Orientador: Giuliano Contento de Oliveira / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T23:38:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Blikstad_NicholasMagunsDeleuse_M.pdf: 2418684 bytes, checksum: d8b98bbe49c4a2141d314bf67f99c71c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de analisar a crise da zona do euro (2007-2013) à luz do processo de integração europeu do pós-guerra e da teoria econômica ortodoxa que embasou e legitimou a forma de constituição da zona do euro. Em relação ao processo de integração, o trabalho enfatiza cinco fatores: 1) mudança das motivações; 2) consolidação da liderança alemã; 3) como as diversas etapas de integração impactaram na coordenação de políticas econômicas; 4) inserção do bloco no sistema monetário e financeiro internacional em cada período; e 5) constituição de um bloco com países heterogêneos. Argumenta-se que a evolução do processo de integração, resultando na constituição de uma união monetária, em 1999, ocorreu sob influência da teoria econômica ortodoxa, com o Novo Consenso Macroeconômico e a Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes, além dos efeitos dessas teorias para as modificações da teoria das Áreas Monetárias Ótimas. Nesse sentido, sustenta-se que a institucionalidade da zona do euro, em um contexto de livre movimentação de capitais, resultou em problemas estruturais que permitiram: 1) a evolução dos desequilíbrios internos ao bloco, no período de expansão econômica (2000-2007), entre centro e periferia (PIIGS); 2) o aprofundamento e transformação da crise, a partir de 2010, com a crise dos títulos soberanos dos PIIGS; e 3) o prolongamento da crise, devido às recomendações realizadas pelas autoridades europeias. Defende-se, assim, que a crise da zona do euro é o resultado dessa dinâmica e que os países centrais possuem um papel essencial para sua determinação. Dessa forma, as causas da crise da zona do euro devem ser buscadas nos problemas estruturais do bloco, com a evolução de suas assimetrias internas e das dificuldades que a institucionalidade do euro impôs para a adoção de políticas econômicas autônomas, especialmente de caráter anticíclico. Para isso, será utilizado o referencial teórico keynesiano e pós-keynesiano, evidenciando a importância da incerteza, das expectativas e do comportamento dos bancos nesse processo / Abstract: This paper seeks to analyze the eurozone crisis (2007-2013) in the light of the European integration process and orthodox economic theory that contributed to legitimate the form of the constitution of the euro area. Regarding the integration process, the paper emphasizes five factors: 1) change in the motivations; 2) consolidation of the German leadership; 3) how the different integration steps impacted in the coordination of the economic policies; 4) insertion of the region in the international monetary and financial system in each period; and 5) establishment of a monetary union with heterogeneous countries. It is argued that the evolution of the integration process, resulting in the formation of a monetary union in 1999, occurred under the influence of orthodox economic theory, with the New Consensus Macroeconomic and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, in addition of the effects of these theories to the modifications of the theory of Optimal Currency Area. In this sense, the overall goal of the dissertation is to show that the institutions of the euro area, in a context of free movement of capital, resulted in structural problems that allowed: 1) development of internal imbalances, between center and periphery (PIIGS), in the economic expansion period (2000-2007); 2) deepening and transformation of the crisis, from 2010, with the crisis of sovereign bonds in the PIIGS; and 3) prolonging the crisis, due to recommendations made by the European authorities. It is argued, therefore, that the eurozone crisis is the result of this dynamic and those central countries has a key role in its determination. In this sense, the causes of the eurozone crisis must be sought in the structural problems of the monetary union, in the performance of its internal imbalances and the difficulties that the institutions of the euro imposed for the adoption of autonomous economic policies, especially countercyclical ones. For this, a theoretical framework of Keynesian and post-Keynesian nature will be used, highlighting the importance of uncertainty and bank behavior / Mestrado / Teoria Economica / Mestre em Ciências Econômicas

This thesis analyses the role of the Euromarket, an offshore market for Eurodollars or expatriate US dollars, in the re-emergence of global finance during the 1960s and 1970s. It charts not only its Cold War origins and the development of various markets for Eurodollars, but also institutions and policies that shaped them from the return to convertibility in 1958 to the ill-fated efforts to regulate the nascent market by international financial institutions. By examining the nature of Eurodollars as both a US and global currency, the thesis sheds light on the changing features of the governance of global finance and its relationship with the economic sovereignty of nation-states. It argues that the Euromarket underwent repeated contestations as politicians, bankers, and economists vested their political ambitions and cultural assumptions in it. The popular, academic, and policy debates challenged the speculative nature of Eurodollars which would destabilise the domestic as well as the international monetary system of the Bretton Woods system. Without a single monetary authority, the tendency of the Euromarket to transcend the order of capitalist nation-states constrained national governments’ capacity to control capital flows and the autonomy of domestic monetary policy. However, nation-states were not impotent but deliberately sought to exploit the liquid pool of capital in Eurodollars. It was not merely the US government that benefited from the seigniorage of Eurodollars and the City of London which was reborn as the international financial centre in the Euromarket. Continental European countries that were hesitant about European economic integration, the UK Labour government, developing countries in the Global South, and even the Communist bloc, resorted to the Euromarket for their national interests. The ambivalent attitudes of national governments and their conflict of interests resulted in the failure of coordinated efforts to introduce the rules of the game but facilitated the transnational network of finance in Eurodollars.

Techn. Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2004.