The major purpose of this dissertation is to begin to experimentally study general equilibrium theory. Partial equilibrium analysis has been the focus of hundreds of experiments, and evidence abounds supporting the proposition that gains from trade will be realized in the market for a single good. Yet, in a general equilibrium context, almost no such documentation exists. Furthermore, general equilibrium theory is not amenable to testing via field data. Thus, at present, the theory that is the intellectual foundation of microeconomics remains untested. The natural starting point of such an investigation is the well-known Edgeworth Box environment. This involves conducting experiments within four major categories. In the first treatment, a two-person, two-good pure barter setting, subjects with given endowments effect trades over the goods. Information is incomplete but symmetric, with individuals having knowledge only of their own endowments and valuations. In the second treatment, prices are introduced to induce a budge constraint. Here, the experimenter acts as an auctioneer, adjusting prices based upon excess demand and supply. Third, the case of asymmetric information is considered, as subjects with full knowledge of both parties' endowments and valuations trade with the experimenter, who acts in a purely price-taking capacity. The final set of experiments extends the second treatment to an r-replication of the economy; here, price-taking behavior is the only individually rational strategy. The results of the barter experiments clearly support standard theoretical predictions, as all gains from trade are exhausted in virtually every case. However, one party usually captures most of these gains through superior bargaining ability. When prices are introduced there is often an initial attempt to behave strategically by at least one of the parties. However, in the limited information environment, it is rarely successful. Thus, the competitive equilibrium is almost always achieved. When information is asymmetric, however, the result is quite different; the majority of people do engage in strategic under-revelation of demand and are thus able to capture the maximum extra surplus available. The final treatment, that of the r-replication of the economy shows the surprising result that subjects in this environment cannot learn, in the alloted time, that behaving in a non-price-taking fashion is very costly.

This thesis explores two different approaches to the study of simple general equilibrium models in situations where "full" or "long-run" equilibrium does not prevail. The first part of the thesis examines the consequences of dynamizing the two-sector model of competitive equilibrium, in the sense of making explicit the process whereby momentary equilibrium (i.e., full equilibrium with a given factor endowment) is attained. A number of plausible adjustment mechanisms are proposed, of which the "short-run capital specificity" hypothesis is an interesting special case. The implications of these adjustment mechanisms for international trade theory, for the theory of proportional factor market distortions in both open and closed economies, for the behaviour of the Harris-Todaro model when capital is intersectorally mobile, and for the dynamic response of the trade balance to a devaluation in a small open economy are then examined. The second part of the thesis studies the properties of a neo-Keynesian temporary equilibrium, by which is meant a shortperiod equilibrium where agents base their behaviour on their expectations about the future and where prices and wages do not move to clear markets in the short run. It is shown that the closed economy model of Malinvaud and the open economy model of Dixit are both special cases of a more general model which incorporates a non-traded good whose price is sticky in the short run, and a traded good, whose price is determined on world markets. While the long-run properties of this model are shown to be fully consistent with the monetary approach to the balance of payments (so, for example, a devaluation has no real long-run effects), its short-run comparative statics properties are shown to provide, in some circumstances, considerable support for discretionary policy.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1982. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY / Bibliography: leaves 100-104. / by Sanjay Srivastava. / Ph.D.

Project (M.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2005. / Project (Dept. of Economics) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri--Rolla, 2007. / Vita. The entire thesis text is included in file. Title from title screen of thesis/dissertation PDF file (viewed November 26, 2007) Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-146).

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2001. / Bibliography: p. 648-661.

Proefschrift--Rotterdam. / "Stellingen": 2 p. inserted. Summary in Dutch. Bibliography: p. 146-149.

Proefschrift--Rotterdam. / "Stellingen": 2 p. inserted. Summary in Dutch. Bibliography: p. 146-149.