This dissertation defends a Kantianism that espouses an ethics of principles while emphasizing the role of revising moral principles. It claims that the resources to account for moral revision can be found in Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, the cognitive power required for forming new concepts or principles on the basis of experience. Reflective judgment, on the interpretation elaborated here, involves both the incorporation of new moral particulars into a standing moral conceptual repertoire and the revision of moral universals on the basis of such alterations. The alteration of moral universals and accommodation of recalcitrant particulars are among the operations of what is termed the ‘reflective dimension’ of practical reasoning for Kant, alongside the moral dimension of application of a priori moral principle (most notably, the categorical imperative) typically taken to exhaust Kant’s moral philosophy. Incorporating a reflective dimension into practical deliberation calls for a broader virtue, namely the taking up of a critical stance to one’s principles in general, as well as the cultivation of inventiveness towards the formation of new principles or revision of preexisting ones. Autonomy presupposes heautonomy: the practical requirement of universalizing a given maxim presupposes, first, that one create this maxim, with a critical awareness of its perpetual revisability.

I inquire into the ethical significance of emotions in Aristotle’s thinking. Commentators who have thus far argued for the importance of emotions in Aristotle’s philosophy claim that they can be useful for ethical judgment or support premises of ethical reasoning. I claim that (1) emotions are indispensable for good ethical discernment or, what we may call, moral perception and they usefully constrain the possibilities of action and deliberation. They are indispensable because they register ethically significant information in a unique way; they do so in virtue of their intensity, duration, and the felt quality of pain or pleasure associated with them. (2) Emotions are also necessary for good ethical judgment (gnōmē) in at least some cases in legal (and political contexts) especially where the law fails to provide sufficient guidance or when the relevant wrong is not yet conceptualised. In these cases, emotions, I argue, can be elicited in a non-coercive way that respects and even enlists the agency of the listener.

The purpose of this essay is to critically examine the current legal status of animals in the United States and offer possible alternatives to the current legal rights for animals. This essay examines the failures of the legal system in protecting animals that have abilities very similar to our own. With an examination of these types of animals, this essay will explain why some animals merit the status of legal personhood to protect them from being carelessly used by others. Ultimately, this essay is an attempt to open the field of legal protection for many animals starting with a few through legal personhood.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1935. / Vita. Bibliography: p. [157].

This thesis argues that Kant has a viable, intellectualist account of moral character that is much richer and more interesting than has often been thought. This account is consistent with his broader practical philosophy, in particular, his account of moral worth. Chapter one establishes that Kant has a theory of education on which a child's inclinations are to be trained in preparation for her to grasp the moral law and acquire full moral agency. It argues that his account of habit is complex, recognizing a kind of moral value that is broader than his definition of moral worth. Chapter two argues that sympathy is, for Kant, a primarily cognitive disposition of special importance; this is because it provides knowledge of how the moral law applies in particular circumstances, therefore enabling an agent to fulfill her duties toward others. This chapter also resolves a puzzle concerning Kant's dual concept of character (as both intelligible and empirical) by drawing an analogy with one account of weakness of will. Chapter three develops an account of moral worth that incorporates these more palatable elements of Kant's account of moral character with the seemingly more austere elements familiar from the Groundwork. This theory allows for positive, participating inclinations alongside ascriptions of moral worth. Further, it introduces a distinction between full and mitigated moral worth, to account for agents who, for example, act rightly but for confused reasons as in the case of Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Chapter four responds to two objections to Kant on the basis of moral demandingness, one concerning psychological integration and personal relationships, the other concerning the value of non-moral goods more broadly. It then responds to some objections to his account of the highest good, or the idea of a world in which happiness is distributed in proportion to virtue.

Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de Moraes / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T05:41:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lima_JoaoSilva_D.pdf: 1167265 bytes, checksum: e98f804c801a4db8ce0726b70c494978 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: A pólis é uma comunidade política ordenada por uma politeía tendo em vista o bem viver para os seus politai. É na estreita relação entre pólis e politeía que se define a cidadania, enquanto direito de cidade e atividade própria do polítes. É a cidade (pólis), por meio dos seus cidadãos (politai), que escolhe a melhor constituição (politeía), e é esta, por sua vez, que estabelece todas as condições necessárias à felicidade (eudaimonía) da pólis e dos seus politai. Inserido na polis é que o homem pode cumprir sua função de vivente político, com a possibilidade de atingir uma vida melhor, que é viver bem. Com efeito, este fim (que é um bem) só pode ser alcançado por aqueles que adquirem o pleno direito de cidadão e, nesta condição, desenvolvem atividades (práticas ou teoréticas) conforme a excelência da virtude, tendo em vista o bem propriamente humano. A filosofia aristotélica se move no interior de uma hermenêutica do viver humano em comunidade, cuja expressão máxima culmina na experiência da cidadania. Não ser cidadão é, em última instância, ser um excluído da pólis, embora isto não signifique viver fora dela. Apenas a condição de cidadão possibilita ao homem exercer plenamente a força do lógos como vivente político numa comunidade de livres e iguais, comunidade política onde a vida humana atinge a plenitude de sua natureza. A pólis é a medida e o limite da humanidade do bem para o homem. Portanto, ao menos no plano da ação (vida política), que certamente difere da contemplação (vida teorética), a "cidadania" (ser cidadão) é a maior possibilidade de alcançar o "bem viver junto dos cidadãos", que finaliza eticamente toda a dimensão humana na pólis. É, portanto, na estreita correlação de pólis e politeía que reside o núcleo deste estudo sobre a ética da cidadania na Política de Aristóteles / Abstract: The pólis is a political community organized by a politeía, aiming at the well being of its politai. It is in the tight relation between pólis and politeía that citizenship is defined as the right to the city and activity proper to polítes. It is the city (pólis), through its citizens (politai) that chooses the best constitution, which, in turn, establishes all the necessary conditions to the happiness (eudaimonía) of the polis and its citizens (politai). Only within the polis can man accomplish his role of a political living being, having the possibility of achieving a better life, which is living well. As a matter of fact, that ultimate goal (which is itself an asset) can only be reached by those who acquire the full right to be a citizen, and in that condition develop (practical or theoretical) activities in accordance with virtue excellence, aiming at the specifically human good. Aristotelian philosophy moves inside a hermeneutics of the condition of human life in community, whose ultimate expression is the experience of citizenship. Not being a citizen is to be an individual, excluded from the polis, although that does not mean to live out of it. Only a citizen condition makes it possible for man to fully exert the logos strength as a political being in a community of free and equal individuals, political community in which human life reaches the plenitude of its nature. The pólis is the measure and the limit of the humanity of the good to man. Therefore, at least in the plan of action (political life), which certainly differs from the plan of contemplation (theoretical life), "citizenship" (being a citizen) is the greatest possibility of reaching the state of goodness of man living together, which ethically concludes the entire human dimension of the pólis. It is, therefore, in the tight correlation of pólis and politeía that resides the core of this study about the ethics of citizenship in Aristotle's Politics / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia Antiga / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Roberto Romano da Silva / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T03:05:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_MaercioAntoniode_M.pdf: 1292800 bytes, checksum: d7a2b04de4cce2217d4e7a48ba0295bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: A relação entre o entendimento e a vontade na Ética de Espinosa é um dos pontos de entrada importante para a inteligibilidade do sistema espinosano. Esta relação permite compreender, diretamente, não só a sua doutrina da vontade, como também a aplicação prática das concepções de tal doutrina. Neste sentido, o objetivo dessa dissertação é expor e examinar esta relação, visando principalmente à delimitação do universo ontológico que a sustenta e o estabelecimento de que o entendimento e a vontade são uma e a mesma coisa, como deduz as proposições 48 e 49 da Segunda Parte da Ética / Abstract: The relation between the understanding and the will in Spinoza¿s Ethics is one of the important entrance points for the intelligibility of the Spinozan system. This relation allows people to understand, directly, not only his doctrine of the wil, but also the practical application of the conceptions of such doctrine. In this sense, the objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate and examine this relation, seeking primarily the delimitation of the ontological universe that sustains it and the establishment that the understanding and the will are one and the same thing, as was traced by the propositions 48 and 49 of the Second Part of Ethics / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

In this study, I consider the possibility of extending Hannah Arendt's critiques of conformity and behavior and her insights on thinking and moral philosophy to Christian life and culture. With Arendt, I argue that the possibility to refrain from perpetrating great evils made possible by uncritical conformity resides within the activity of thinking itself, as she defines it. Furthermore, I argue, again with Arendt, that refraining from such evils is a moral decision which finds its ultimate standard in the self. Although she culls many helpful insights from religious traditions, Arendt refrains from extending her moral philosophy into any realm in which religion is considered to be the valid standard of what constitutes moral behavior. Instead, I argue, against Arendt, that Christians can, and perhaps should, develop a more mature understanding of religion and a more "covenantal" understanding of their relationship with the divine.

The highly complex role of the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO) requires the refinement of a multitude of competencies and leadership skills in this unprecedented time of healthcare reform. As the senior most patient advocate in our medical centers the CNO is responsible for translating research into practice, policy development and implementation creating value based patient-centric strategies to transform health care. The ability to sustain and thrive in this role is essential in repositioning nursing as a knowledgeable discipline actively contributing to the redesign of healthcare. This exploratory descriptive phenomenological study was designed to explore and describe the elements that contribute to the sustainment of CNOs in their practice of nurse executive leadership. Ray’s (1989) Theory of Bureaucratic Caring, Authentic Leadership Theory (Wong & Cummings, 2009), and Resiliency Theory (Earvolino- Ramirez (2007) provided the theoretical lens through which this study was grounded. Semi-structured telephonic interviews were conducted with twenty CNOs all with two consecutive years experience in their current role. Six themes emerged after thorough content analysis which describes the lived experience of sustainment. Each theme was supported by several subthemes. Themes emerged as: Loving the Profession, Having a Broader Impact Reflecting on One’s Own Work, Learning to Manage Conflict, Maintaining Work/Life Balance Working with Supportive Leaders. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection