This study aims to accomplish two tasks: First, it is argued that an &lsquo / ethical transcendental philosophy&rsquo / is possible with Levinas. Second, the concepts that bear this possibility to a philosophically acceptable level of cogency can be clarified. Philosopher&rsquo / s position in history of philosophy suggests a kind of &lsquo / externality&rsquo / in the sense that he is not within the realm of very tradition. Levinas&rsquo / predisposition is rather to employ what he calls &lsquo / peri-phrases&rsquo / that hinder the philosopher to settle in the existing structure of concepts (read as Greek language). This position can also be read as a resistance to dominating forms of knowledge. Levinas takes this attitude as an important point of resistance against Western metaphysics that puts the ontology at the center. Against this tradition, he celebrates both the &lsquo / encounter with the Other&rsquo / as a pilot point in ethics, one that all rest of which follows from, and the priority of &lsquo / the Good&rsquo / . In such a way, &lsquo / I&rsquo / has been put into question in its gay independence without any reference to self contained totality, of the kind which is &lsquo / self intelligible&rsquo / . This attachment that is infinition, of infinity helps us experience not a totality, but &lsquo / otherwise than being&rsquo / . This attitute might resonate with the Kantian attempt displacing knowledge in order to make room for morality. However, a closer reading would notice that there is another agenda here, one that attempts to go to a status of pre-rationality, beyond rationality, so to speak an agenda that radicalizes the Kantian attempt. Derrida, a philosopher who showed that this attempt was just impossible, impossible in the sense that it was contaminated at the very beginning, skillfully benefits from the very inspiration Levinas has provided with. All these attempts and conceptual suggestions have been examined and analyzed, and the Levinasian inspiration has been tried to be elucidated.

The concept of desire has been central to most recent philosophical debates, in various forms and styles. I have argued in the present study that, one of the main motivations for this apparent interest in the concept of desire is the result of the increasing awareness of the shortcomings of those presuppositions revolving around an &ldquo / autonomous subject&rdquo / , &ldquo / transcendence&rdquo / , &ldquo / representation&rdquo / , and &ldquo / moral subjectivity&rdquo / . Desire, in this vein, is conceived and put into practice by the traditional philosophy as one among the other attributes that cannot be considered without reference to man. Desire as such is conceived as something that is necessarily controlled and managed by reason. Ethics and politics, in terms of these ill-conceived presuppositions, are narratives erected upon this tension that necessarily refers to a self-conscious subject and her subversive desires. I argue, in this study, for the possibility of imagining other variants of desire, i.e., something other than traditionally established debates, where desire is no longer conceived in strict reference to human beings. These novel accounts, which I will attempt to uncover, hope, will help us see in what ways desire can be considered within the concept of pure immanence and the realm post-humanist ethico-politics. Spinoza, Nietzsche and certainly Deleuze and Guattari are on this side. Desire, according to this non-tradition, belongs to immanence. In arguing for the legitimacy of two affirmative notions of desire, namely, that of immanent desire and embodied desire, I tried to establish a continuity between immanence (totality of bodies and constant differing) and embodied desire (singular intensities), and by means of which I have drawn attention to the importance of a new vision of ethics and politics that might work, not through the already established form of subjectivities, but through new forms of individuation and flow-like encounters of bodies.

O presente trabalho, pautado na análise de textos de autores que se ocuparam ou não da educação como tema, retoma a antiga e sempre atual questão do ensino das atitudes morais. Nesta discussão, indicam-se dois elementos que podem enriquecer e até contribuir decisivamente para esse ensino a virtude e a reflexão filosófica. De saída, questionam-se os discursos que objetivam construir atitudes morais, sobretudo com base no exame de seus possíveis significados para aqueles a quem se dirigem. Embora apoiado exclusivamente na bibliografia consultada, este trabalho encontrou indicações de que a assimilação de algo que é externo pode ser mais proveitosa e dotada de significado quando existe um tempo para entendê-lo, analisá-lo e enfim absorvê-lo. Analogamente, a repetição reiterada de uma atitude pode ser ressignificada se essas repetições forem entremeadas por momentos de reflexão. Neste contexto, complementa-se a idéia de virtude fazendo-a sempre acompanhar de reflexão atenta e argumentação rigorosa, como convém às disposições e ações que demandam atualização permanente. O trabalho envolve também questões relativas ao conceito de ensino, procura delimitar os limites tênues entre moral e ética e tece algumas reflexões sobre a virtude. Finalmente, sustenta a idéia de uma crença alicerçada em fundamentos filosóficos e encerra-se com algumas observações sobre como a escola pode atuar a partir destas formulações. / This paper , based on the analysis of texts by authors who are not occupied or education as its theme , incorporates ancient and ever present issue of the teaching of moral attitudes . In this discussion , indicate are two elements that can enhance and even contribute decisively to this teaching virtue and philosophical reflection . Output , is the question discourses that aim at building moral attitudes , particularly based on the examination of its possible meanings for those to whom they are addressed . Although supported exclusively found in the literature , this study found indications that the assimilation of something that is external can be more profitable and endowed with meaning when there is a time to understand it , analyze it and finally absorb it . Similarly , the repeated repetition of an attitude can be re-signified whether these repeats are interspersed with moments of reflection . In this context, it complements the idea of making a virtue always follow careful and rigorous reasoning reflection, as befits the provisions and actions that require constant updating . The work also involves issues relating to the concept of education , aims at defining the tenuous boundaries between morals and ethics and offers some reflections on virtue . Finally, it supports the idea of a grounded in philosophical foundations and ends with some observations on how the school can act from these formulations belief.

