This dissertation comprises three essays in experimental economics. The first investigates the extent of strategic behaviour in jury voting models. Existing experimental evidence in jury voting models shows subjects largely act in accordance with theoretical predictions, implying that they have the insight to condition their votes upon their own pivotality. The experiment presented here tests the extent of these abilities, finding that a large portion of subjects behave consistently with such insight in the face of several variations on the basic jury voting game, but largely fail to do so in another, perhaps due to the difficulty of extracting informational implications from counterintuitive strategies. The second investigates the extent to which hypothetical thinking - the ability to condition upon and extract information from hypothetical events - persists across different strategic environments. Two games of considerable interest in the experimental literature - jury voting games and common value auctions - each contain the feature that a sophisticated player can simplify the problem by conditioning upon a hypothetical event - pivotality and winning the auction, respectively - and extract from it information about the state of the world that might affect their own behaviour. This common element suggests that the capability that leads to sophisticated play in one should lead to the same in the other. This paper tests this connection through a within-subject experiment in which subjects each play both games. Little evidence is found that play in one relates to play in the other in any meaningful way. Finally, the third, co-authored with Evan Friedman, investigates the nature of errors relative to Nash equilibrium play in a family of two-by-two games. Using data on one- shot games, we study the mapping from the distribution of player j’s actions to the distribution of player i’s beliefs (over player j’s actions) and the mapping from player i’s payoffs (given beliefs) to the distribution over player i’s actions. In our laboratory experiment, subjects play a set of fully mixed 2 × 2 games without feedback and state their beliefs about which actions they expect their opponents to play. We find that (i) belief distributions tend to shift in the same direction as changes in opponents’ actions, (ii) beliefs are systematically biased–“conservative” for one player role and “extreme” for the other, (iii) rates of best response vary systematically across games, and (iv) systematic failures to maximize expected payoffs (given beliefs) are well explained by risk aversion. To better understand the belief formation process, we collect subject-level measures of strategic sophistication based on dominance solvable games. We find that (v) the player role itself has a strong effect on sophistication, (vi) sophistication measured in dominance solvable games strongly predicts behavior in fully mixed games, and (vii) belief elicitation significantly effects actions in a direction consistent with increasing sophistication.

Neoclassical economic theorys assumption of a strictly utility of money maximizing economic actor has been unable to explain such economic phenomena as involuntary unemployment and above market clearing wages. Efficiency wage theory, in its various forms, has provided some explanation for these labour market features. Akerlofs (1982) Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis or Partial Gift Exchange model of the labour market explains involuntary unemployment through the productivity enhancing effects of higher wages. In Akerlofs model this is done through a sort of unspoken gift exchange in which higher wages given to the workers are returned to the firm in the form of higher effort or productivity. <p>The Partial Gift Exchange model can also be modeled in a laboratory setting where its various predictions and assumptions can be tested. This has been done by a number of researchers over the last 15 years, who have generally found support for the validity of the theory using a one sided oral auction procedure. This thesis seeks to conduct a similar experiment, but in the form of a survey, the focus of which is the relationship between wages and effort. <p>A number of the results of previous experiments supporting the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis have also been generated in the survey, for example a positive relationship between wages and effort. New and interesting findings not previously examined in the lab or not present in previous experiment were also present in the survey: the negative effect of wage inequity; a positive coefficient for the gender dummy variable; and the negative effect of unemployment insurance. <p>The survey has produced some new and interesting results, transporting the survey back into the laboratory setting from which it was inspired would provide an interesting comparison.

I combine theory, experiments and econometrics to undertake the task of disentangling the subtleties and implications of the distinction between risk, uncertainty and ambiguity. One general conclusion is that the elements of this methodological trilogy are not equally advanced. For example, new experimental tools must be developed to adequately test the predictions of theory. My dissertation is an example of this dynamic between theoretical and applied economics.

