Spelling suggestions: "subject:"executive dominance"" "subject:"xecutive dominance""
1 |
Relationship between the executive and legislative authority in South Africa with reference to the role of the leader of government business in the legislative and oversight processesCalvert, Vanessa Yvonne January 2011 (has links)
Masters in Public Administration - MPA / The relationship between the executive and the legislature in South Africa is
determined by the Constitution. The study focuses on the separation of powers
in a single party-dominant system and examines the role of the Leader of
Government Business in parliamentary processes. The Leader of Government Business is appointed by the President in terms of Section 91(4) of the Constitution. The role is outlined in the terms of National Assembly Rule (150), while the functions have been developed over time since 1994. Though an executive function an office in parliament was established to act as conduit between the executive and the legislature on matters relating to the legislative and oversight processes. The office mainly fulfills its role by monitoring government‟s legislative programme and ensuring that government‟s priorities are achieved. Over the past 15 years, the office of the LOGB has developed into one that performs a dual function supporting both the executive and the legislature. Parliament relies more and more on this office in executing its oversight responsibilities with regard to the functions of programming in ensuring the availability of the executive, tracking matters of executive compliance and tracking vacancies in institutions that support democracy. The study employed a combination of research methods. It used a desk top study approach by consulting relevant literature on the subject matter. Interviews were conducted with both politicians and relevant officials in the South African Parliament and the House of Commons in Britain to gauge their perceptions, knowledge and experiences in respect of the role of the executive and the legislature in the legislative and oversight processes. Reports of Portfolio and Select Committees on deliberations during the legislative and oversight processes were consulted.
|
2 |
Doing provincial constitutions differently : codifying responsible government in the era of executive dominanceO'Flaherty, Liam Michael 11 1900 (has links)
This paper examines the changing nature of provincial constitutions in Canada. Provinces are granted the right to have their own constitutions by Sections 58-90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and various sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. The substance of provincial constitutions includes various Acts of provincial parliaments, long-standing constitutional conventions, unwritten rules and principles and common law. With respect to the practice of responsible government, the provinces have long relied on the traditionally “flexible” nature of their largely unwritten constitutions. Using the case studies of statutes dealing with the executive and legislative branches of government in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador, this paper analyzes recent changes in the statutes (and therefore constitutions) of the provinces. The analysis shows that there have been many changes in provincial constitutions on the subject of responsible government. The constitutions increasingly recognize the role of the Premier and cabinets, to the detriment of the traditional roles of Lieutenant Governors and the legislatures. This is in line with general trends in Canada’s provinces toward increased executive dominance. The practice of codifying changes in provincial constitutions is also more in line with how constitutional change happens in the states of comparable federations such as Australia and the United States.
|
3 |
Doing provincial constitutions differently : codifying responsible government in the era of executive dominanceO'Flaherty, Liam Michael 11 1900 (has links)
This paper examines the changing nature of provincial constitutions in Canada. Provinces are granted the right to have their own constitutions by Sections 58-90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and various sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. The substance of provincial constitutions includes various Acts of provincial parliaments, long-standing constitutional conventions, unwritten rules and principles and common law. With respect to the practice of responsible government, the provinces have long relied on the traditionally “flexible” nature of their largely unwritten constitutions. Using the case studies of statutes dealing with the executive and legislative branches of government in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador, this paper analyzes recent changes in the statutes (and therefore constitutions) of the provinces. The analysis shows that there have been many changes in provincial constitutions on the subject of responsible government. The constitutions increasingly recognize the role of the Premier and cabinets, to the detriment of the traditional roles of Lieutenant Governors and the legislatures. This is in line with general trends in Canada’s provinces toward increased executive dominance. The practice of codifying changes in provincial constitutions is also more in line with how constitutional change happens in the states of comparable federations such as Australia and the United States.
|
4 |
Doing provincial constitutions differently : codifying responsible government in the era of executive dominanceO'Flaherty, Liam Michael 11 1900 (has links)
This paper examines the changing nature of provincial constitutions in Canada. Provinces are granted the right to have their own constitutions by Sections 58-90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and various sections of the Constitution Act, 1982. The substance of provincial constitutions includes various Acts of provincial parliaments, long-standing constitutional conventions, unwritten rules and principles and common law. With respect to the practice of responsible government, the provinces have long relied on the traditionally “flexible” nature of their largely unwritten constitutions. Using the case studies of statutes dealing with the executive and legislative branches of government in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador, this paper analyzes recent changes in the statutes (and therefore constitutions) of the provinces. The analysis shows that there have been many changes in provincial constitutions on the subject of responsible government. The constitutions increasingly recognize the role of the Premier and cabinets, to the detriment of the traditional roles of Lieutenant Governors and the legislatures. This is in line with general trends in Canada’s provinces toward increased executive dominance. The practice of codifying changes in provincial constitutions is also more in line with how constitutional change happens in the states of comparable federations such as Australia and the United States. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate
|
Page generated in 0.0555 seconds