The idea that ‘business ethics' picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action. The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct' collective entities. From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential' moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.

The emergence of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa as a legal theory, which is a purposive approach to the law in which the main purposes of the law are considered as deriving elements of the legal rulings, has occurred in a particular socio-political and cultural context for the Shīʿa and within a particular epistemological construction. Given the lack of a historical reading of Shīʿī jurisprudence and the limitations of the methodological approaches which have to date been employed, this research applies a holistic approach. “The Bahbahānian paradigm” is identified as the overarching epistemological paradigm in modern and contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence. The Bahbahanian paradigm was formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and is arguably characterised as being a combination of Aristotelian epistemologically, formalist methodologically and soft utilitarianism. Within this paradigm in the context of the twentieth century, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa emerged in Shīʿī thought, especially in its systematic and comprehensive theorisation by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī - a contemporary Shīʿī scholar. The introduction of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa approach represents a paradigm shift that departs epistemologically, methodologically and functionally from the Bahbahānian paradigm. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa paradigm is characterized as pragmatic epistemologically, more accessible and dynamic methodologically and employing a virtue ethic. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa reflects the eclipse of the quietist character of the previous paradigm and the ambition of the contemporary Shīʿī religious institution. This ambition comprises a more significant role in the public sphere, which is embodied in the application or renewal of the sharīʿa in reality on one hand, and confronting the systematical secularization of the modern nation-state of the public sphere on the other. Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is obligated to challenge three intellectual enterprises; that is, the classical Shīʿī jurisprudential reasoning by embracing hermeneutical tools which are more accessible to religious knowledge; the Sunnī soft utilitarian maqāṣidī approaches by providing virtue ethical jurisprudence; and the secular nation-state by providing a flexible legal system.

This diploma thesis deals with the Aristotelian virtue ethics and its renaissance in the twentieth century. Ethics is first defined generally as a separate science which belongs to the practical sciences. Subsequently, the emphasis on virtue ethics as one of the directions of normative ethics. A key part of the thesis deals with the ethics of virtue in Aristotle and interpretation corresponding more or less to the interpretation of the work of Nicomachean Ethics. The emphasis is on concepts of virtue, bliss and goodness. The development of u virtue ethics from the time of Aristotle until the twentieth century is also mentioned. The last part deals with the form of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, including the process how the ethics of virtue acquired its present form. It is also compared to the interpretation of virtue ethics in Aristotle and in the works of modern moral philosophers, particularly the work of Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue is emphasized.

(in English): The thesis deals with the problem of induced abortions. It focuses on, and offers an analysis of, common ways in which abortion has recently been defended in the Czech Republic. In an examination of usual lines of defence of abortion, a description of ongoing philosophical debate about morality of abortion is employed. Arguments founded on bodily integrity and drawn from general feministic positions are attacked with the aim to show that all these ways of defending abortion elude the crucial problems such as the moral status of a fetus, father rights, the nature of discourses which underlie women's choices to abort, and the consequences of the common contemporary view of abortions for women's lives. The tension between basic sexual needs and responsibility for a human life that begins is set forth as the pivotal problem. Concerning the theoretical question of the moral status of a fetus, the thesis endorses a skeptical stance. As a consequence, unassailable solution to the question of permissibility of abortions is rejected as an impossible task. Such a negative result invites a question of how, if at all,the contemporary discourse might be substantiated in which abortions are treated quite straightforwardly as permissible acts. The acquaintance with philosophical problems concerning...