Neoclassical economic theorys assumption of a strictly utility of money maximizing economic actor has been unable to explain such economic phenomena as involuntary unemployment and above market clearing wages. Efficiency wage theory, in its various forms, has provided some explanation for these labour market features. Akerlofs (1982) Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis or Partial Gift Exchange model of the labour market explains involuntary unemployment through the productivity enhancing effects of higher wages. In Akerlofs model this is done through a sort of unspoken gift exchange in which higher wages given to the workers are returned to the firm in the form of higher effort or productivity. <p>The Partial Gift Exchange model can also be modeled in a laboratory setting where its various predictions and assumptions can be tested. This has been done by a number of researchers over the last 15 years, who have generally found support for the validity of the theory using a one sided oral auction procedure. This thesis seeks to conduct a similar experiment, but in the form of a survey, the focus of which is the relationship between wages and effort. <p>A number of the results of previous experiments supporting the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis have also been generated in the survey, for example a positive relationship between wages and effort. New and interesting findings not previously examined in the lab or not present in previous experiment were also present in the survey: the negative effect of wage inequity; a positive coefficient for the gender dummy variable; and the negative effect of unemployment insurance. <p>The survey has produced some new and interesting results, transporting the survey back into the laboratory setting from which it was inspired would provide an interesting comparison.

The object of this study was to examine the extent of gender discrimination in the Swedish labour market by using a randomized correspondence testing procedure. To gather the data we utilized a field experiment where fictitious job applications where conducted and sent to real employers. The applications were carefully matched and differed only in gender which was signaled by a traditional Swedish male name or female name. The responses were then analyzed and were the basis in our tests for discrimination. We found only minor evidence of discrimination. Statistically significant discrimination was only found against males in the restaurant business and discrimination against females in full time positions.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2003.

Contrairement à l'hypothèse conventionnelle d'égoïsme avancée par la théorie standard, il est largement reconnu que les gens se comportent systématiquement de manière prosociale et, en outre, que la propension à le faire est sensible à plusieurs éléments du contexte décisionnel, qui autrefois étaient systématiquement relégués au second plan. Notre thèse s'intéresse particulièrement au fait que les préférences sociales constituent des éléments contextuels décisifs et examine la mesure dans laquelle les normes sociales peuvent expliquer des déviations comportementales qui autrement pourraient sembler irrationnelles. Dans un contexte où les budgets publics sont limités et ou les défis sociaux et environnementaux sont de plus en plus pressants, les interventions basées sur des approches comportementales peuvent constituer des instruments politiques attrayants, notamment du fait de leur moindre coût en comparaison des mesures basées sur descontraintes réglementaires et/ou sur des incitations économiques. Étant donné que les normes sociales peuvent être un déterminant important des performances globales d'une société dans des domaines très variés, nous étudions plusieurs aspects liés à la conception optimale de ces interventions comportementales qui exploitent les considérations normatives, ainsi que de la dynamique entre les normes sociales et les mesures institutionnelles formelles. Nous réalisons également une revue de la littérature relative à l'impact des interventions basées sur les normes sociales sur les comportementsenvironnementaux ainsi qu'aux mécanismes théoriques sous-jacents permettant d'expliciter le le rôle de ces normes dans le processus décisionnel. / A growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates that decision-making is embedded within complex personal, cognitive, and social contexts that call for a richer understanding of behavior than that described by traditional neoclassical economic theory. Contrary to the conventional selfishness assumption advanced by standard theory, it has now been established that people systematically behave in prosocial ways and furthermore, that the propensity to do so is sensitive to a variety of elements of decision context that have historically been considered irrelevant. We examine the assumptions that social preferences are outcome-regarding and consistent, and the extent to which social norms may be implicated in the divergences from these assumptions.This work has a strong applied focus. In an environment of limited public budgets and increasingly pressing social and environmental challenges, interventions based on behavioral insights can be appealing policy instruments, as they are often more economical than traditional command-and-control or incentive-based tools, and have the potential to generate reliable and immediate behavior change. Given that social norms can be an important determinant of aggregate societal outcomes in a diverse range of contexts, we investigate several aspects of the optimal design of behavioral interventions that leverage normative considerations, as well as the dynamics between social norms and formal institutional measures. These works are complemented by a review of the literature regarding the impact of social norm interventions on proenvironmental behaviors and of several theoretical accounts of the role that social norms play in the decision-making process.Through the use of both laboratory and online experiments (via Amazon Mechanical Turk and the NSF-funded Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences), the experimental studies that comprise the thesis examine the impact of valence framing on the effectiveness of a normative intervention, the capacity for a single normative intervention to generate heterogeneous behavioral impacts, and the effectiveness of certain informal norm-enforcement mechanisms and their interaction with formal institutional sanctions. From these studies, we draw a number of policy-relevant implications and identify the need for future work on a number of specific issues related to the role of social norms in behavior and accordingly, to the design of effective behavioral interventions that leverage social norms.

