M.Phil. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

This thesis investigates Habermas's attempt to establish a credible form of universalism in moral and political philosophy by means of the theoretical approach which he terms "discourse ethics." The central question motivating this study is whether Habermas succeeds in this ambition. Discourse ethics specifies a procedure which purports to enable all agents involved in a conflict of interest in which issues of justice are at stake to come to a rational and cooperative resolution. It proposes a position unique among contemporary approaches to justice in the strength and character of its anti-relativist stance: the plurality of human cultures and the situated character of human understanding do not, according to this theory, bar the way to arriving at a minimal form of moral universalism. Although the procedure specified in communicative ethics elucidates only a narrow range of concerns--those pertaining to justice in the strict sense--it aims to do so in a way valid across all human cultures. / Habermas's strategy for the defence of a species-wide moral universalism is, I argue, both the key feature of his position, and the least well understood. Discussion of discourse ethics to date has focussed almost exclusively on the question of its appropriateness to the context of modern, Western pluralism. An important reason for this focus has been the intricacy of Habermas's argumentative strategy, which links the recent work on discourse ethics to his longstanding project of developing a theory of communicative action. / The principle aim of this thesis is to clarify Habermas's position by explicating his programme of justification. In so doing, I draw attention to several problems in his approach as a mechanism for cross-cultural conflict adjudication, and endeavour to provide a more perspicuous account of the relation of Habermas's theory to its main philosophical competitors, especially Rawlsian deontology, and contextualism.

The possibility of considering the ethical domain as cognitive is a principal concern of contemporary moral philosophy. Following an analysis of Hilary Putnam's internal realism, I discuss how our usual conceptions of truth and factuality should be modified in order to render philosophical discourse free of the fact/value distinction. I then present a response to Gilbert Harman's argument for non-cognitivism in ethics and argue that, within an internal realism that incorporates such modified conceptions, the non-cognitive argument no longer carriers any weight.

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The aims of modern education are largely Enlightenment-inspired - thus postmodernism finds an uneasy foothold within educational theory. But the needs of the present are not so much for universal reason and truth as for respect and non-violence (which it is argued are the "spirit" of postmodernity). This research report suggests that the usefulness of postmodern thought (and particularly of deconstruction) to education is not so much political as ethical. Drawing upon recent work of Jacques Derrida and commentaries upon his work by Simon Critchley and Johan Degenaar, it is argued that deconstruction is inherently a discourse of moral advocacy and that although it undermines the ultimate validity of any particular thought system this does not render it nihilistic; rather it involves responsiveness and openness towards the Other (person or system). While a reading of postmodern pedagogy acknowledges this, the intention is more often linked to particular political agendas, especially radical and feminist , than to wider ethical issues. Within educational theory a deconstructive "ethic of ethics" has implications for the kinds of knowledge which will be taught, the social relations which will be promoted, and the kinds of educational provision which will be made - but without prescription and within wide bounds of possibility. / Thesis (M.Ed.) - University of Natal, Durban, 1995.

This study examines impediments to dynamic moral awareness. Following the understanding of knowledge developed by Michael Polanyi and Bernard Lonergan, ethics is presented not as a science of abstract norms and principles, but as a transformative science of reflection on moral activity. Drawing from the social sciences, negative structural patterns which corrupt transformative awareness are examined under the rubrics of self-deception, social ignorance, ideology, dependency and social conformity. These investigations identify and analyze sociological and psychological features of dynamic relationships preventing or corrupting processes of personal transformation and the building up of moral human community. At each stage of the study, the central role of economic and political structures and conditions influencing modern consciousness, and defining society, are taken into account. This research provides insights and analytical tools to increase our capacity to become aware of the subtle social psychological dynamics which stifle human creativity and block moral and social development within contemporary society.

