<p> Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is one of a handful of ancient philosophical theories that is widely known among philosophers generally. By contrast, Plato's discussions of measure are hardly known even among ancient philosophy specialists. It is unsurprising, then, that the influence of those discussions on Aristotle's doctrine has hardly been acknowledged, let alone examined in detail. The project of this dissertation is to fill this gap in our understanding; it is to examine the relationship between Plato's measure and Aristotle's mean.</p><p> In order to undertake this examination, accurate accounts of Plato's measure and of Aristotle's mean are needed. With regard to Plato, I pay particular attention to the <i>Statesman</i> and the <i>Philebus.</i> Out of the entire Platonic corpus, the passage on the art of measurement from the <i>Statesman</i> (283c-285c) is the clearest source of inspiration for Aristotle's doctrine. The standard interpretation of this difficult passage, however, is fundamentally mistaken, and so an alternative interpretation is needed. The discussions of measure in the <i>Philebus</i> supplement and illuminate this passage from the <i>Statesman</i> by elucidating the philosophical roles played by measure: measure both gives particular things their identities and serves as the relevant norm compliance with which renders those things good.</p><p> Turning to Aristotle, I develop a novel account of the doctrine of the mean. The need for such an account is especially pressing inasmuch as Aristotle's doctrine is often interpreted in a way that renders the doctrine philosophically implausible but that also has very little textual support. The novel account offered in this thesis is shown to handle readily the most common objections to Aristotle's doctrine.</p><p> With accurate accounts of measure and the mean, I then turn to comparing them along four points: normativity, ethical knowledge, what compliance with measure or the mean consists in, and absolutism (as opposed to relativism). The differences between Aristotle and Plato with regard to these four points reveal, I conclude, a fundamental difference in approach to ethical philosophy. For Plato, ethical theorizing is to be undertaken for the sake of gaining greater theoretical understanding; for Aristotle, its benefit is primarily practical.</p>

<p> This dissertation attempts to fill, in part, three lacunae in contemporary philosophical scholarship: first, the failure to identify the two distinct types of dialogism&mdash;psychological and interpersonal&mdash;that have been operative in discussions of the dialogical self; second, the lack of acknowledgement of the six most prominent features of interpersonal dialogism; and third, the unwillingness to recognize that interpersonal dialogism is a crucial feature of human ethical agency and identity. </p><p> In Chapter One, I explain why dialogism has been relatively neglected&mdash;and certainly underappreciated&mdash;in contemporary Western philosophy. In Chapter Two, I offer a picture of Mikhail Bakhtin&rsquo;s conception of dialogism. I explain why and how Bakhtin focuses on the novel in his account of dialogism. I then offer an account of Bakhtin&rsquo;s claim regarding the dialogism of the &lsquo;inner&rsquo; speech of thought. In the second part of Chapter Two, I offer an account of Gadamer&rsquo;s conception of dialogism. I begin my examination of Gadamer by discussing the event ontology that serves as the metaphysical framework for his account of &ldquo;play&rdquo; (Spiel) and dialogue. In doing so, I explain some of the most important ideas in this part of his thought, such as his notion of understanding, tradition, effective history, the fusion of horizons, and the text. I explain what Gadamer means by genuine conversation, or dialogue, and I then describe one of the most important ideas in Gadamer&rsquo;s thought&mdash;his notion of &ldquo;play.&rdquo; </p><p> In Chapter Three, I give a critical account of the most influential contemporary account of dialogism in psychology, offered by Hubert Hermans et al., specifically in terms of their establishment of dialogical self theory. My examination consists of several parts. First, I discuss the ways they conceptualize the self, temporally and spatially. Second, I offer a description of their account of I-positions within the dialogical self. Third, I examine their claims about the necessary features of the dialogical self, and argue against one of their claims, which says that dominance relations are intrinsic to dialogue. Fourth, I describe their account of the four kinds of relations that can emerge within the self (2010, 121). Fifth, I briefly discuss their view regarding the &ldquo;[t]hree models of self and identity, associated with different historical phases&rdquo; (4), that have predominated in Western history. Sixth, I consider their claim that there are &ldquo;positions&rdquo; within the self in addition to the &ldquo;I-positions&rdquo; noted above. And lastly, I evaluate their account of (what they call) the nine &ldquo;features of good dialogue&rdquo; (10). </p><p> In Chapter Four, I offer a critical evaluation of the account of dialogue and dialogism developed by Dmitri Nikulin, arguably the leading contemporary philosopher on the subjects. While I address the features of his account that I think are correct, I ultimately argue that it is problematic for three main reasons: first, it fails to recognize the proper relationship between dialogue and agency; second, its elucidation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for dialogue contains conceptual inconsistencies; and third, its conception of the relation between dialogue and personhood has potentially disastrous ethical implications. </p><p> In Chapter Five, I show how Heidegger&rsquo;s notions of Dasein&rsquo;s &ldquo;Being-with&rdquo; (Mitsein), &ldquo;discourse&rdquo; (Rede), and &ldquo;solicitude&rdquo; (Fursorge) help lay the groundwork for recognizing some important features of dialogism. I do three things in Chapter Six. First, I briefly discuss Charles Taylor&rsquo;s work on dialogism. Second, I offer my account of the seven most prominent features of dialogism. And third, I argue that dialogism is a crucial feature of ethical agency and identity. To do so, I offer an example of a personal (and social) virtue, namely, empathy, which illustrates the important role dialogism plays in ethical agency.</p>