There are many contexts where an "everybody else is doing it" attitude is relevant. We evaluate the impact of this attitude in a multi-threshold public goods game. We use a lab experiment to study the role of providing information about contribution behavior to targeted subsets of individuals, and its effect on coordination. Treatments include one in which no information is provided and three others that vary in whom we provide information to: a random sample of subjects; those whose contributions are below the average of their group, and those whose contributions are above the average of their group. We find that the random provision of information is no different than not providing information at all. More importantly, average contributions improve with targeted treatments. Coordination waste is also lower with targeted treatments. The insights from this research are relevant more broadly to contexts including piracy, open innovation, and crowdfunding.

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<div>This dissertation expands on the economics of labeling products with credence quality attributes. Specifically, it aims at incorporating recent discussions in the food markets regarding 1) consumers' difficulty of perceiving the exact quality that labels try to communicate and 2) imperfect competition on quality and price between firms providing these labeled products. These items are important because consumers and firms have to navigate a market environment in which there exist many quality labels competing for consumers' preferences (e.g., nonGMO, USDA organic, Bioengineered label, local) with many of these labels offering different grades of quality (e.g., 100\% organic, organic, made with organic ingredients). While more quality label may match consumers' heterogeneous preferences, they may cause confusion and misperception among buyers, ultimately impacting efficiency and distribution of surplus in the market. More quality labels also may impact firms' decisions as firms can select themselves into different poles of the quality spectrum and avoid price competition by doing so. Finally, governmental policies that aim at educating consumers or provide them with more options (e.g., informational-based policies, graded USDA organic certification program) can have unintended consequences under an environment in which there exist market failures related to information or competition.</div><div><br></div><div>My goal is to evaluate this complex environment in three interconnected studies. The first study is an applied theory paper in which I show how curbing consumers' misperception about quality in a market of labeled credence attributes may decrease welfare if firms imperfectly compete in quality and prices. I show that this is true if consumers' misperception offers incentives for firms to either expand the size of the market or increase the average quality of products offered. The second essay empirically tests these insights in controlled laboratory experiments in which subjects act as sellers that compete along quality and price dimensions. I show that the insights of the theory paper hold particularly when consumers overvalue a high-quality product that holds a large market share. Finally, in the last study of this dissertation, I show that the rank-order of the USDA organic certification program may not hold in all markets, as consumers may not have a high willingness to pay for 100\% organic products. In the study, I show that consumers in the market of organic ground coffee market could be better off if USDA ditched the quality grade \textbf{100\% organic} of its program. Doing so would also benefit the most profitable firms in the market and increase welfare.</div><div><br></div><div>This dissertation shows that label programs and food policies that tackle quality in credence attributes must be designed with two main market characteristics in sight. The first is how well consumers understand the information in labels. The second is what is the degree of competition in the market and how firms can use the certification program to extract further rents from consumers.</div><div><br></div>