In my doctorate thesis, I have discussed the notion of the experience of the ethical and its political consequences. In this context, I have pointed to the central strategy of Kantian ethics that is called transcendental strategy. Transcendental strategy relies on a concept of causality, which unlike the causality that governs the laws of nature, arises from freedom in its cosmological meaning. I have discussed Heideggerian challenge to this concept of causality from an ontological point of view that gives rise to totalitarian political consequences. In relation to Heideggerian challenge, I have argued that Derrida&rsquo / s critique of Heidegger gives rise to democratic political consequences that reconcile the origin of ethics with fiction through utilization of the transcendence of transcendentality. Thereby, I have argued that experience of the ethical for Derrida induces to similar political consequences with holistic pragmatism.

This research thesis focuses on the experiences of pre-service drama teachers and considers how process drama may assist them to reflect on key aspects of professional ethics such as mandatory codes or standards, principled moral reasoning, moral character, moral agency, and moral literacy. Research from higher education provides evidence that current pedagogical approaches used to prepare pre –professionals for practice in medicine, engineering, accountancy, business, psychology, counselling, nursing and education, rarely address the more holistic or affective dimensions of professional ethics such as moral character. Process drama, a form of educational drama, is a complex improvisational group experience that invites participants to create and assume roles, and select and manage symbols in order to create a fictional world exploring human experience. Many practitioners claim that process drama offers an aesthetic space to develop a deeper understanding of self and situations, expanding the participant’s consciousness and ways of knowing. However, little research has been conducted into the potential efficacy of process drama in professional ethics education for pre-professionals. This study utilizes practitioner research and case study to explore how process drama may contribute to the development of professional ethics education and pedagogy.

Dans le cadre d’une médecine de plus en plus technique et spécialisée, les médecins coopèrent de plus en plus ensemble au cours du parcours de soin du patient. Les relations confraternelles entre médecins sont réglementées partiellement par le Code de déontologie. Dans la pratique, il existe parfois des difficultés pouvant altérer la qualité de vie au travail des médecins. À partir de ce constat, l’objet de ce travail est de proposer une réflexion éthique pour ces relations. Après une approche méta-éthique pour définir quelle théorie éthique pourrait aider à conceptualiser l’agir relationnel confraternel, il nous est apparu que l’éthique des vertus était la plus appropriée pour répondre à des situations archétypales de difficultés pratiques. La première partie de ce travail fonde une éthique de la vertu dans le cadre d’une téléologie du bon soin choisie par le médecin au moyen de son intégration au corps médical, ce qui forge son identité médicale, dans un processus que nous appelons iatrologie et s’intégrant dans une approche de l’ordre narratif. La deuxième partie du travail développe trois vertus particulières de la confraternité, désignées par un travail de sciences humaines autour de l’analyse d’entretiens et de questionnaires réalisés auprès de jeunes médecins. Enfin, la troisième partie pose la question des rapports des vertus entre elles en vue de mettre en exergue une vertu architectonique. À partir des notions d’amitié et de justice, abordées à partir d’Aristote et de MacIntyre, nous proposons une vertu de justice se spécifiant dans ce que nous appelons la correction confraternelle. / Within the framework of a more and more technical and specialized medicine, the doctors cooperate more and more together during the course of care of the patient. The fraternal relations between doctors are partially regulated by the Code of ethics. In the practice, there are sometimes difficulties that can affect the quality of life at work for doctors. From this observation, the purpose of this work is to propose an ethical reflection for these relationships. After a meta-ethical approach to define which ethical theory could help to conceptualize confraternal interpersonal skills, it appeared to us that the ethic of virtues was the most appropriate to answer archetypal situations of practical difficulties.The first part of this work establishes an ethic of virtue as part of a teleology of the good care chosen by the physician through his integration into the medical profession, what forges its medical identity, in a process we call iatrology and which is integrated into an approach of the narrative order. The second part of the work develops three particular virtues of the fellowship, appointed by a work of human sciences around the analysis of conversations with young doctors and questionnaires filled in by young doctors. Finally, the third part raises the question of the relation of the virtues to one another to highlight an architectural virtue. From friendship and justice, approached from Aristotle and MacIntyre, we propose a virtue of justice that is specified in what we call the confraternal correction.