<p>The following work explores two interrelated ideas of Stoic ethics. The first of these is oikeiosis, a process of identifying with alterity that enables human identity to become more inclusive and expansive. Oikeiosis is outwardly directed, bringing ever more complexity to identity by engaging with difference in the world. The second principle is homologia, the goal of establishing a harmonious life. Homologia is inwardly directed, ensuring the coherency and internal consistency of human experience. The two principles express polar aspects of identity, one centrifugal, the other centripetal. I seek to demonstrate that these are mutually supporting directions of moral development that, taken together, offer helpful resolutions to fundamental questions about ethical relationships: Why do (or should) people experience a moral commitment to others? How are commitments to others best balanced with responsibilities to oneself? Does a person have an equal moral obligation to all others, or is it morally legitimate to preference close friends and family?

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Arts

<p> Nietzsche famously calls for a revaluation of all values, repudiating the Christian moral tradition. As famously, it has never been clear on what basis Nietzsche condemns morality. Some have looked to Nietzsche's analysis of master morality and his celebration of power and have concluded that Nietzsche is a modem version of Callicles. For example, Brian Leiter argues that, according to Nietzsche, people come in two types-higher and lower. According to him, Nietzsche believes morality is good for lower types but bad for higher types. On this basis, Nietzsche repudiates morality. In contrast, this thesis concludes that morality is bad for all people, according to Nietzsche. Nietzsche evaluates morality on the basis of what promotes human flourishing, not the flourishing of higher types only. Finally, Nietzsche's higher types, unlike Callicles', are moral exemplars who foster a strong culture, challenging Leiter's implicit assumption that they are intrinsically valuable, to Nietzsche. </p>

<p> In this dissertation, I examine the prospects for moral particularism. Moral particularism, which, like most views, comes in a variety of flavors, is essentially the view that the role general principles have traditionally played in moral theorizing is overstated. In Chapter One, I lay out the groundwork for the theories which I will discuss in Chapters Two through Four &ndash; a framework which I will ultimately reject. The most prominent variety of particularism in the literature, and the subject of Chapter Two, is the one offered by Jonathan Dancy in his <i>Ethics Without Principles</i>. (Dancy 2004) Dancy argues for a holistic conception of practical reasons -- reasons that sometimes count in favor of &Phi;ing can, in other situations, count against &Phi;ing. He claims that the truth of holism leads rather immediately (though not directly) to moral particularism. The literature on particularism is flooded with arguments against Dancy. In Chapter Two, I discuss Dancy's particularism and rehearse what I take to be the strongest objections against his view. I take some of those arguments to be rather decisive. And so I suggest that for particularism to survive, we must move beyond Dancy's view. </p><p> In Chapter Three I examine another variety of moral particularism - that offered by David McNaughton and Piers Rawling. Given the objections leveled against Dancy, one maneuver for preserving particularism would be to have a variety that is less objectionable by being more like traditional generalist theories. McNaughton and Rawling's particularism is just such a view. However, for various reasons which I discuss in that chapter, I find McNaughton and Rawling's view also to be unsatisfactory. </p><p> Given that I take these two, the most prominent, strains of particularism to be the best developed, and given their problems, I suggest in Chapter Four that perhaps if particularism is untenable, particularists might best serve their aims by adopting quasi-generalist views. Essentially what particularists seem to be looking for is a view that privileges moral contexts over moral rules. The rules cannot adequately guide us, not exceptionlessly, at least, given the variety of moral situations in which we find ourselves. So, in this chapter I examine the moral contextualism offered by Margaret Olivia Little and Mark Norris Lance, as well as Pekka V\"{a}rynen's theory of hedged moral principles. If extant varieties of particularism face insurmountable problems, then perhaps there are varieties of generalism which privilege moral contexts enough to satisfy particularist intuitions. Ultimately, I find these views also to be inadequate. </p><p> The overarching theme of this work is that extant particularist views are inadequate in various ways all relating to their conception of a practical reason. And so, with that in mind, in Chapter Five, I argue that for particularists to maintain a foothold in the debate, they must rethink the conception of a practical reason they employ in their views. I suggest that there is room for a variety of particularism that rejects the traditional conception of practical reasons as holistic contributory considerations that we weigh together and against each other to determine what we ought to do. I call the view I am offering `Eliminativism', as it is an attempted elimination of contributory-reasons-talk from the discourse. I reject the contributory conception of reasons and offer a more coarse-grained conception of reasons for action that privileges context above all else, thereby giving particularism a coherent conception of reasons for action that enables them to eschew general principles.</p>

