In this paper I argue that the presentist cannot deal adequately with cross-temporal relations. I look at several attempts to solve the cross-temporal relations objection and find only one that might work. Still I argue that even it can't deal with cross-temporal spatial relations such as continuity. I defend Sider here against two plausible responses. The first is that instantaneous velocities can be employed on the presentist's behalf to get them out of trouble. I argue that this response won't work. The second is a response by Dean Zimmerman in which the presentist accepts that past space-time points exist at present. I argue that his response does indeed provide us with a solution but that the cost of that solution is far too high. / text

This thesis considers the relationship between the ontology of time and the passage of time, and concludes that the best way to understand this relationship is found in the combination of eternalism with the view that the passage of time is an objective, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal world. The steps I take to reach this conclusion are as follows: first, I propose that eternalism is the best ontological basis from which to consider temporal passage; second, I argue that the moving spotlight theory, which attempts to reconcile eternalism with temporal passage, is an inadequate representation of the relationship between eternalism and temporal passage; third, I suggest that temporal passage is best understood as a mind-independent phenomenon. I argue that eternalism is preferable to presentism insofar as presentism suffers from inconsistencies that eternalism both avoids and easily solves. I then defend the rejection of the moving spotlight theory by an appeal to the incoherency of the moving now. Finally, I dismiss mind-dependent temporal passage in favour of mind-independent temporal passage based on the irreducibility of temporal passage in and of itself. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-12 21:21:29.147

This study discusses how the literary device of time travel can limit or empower protagonists. The main focus is on H.G. Wells The Time Machine and the two films of the same name inspired by the novel. The popularity of time travel in film springs from the myriad storytelling possibilities the device provides, and the writers agenda determines what place, if any, logic and causality have in the story. Some narratives endorse the theory of eternalism, where time is fixed and the time travellers actions are fated to be consistent with the history the traveller knows. But many films rely on theories of multiple timelines and many worlds, giving the traveller a much greater range of agency. Paradoxes of causality can inhibit the travellers actions as well. This essay discusses the broad spectrum in time travel narrative, where at one end travellers are imprisoned in history, and at the other they enjoy a great deal of freedom.

This study discusses how the literary device of time travel can limit or empower protagonists. The main focus is on H.G. Wells The Time Machine and the two films of the same name inspired by the novel. The popularity of time travel in film springs from the myriad storytelling possibilities the device provides, and the writers agenda determines what place, if any, logic and causality have in the story. Some narratives endorse the theory of eternalism, where time is fixed and the time travellers actions are fated to be consistent with the history the traveller knows. But many films rely on theories of multiple timelines and many worlds, giving the traveller a much greater range of agency. Paradoxes of causality can inhibit the travellers actions as well. This essay discusses the broad spectrum in time travel narrative, where at one end travellers are imprisoned in history, and at the other they enjoy a great deal of freedom.

Yes / The essay revisits the puzzle of the ‘passage’ of time in relation to EPR-type measurements and asks what philosophical consequences can be drawn from them. Some argue that the lack of invariance of temporal order in the measurement of a space-like related EPR pair, under relativistic motion, casts serious doubts on the ‘reality’ of the lapse of time. Others argue that certain features of quantum mechanics establish a tensed theory of time – understood here as Possibilism or the growing block universe. The paper analyzes the employment of frame-invariant entropic clocks in a relativistic setting and argues that tenselessness does not imply timelessness. But this conclusion does not support a tensed theory of time, which requires a preferred foliation. It is argued that the only reliable inference from the EPR example and the use of entropic clocks is an inference not just to a Leibnizian order of the succession of events but a frame-invariant order according to some selected clocks.