abstract: In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may result in differential incentives in governance through the selection of senior management and in the design of senior management compensation system. This thesis investigates four firms with four different types of ownership structures: a public listed firm with the controlling interest by the state, a public listed firm with a non-state-owned controlling interest, a public listed firm a family-owned controlling interest, and a Sino-foreign joint venture firm. By using a case study approach, I focus on two dimensions of ownership structure characteristics – ownership diversification and differences in property rights so as to document whether there are systematic differences in governance participation and executive compensation design. Specifically, I focused on whether such differences are reflected in management selection (which is linked to adverse selection and moral hazard problems) and in compensation design (the choices of performance measurements, performance pay, and in stock option or restricted stock). The results are consistent with my expectation – the nature of ownership structure does affect senior management compensation design. Policy implications are discussed accordingly. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2015

abstract: Accompanying with the development of economy system and the completion of legal framework, Chinese domestic PE industry not only transfused vigor and vividness to capital market, but also generated contribution to substantial economy with a rapid pace in recent decades. Depending on the first move advantage and an affinity with Chinese government, PE industry initially was led by state-owned enterprises. However, these non-market-oriented PE institutions confronted challenge from the perspective of culture, structure and mechanism and crises of outflow of human capital and lacking capability of sustainable development while private section and foreign capital enter the market. Based on the figure of PE investment and the pattern of historical development in foreign and domestic market, this article specifically analyzed the history of state-backed PE industry‘s development and both advantage and disadvantage of state-backed PE institutions according to real cases intending to improve the competitive strength of state-backed enterprises and to promote a state-backed PE institutions to world-class enterprises through the application of a multi-dimensional stock equity structure, the advantage in accessibility of resource as state-backed enterprises, a market-oriented system and the ability of key staffs. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2015