<p> An act is usually thought of as wrong only if it harms someone and to harm someone is, roughly speaking, to make her worse off. However, the view that an act is wrong only if it harms some particular individual restricts us to a person-affecting view about wrongness. If an act is wrong that does not make any individual worse off, this wrongness cannot be explained in terms of person-affecting consequences. I want to propose that an action can be wrong even if no particular individual is harmed by that act. It is the goal of this paper to show that not only is this a plausible view about wrongness, but it is the correct view. On this view, there can be wrongness in the harm caused by diminishing the overall value in the world or by making the world a worse place than it otherwise would have been.</p>

<p> Kant and Fichte's respective accounts of evil share many similarities. This paper seeks to determine if and identify where the two accounts diverge. Due to the systematic nature of German Idealist writing, it is impossible to compare the relevant doctrines of Kant and Fichte and passages in a vacuum. Each explanation belongs to a broader account of evil which itself fits into an even more expansive moral philosophy. Thus, the paper has two goals, one belonging to history of philosophy, the other to moral philosophy. The former involves analyzing the differences that exist between the accounts of evil provided by Kant in Part One of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Fichte in section 16 of his System of Ethics. The latter furthers our understanding of self-conceit by comparing Kant and Fichte's explanations of this evil disposition. Ultimately, Fichte's account helps to explain the Kantian doctrine taken from Rousseau of 'unsociable sociability.'</p>

<p> The frequency of use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for combat by the United States has increased dramatically in recent years. Since this technology has comprised a significant portion of American counter-terror operations abroad and there are virtually no signs of this practice slowing or ceasing in the foreseeable future, it is necessary to closely examine the ethical implications of remote-control warfare. At first glance, arguments supporting the use of "drones" seem robust and sensible: in theory, they save American military lives. But upon further investigation, the use of drones in practice actually creates morally murky, problematic situations that could lead to great transgression of the laws of a just war. I argue that for all its apparent benefits, drone use thrusts modern warfare at large into an ethically unprecedented arena of vast asymmetry between opposing forces and what this means for the authorized use of force in wartime.</p>

<p> Oppression is easily recognized. That is, at least, when oppression results from overt, consciously professed racism, for example, in which violence, explicit exclusion from economic opportunities, denial of adequate legal access, and open discrimination perpetuate the subjugation of a group of people. There are relatively clear legal remedies to such oppression. But this is not the case with covert oppression where the psychological harms and resulting legal and economic exclusion are every bit as real, but caused by concealed mechanisms subtly and systematically employed. In many cases, those with power and privilege use cultural stereotypes in order to sustain an unjust status quo. This is so even if the biases are implicit, automatic, and contrary to the consciously professed beliefs of the stereotyper. Furthermore, since many of these biases are not consciously reasoned into one's system of beliefs, and since they are notoriously difficult to bring to consciousness and dislodge via direct, logical confrontation, some other creative means of resistance is needed. </p><p> I argue that an indirect and imaginative route through subversive humor offers a means to raise consciousness about covert oppression and the mechanisms underlying it, reveal the errors of those with power who complacently sustain systematic oppression, and even open those people up to changing their minds. Subversive humor confronts serious matters, but in a playful manner that fosters creative and critical thinking, and cultivates a desire and skill for recognizing incongruities between our professed ideals and a reality that does not meet those standards. Successful subversive wits create fictional scenarios that highlight such moral incongruities, but, like philosophical thought experiments, they reveal a moral truth that also holds in the real world. Such humor offers opportunities for "border crossing" where the audience is encouraged to see from the perspectives of marginalized people who, because they inhabit ambiguous spaces in between the dominant and subordinate spheres, are in an epistemically privileged position with respect to matters of oppression. Subversive humorists open their audiences to the lived experiences of others, uncover the absurdities of otherwise <i>covert</i> oppression, and appeal to our desire to be truthful and just.</p>