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Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study is concerned with the possibility and characterisation of poststructural ethics and the ethics of general theories. It contains a review of selected readings on Modernity and provides a "snapshot" of an ethical system that is essentially rule based and privileges rationality. Some of the problems with such a system, such as inflexibility, tolerance based on superiority and force and the privileging of male gender is explored. It proceeds by perusing some literature on postmodernity as an open ethical system in which values are free floating and lists of rules are constantly produced and disregarded in a dizzying ethical free for all in which "anything goes". No value is considered more worthwhile than personal survival. As a starting point for reading Modernity and postmodernity together, Levinas introduces a radical perspective on ethics that can be read as a condemnation of postmodern morality. He relates an ethics in which the survival of the "other" is more important than the survival of the self. However, he does not ground the metaphysics of such a privilege in rationality or knowledge and hence does not turn it into an ethical rule, but rather, subtly shifts the responsibility for the other person to an ultimate responsibility for the Other as God. This radical responsibility is rejected by deconstruction which does not reject either postmodernity or Modernity but is an attempt to think through the limits of rule-orientated rationality, free-play and mystical metaphysics to produce an ethical awareness that has a sensitivity for the complexity of context. Through the notion of "writing", the peculiarities it displays and the objections it attracts, Derrida seeks to establish a uniquely ethical writing that is both a stable manifestation of ethics and a dynamic engagement with those subject to it. With these readings in the background the thesis attempts to provide a framework for poststructural ethics. It is an ethics based in the notion of friendship but does not ground itself in any guarantees. It re-evaluates rationality in terms of a sublime struggle for meaning and truth. This sublime struggle offers a unique perspective on political debates that strive towards responsible development for multicultural societies and also on a sociological approach to law and the ability to dispense justice without undue prejudice. The main contention of the thesis is that although poststructuralism does not suppose a grounding metaphysics in either rationality or responsibility towards God it cannot be satisfied with the self-indulgent nihilism of an "anything goes" postmodernism. Thus, it depends on the notion of a "complex system" that "self-organises" and produces limits through spontaneous connections. Through the working of deconstruction complex systems can take on a more human manifestation as friendships flourish and decay through the interaction of faces. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie is gemoeid met die moontlikheid en karakterisering van poststrukturele etiek en die etiek van algemene teorië. Dit bevat In geselekteerde oorsig van Moderniteit en verskaf In "kiekie" van In etiese sisteem wat essentieël op reëls gebasseer is en rationaliteit privilegieer. Sommige probleme met so In sisteem, soos byvoorbeeld onbuigsaamheid, verdraagsaamheid gegrond in superioriteit, geweld en die privilegieering van manlikheid, word ondersoek. Die studie sit voort deur sommige literatuur oor postmoderniteit as In oop etiese sisteem onder oë te neem. So In sisteem veronderstel vryvloeiende waardes en lyste van reëls wat gedurig geproduseer en geabandoneer word in In duisligwekkende etiese vryspel wat beskryf kan word as "anything goes". Geen waarde word hoër geag as persoonlike oorlewing nie. As die beginpunt van In lesing wat Moderniteit en postmoderniteit met mekaar in verband bring verskaf Levinas In radikale perspektief op etiek wat verdoemend staan teenoor die moraliteit van postmoderniteit. Hy beskryf In etiek waarin die oorlewing van die "ander" meer belangrik geag word as die oorlewing van die self. Hy grond egter nie die metafisieka van so In voorreg in rationaliteit of kennis nie, en lê dit dus nie neer as In etiese reël nie, maar verskuif eerder op subtitle wyse verantwoordelikheid vir die ander persoon na In uiteindelike verantwoordelikheid vir die Ander as God. Laasgenoemde radikale verantwoordelikheid word deur dekonstruksie verwerp in In poging om postmoderniteit en Moderniteit saam te snoer en die limiete van reël-georiënteerde rationaliteit, vry-spel en mistiese metafisieka deur te dink. Hierdeur word 'n etiese gewaarwording geproduseer wat sensitiviteit vir die kompleksiteite van konteks vertoon. Deur die nosie van "skryf', die eienaardighede en teenkanting daaraan verbonde, is Derrida op soek na die neerlegging van In unike etiese skryf wat beide In stabille manifestasie van etiek is en 'n dinamiese betrokkenheid by die wat daaraan onderhewig staan. Met hierdie leeswerk in die agtergrond poog die tesis om 'n raamwerk vir poststrukturele etiek daar te stel. Dit is In etiek wat as basis die nosie van vriendskap aanvaar sonder om enige waarborge uit te deel. Rationaliteit word gere-evalueer in terme van In sublime stryd vir betekenis en waarheid. Hierdie sublime stryd bring 'n unieke perspektief na politieke debatte wat volhoubare ontwikkeling in multikulturele samelewings ten doel het en vir In sosiologiese benadering tot die reg en regsvaardigheid. Alhoewel poststrukturele etiek nie In metanarratief veronderstel, soos die etiek van Moderniteit, nie kan dit egter ook nie tevrede wees met die destabiliserende nihilisme van 'n "anything goes" postmodernisme nie. Poststrukturele etiek steun dus swaar op die idee van 'n "komplekse sisteem" wat self-organiseer en llrniette stel deur middel van spontane konneksievorming. Deur die werking van dekonstruksie kan so In komplekse sisteem ook in meer menslike terme verwoord word as vriendskappe wat groei en vergaan in die interaksie tussen "gesigte".

This thesis is an exercise in the retrieval of a critique of the moral language of rights. Grounded in her account of moral agency and her analysis of force, Simone Weil's critique of rights language goes beyond, although it contains, the Marxist view of rights language as ideological, as masking power relations. Weil argued not only that humans are unable to extract themselves from social and economic relations in order to appear equal on the political level, but also they are unable to extract themselves from the consequences of force. The thesis clarifies the Weilian appeal to examine in detail the consequences of force as a precondition to justice. Failure to conduct such an examination Weil views as a flight from reality, a consolation. Weil argued that facing the consequences of force is a virtue and requires the exercise of attention, a pivotal concept of her paradigm of renunciation. Weil's ethical category of affliction represents the psycho-social dimensions of extreme forms of victimization. Weil distinguished three objects of violation that compose reification: the body, self-interpretation and relatedness. The capacity to articulate, Weil argues, is impaired by practices which result in affliction. The recognition of muteness engenders understanding of the depth of violation. The impact of the muteness of the afflicted on the public sphere, discourse, and conceptions of justice is disclosed by the ethical category of affliction. The category of affliction discloses, not the absent voice but, the absence of a voice.