This submission is based on a critical analytical literature review of the moral paradigm of virtue ethics and a specific application of this to social work value discourse in search of lost identity. It echoes the philosophical academy's paradigmatic wars between 'act' and 'agent' appraisals in moral theory. Act appraisal theories focus on a person's act as the primary source of moral value whereas agent appraisal theories - whether 'agentprior' or stricter 'agent-based' versions - focus on a person's disposition to act morally. This generates a philosophical debate about which type of appraisal should take precedence in making an overall evaluation of a person's moral performance. My starting point is that at core social work is an altruistic activity entailing a deep commitment, a 'moral impulse', towards the distressed 'other'. This should privilege dispositional models of value that stress character and good motivation correctly applied - in effect making for an ethical career built upon the requisite moral virtues. However, the neo-liberal and neo-conservative state hegemony has all but vanquished the moral impulse and its correct application. In virtue ethical language, we live in 'vicious' times. I claim that social work's adherence to act appraisal Kantian and Utilitarian models is implicated in this loss. Kantian 'deontic' theory stresses inviolable moral principle to be obeyed irrespective of outcome: Utilitarian 'consequentualist' theory calculates the best moral outcome measured against principle. The withering of social work as a morally active profession has culminated in the state regulator's Code of Practice. This makes for a conformity of behaviour which I call 'proto-ethical' to distinguish it from 'ethics proper'. The Code demands that de-moralised practitioners dutifully follow policy, rules, procedures and targets - ersatz, piecemeal and simplistic forms of deontic and consequentualist act appraisals. Numerous inquiries into social work failures indict practitioners for such behaviour. I draw upon mainstream virtue ethical theory and the emergent social work counter discourse to get beyond both code and the simplified under-theoretisation of social work value. I defend a thesis regarding an identity-defining cluster of social work specific virtues. I propose two modules: 'righteous indignation' to capture the heartfelt moral impulse, and 'just generosity' to mindfully delineate the scope and legitimacy of the former. Their operation generates an exchange relationship with the client whereby the social worker builds 'surplus value' to give back more than must be taken in the transaction. I construct a social work specific minimal-maximal 'stability standard' to anchor the morally correct expression of these two modules and the estimation of surplus value. In satisficing terms, the standard describes what is good enough but is also potentially expansive. A derivative social work practice of moral value is embedded in an historic 'care and control' dialectic. The uncomfortable landscape is one of moral ambiguity and paradoxicality, to be navigated well in virtue terms. I argue that it is incongruous to speak of charactereological social worker virtues and vices and then not to employ the same paradigm to the client's moral world. This invites a functional analysis of virtue. The telos of social work - our moral impulse at work - directs us to scrutiny of the unsafe household. Our mandate is the well-being of the putative client within, discoursed in terms of functional life-stage virtues and vicious circumstance. I employ the allegorical device of a personal ethical journey from interested lay person to committed social worker, tracking the character-building moral peregrinations. I focus on two criticisms of virtue ethics - a philosophical fork. It is said that virtue ethical theory cannot of itself generate any reliable, independently validated action guidance. In so far as it does, the theory will endorse an as-given, even reactionary, criterion of right action, making 'virtue and vice' talk the bastion of the establishment power holders who control knowledge. I seek to repudiate these claims. Given that this demands a new approach to moral pedagogy, the practical implications for the suitability and training of social workers are discussed.

This dissertation examines the claim that, unlike utilitarianism and deontology, virtue ethics ascribes a positive role to emotions in moral evaluation by taking them as the constituents of moral goodness and moral value. I wish to identify the limit and scope of this claim and to show what kind of emotion theory is suitable for explaining the essential features of virtue ethics. To do so, I defend some kind of cognitivism, the cognitive-affective theory of emotion, as the most suitable theory for virtue ethics. I argue that the moral significance that virtue ethicists assign to emotions can only be explained by such a holistic and non-reductionist account of emotions. In order to demonstrate how the virtue ethicists&rsquo / positive treatment of emotions with respect to moral evaluations works in theory, I have looked at Aristotle&rsquo / s theory of emotions and ethics, paying special attention to his notion of the &lsquo / mean relative to us.&rsquo / We shall see that the &lsquo / mean relative to us,&rsquo / which entails the existence of suitable emotions being felt by the moral agent, is justified on the basis of such an idea. The other main purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether Kant&rsquo / s ethics is compatible with virtue ethics. My interpretation is that Kant&rsquo / s position on emotions oscillates between the negative and the instrumentalist view, while Aristotle&rsquo / s view is moralist. I will argue that even the most celebrated Kantian feeling of respect does not fall under the moralist position. Although Kant recognizes emotions as morally relevant in the determination of duties of virtue, the kind of roles he assigns to them are merely aesthetic, instrumental, or ornamental and regulative, all of which are secondary to pure practical reason. But, in virtue ethics, emotions and feelings play actual causative roles. They can both influence and be influenced from reason in the determination of virtuous actions / they are therefore both causally active and morally valuable in moral actions.