type of the poor region.

This doctoral thesis contains three essays on equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism. In Chapter One, we study the impact of equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism on the policies of the regional governments. This chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a fiscal federalism in which two asymmetric regions provide their residents with non-productive public expenditures (a flow) and public capital (a stock). In our model, each regional government behaves strategically in choosing its policies to maximize the discounted welfare of its own residents, under the equalization transfer scheme. Our analysis indicates that the the tax on the use of the private capital input is equal to zero in the steady state. In addition, we observe that the only change induced by the equalization transfer scheme is an increase in the non-productive public expenditures in less-endowed region (Quebec) with an offsetting fall in the non-productive public expenditures in more-endowed region (Ontario). The results of the numerical exercise we carry out also suggest that an equalization scheme in a federal state lowers the welfare gap between a rich and a poor region. In Chapter Two, we investigate how the equalization transfer formula is determined and how the equalization transfer program affects a region’s policies. This chapter presents a political economy model of equalization payments in a fiscal federalism in which asymmetric regional governments, who care about the welfare of its own residents, lobby the (incumbent) federal government, who takes into consideration both the welfare of the federation and the political support it receives from the states when allocating equalization transfers. It is shown that if the federal government allows politics to distort its economic policy it actively implements an equalization transfer program that is different from the one it would implement if it behaved like a benevolent dictator. The equalization transfer scheme implemented by the federal government induces a fall in the investment of public capital in both regions, and if the political power of the poor region is sufficiently higher than that of the rich province, then the equalization transfer scheme induces a higher level of the non-productive public good in the poor region than in the rich region. A numerical example is provided to illustrate this result. Chapter Three presents a model of equalization transfers in a federation in which each regional government has private information on its own technology for public service delivery. The aim of the federal government is to design an equalization transfer scheme that is Bayesian incentive compatible and satisfies the interim participation constraint in order to achieve the goal of providing residents of a poor region with at least a certain level of utility without imposing an excessive burden on the giving region. We show that the equalization transfers allow the recipient region to raise its private consumption above the level it would have attained in the absence of equalization transfers because some of the transfer is allocated to raise private consumption. Furthermore, it is shown that the equalization transfers are also lower if the federal government can observe the type of the poor region.

El estudio rediseña el sistema de transferencias intergubernamentales peruano a nivel municipalincorporando criterios de equidad horizontal y de compensación transversales en la distribuciónde recursos. Para dicho fin se empleó la metodología propuesta por Ahmad, Singh y Fortuna(2004), la cual plantea una fórmula para la nivelación de las transferencias a partir del cálculo delas capacidades tributarias y de las necesidades de gasto municipales. Los resultados del estudioson 5: (i) las municipalidades localizadas en regiones mineras reciben más recursos que los quedebieran recibir acorde a sus capacidades fiscales y sus necesidades de gasto; (ii) los recursos quelas municipalidades ubicadas en regiones mineras recibieron en exceso, ascendieron en el año2006 a S/. 1.364,3 millones (US$ 455 millones), monto que representa un exceso de 67,5%; (iii)cuando se implementa una reforma integral del sistema de transferencias intergubernamentales,la totalidad de recursos que las municipalidades de regiones mineras reciben en exceso, son absorbidaspor los municipios de regiones no mineras; (iv) la dispersión de la distribución interregionalde recursos municipales se reduce progresivamente en cada una de las tres etapas de la reformapropuesta; (v) para reformar el sistema de transferencias peruano no se requieren recursos adicionales,únicamente voluntad política. El documento concluye estableciendo cuatro lineamientospara la adopción de una reforma del sistema de transferencias intergubernamentales peruano. -- In this study the Peruvian intergovernmental transfer system was re-designed taking into considerationboth horizontal equity and transverse compensation in the distribution of resources.In doing so, the Ahmad, Singh and Fortuna (2004)’s methodology was used, the same whichproposes a formula to equalize intergovernmental transfers by calculating fiscal capacities andspending requirements at the municipal level. The results of the study are 5: (i) the municipalitieslocated at mining regions receive more resources than they should receive according to their fiscal capacities and spending needs; (ii) the municipalities located at mining regions receivedS/. 1.364,3 millions (US$ 455 millions) in excess, which represents a surplus of 67,5%; (iii)when a entire reform of the transfer system is implemented, the whole of the resources thatmunicipalities placed at mining regions receive in excess are redistributed between non-miningmunicipalities; (iv) the variance of the resources inter-regional distribution declines gradually ineach of the 3 stages of the proposed reform; (v) additional resources are not necessary to equalizethe intergovernmental transfer system, only political will is needed. At the end, the study establishes4 guidelines to implement a reform of the Peruvian intergovernmental transfer system.