Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, Vancouver, BC, 2007. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-140).

In this study the psychological structures of two categories of religious and schizophrenic experience were examined from a phenomenological- existential perspective. Existing theories describe schizophrenia as an unfree, rigid experience with limited possibilities for selfhood. Some theorists believe, however, that some forms of schizophrenia can be seen as potential growth experiences which could facilitate existential renewal. These forms of schizophrenia are mystical, mythical or spiritual in nature. Religious experiences are, according to the literature, essentially renewal experiences facilitating existential growth and transformation through a particular system of thought and devotional relationship shared by a group of people. The Duquesne phenomenological- psychological method was used to analyse seven case studies, four of which involved schizophrenic experiences and three which involved religious conversion experiences. The general psychological structure which emerged through this analysis showed both schizophrenia and religious experience to have specific implications for the personal, social, material and mystical dimensions of being. The description of a specific psychological structure of experience which could optimally facilitate existential growth and transformation was attained by examining psychological structures where the subject's experience culminated in existential growth and transformation (such as religious experience and certain schizophrenIc experiences). As both these categories of experience displayed a strong mystical component, a psychological structure of experience which facilitates a transformative mystical experience was described. It can be concluded that an experience involving a mystical dimension could be transformative if the general psychological structure of the person displays (a) an openness towards reality as it presents itself (b) an experience of oneself as having a measure of existential freedom (c) a certain sense of security in one's own selfhood and (d) a social world which could understand, support and reflect inner experiences.

No description available.

Abstract not available

Applied research project (D. Min.)--School of Theology and Missions, Oral Roberts University, 2005. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-228).

No description available.

This study examines Christian experientialist epistemology as articulated of late by Alvin Plantinga especially and also William Alston. It situates their approach to the epistemic status of Christian belief claims within the overall outlook they have respectively developed on what features generally legitimate beliefs as being rationally responsible or even qualify some true beliefs as constituting knowledge. First to be taken up is Plantinga's journey from considering the deontological justification for basic belief in God to making his own externalist proposal for warranted belief at large. Next up for consideration is Alston's accent on adequate grounds and reliable process, attending as well to his stance on perceptual immediacy and belief-forming or doxastic practices in general. The study then looks at his case for Christian mystical practice as a dependable perceptual doxastic habit. Also treated is Alston's support for the process of forming Christian beliefs on testimony and his contention that these practices are realist and partly amenable to evaluation drawing on standards used also outside them. Then comes extended analysis of Plantinga's recent lengthy claim that, courtesy of special divine provisions, core Christian convictions can enjoy warrant even in the face of frequently alleged defeaters. / While Alston's reliabilist epistemology is not as strong as Plantinga's package on appropriate proper function, his appreciation for the communal contribution to second-level knowledge is an important supplement. He offers more perspective on the status of Christian belief overall. Plantinga's model suffers from some internal tensions which admit better resolution than he has yet supplied. His response to religious pluralism is a solid one within his framework. Like Alston, Plantinga unabashedly appeals to theology to indicate doxastic propriety, but could do so in a way more sensitive to hermeneutical challenges. Yet Plantinga's and Alston's realism is an attempt to honor the distance between God's knowledge and that of believers.

Describing Bernard Lonergan's relation to philosophy of religion is tricky business, with complications arising on different levels. To begin with, he does not use the term as it is usually understood in the field of the same name. Moreover, he addresses the same issues as philosophers of religion, but under the guise of philosophy of God or natural theology. Finally, he understands idiosyncratically the issue of religious experience, which is now a specialized category in philosophy of religion called upon to support formally rational statements for or against theistic belief. This central issue in Lonergan is further complicated by the fact that his idiosyncratic understanding of (religious) experience plays different roles in his thinking about God and religion. In this study I flesh out the dynamics of these various components, their interrelationships, and their function from early to late development. / My point of departure is a period in Lonergan's thought where he attributes more to the influence of religious experience in our thinking than at any time prior in his career. In chapter 1 I pursue some reasons that have been given for the tardiness of his response, intimating its nature and what it meant for his controversial "proof" for God's existence. Something of a detour is taken in chapter 2 since discussion of the concept of religious experience in Lonergan must grapple with what he means by experience in general. I decipher three senses to the term integral to his concept of consciousness that I distinguish from a contemporary model, that of David Chalmers. Since Lonergan is emphatic about distinguishing consciousness from its concept I trace this aspect of his philosophical claim against the background of Kant and Hegel, his main dialogue partners on the question. In chapter 3 I return to the specifically religious dimension of the notion of experience in the early Lonergan. Here I track the development of his category of religious experience as it moves from the periphery to the explanatory basis of his thought. In chapter 4 the relevant later literature in Lonergan is examined in which is seen the emergence of what is technically philosophy of religion to him. Among the distinctions I introduce is the difference between his model of religion and what he calls his philosophy of religion. Conceiving it historically, I see the former, his model of religion, as the departure point for what in his philosophy of religion he sets out to accomplish. They are related, of course, but not one and the same thing. To avoid confusion with the field of the same name, I recommend that we refer to his philosophy of religion as it is literally, as a philosophy of religious studies, distinguishing it firstly from his philosophy of God and secondly from his model of religious experience. / Besides providing an unprecedented comprehensive understanding of Lonergan's philosophy of religion, outlining the matter this way also aids in identifying precisely what are the points of contact between Lonergan's thoughts on God and religion and the issues presently discussed by philosophers of religion. The conclusion offers an example of this at the level of "philosophy of," the formal component of Lonergan's philosophy of religion in the generic sense in which I understand it. It represents steps toward a larger project, which I adumbrate in the appendix.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Western Seminary, Portland, OR, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 187-193).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, Deerfield, Ill., 1996. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 111-117).