Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation investigates the importance of the imagination in the thought of F.W. J. Schelling and Martin Heidegger, and argues that Heidegger's later philosophy cannot be understood properly without appreciating Schelling's central importance for him. It is increasingly recognized today that Schelling, who had long been overlooked, is an important figure in post-Kantian German Idealism. However, his significance for Heidegger's concentration on the creative character of thought remains undervalued. I argue that, by tracing the theme of imagination in these thinkers, the milieu of Schelling's absolute idealism and that of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenlogy may be understood as distinct discourses that nevertheless share in a profound impulse to overcome sensible-intelligible and subject-object dualisms and retrieve and refine the productive and projective character of reason. This impulse is first evident in both thinkers' attention to the role of imagination in Kant's critical project (for Schelling, cir. 1800; for Heidegger, cir. 1929). It then proves inseparable from Schelling's treatments of intuition, identity, ground, and freedom; and it becomes still more evident in Heidegger's 1936 lecture course on Schelling and his affiliated inquiries into the essence of art and poetry. Even as Heidegger labors to deconstruct the alleged visual and subjectivist bias of metaphysics, he remains preoccupied with Schelling's ontological treatment of the law of identity and intent on translating Schelling's aesthetic emphasis into a poetic paradigm for philosophical inquiry. By focusing on how, alongside his engagement with Schelling, Heidegger endeavors to recover the imagination as a poetic (as opposed to reductive and willful) basis for reason, we attain a decisive rubric for understanding his later thought / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The topic of Tillich and Judaism has received relatively little scholarly treatment. This is despite the importance of Jews and Judaism for Tillich, which is established by numerous biographical details, including the reason for his opposition to the Nazi government and ensuing emigration to the United States in 1933 (Introduction and Chapter 1). Tillich’s ecumenical activities are acknowledged, but Tillich’s dialectical theological method is analyzed to determine how it could have justified his pro-Jewish stance. This refers to his consistent attacks on anti-Semitism, and after World War II, numerous lectures on the structural similarities between Judaism and Christianity, not to mention lifetime relationships with secular and religious Jews (Chapters 1 and 2). Tillich has a dialectical understanding of reality, influenced by F. W. J. Schelling, and this influences every major aspect of his theology. Select primary sources are analyzed to assess the evolution of Tillich’s idea of Judaism through his dialectical, theological and inclusive history of religion (Chapters 3 through 6). ‘Jewish prophetism’, highlighting the critical and existential dimensions of Judaism, emerged as the most characteristic expression, significantly, after World War I, as Tillich rejected the religious nationalism of his early adulthood. After World War II and the Holocaust, Tillich’s ‘dialectic of the Holy’ expressed the fullness of the divine reality as the permanent polar tension between the priestly/mystical/vertical/’Is’, and the prophetic/critical/horizontal/’Ought’. This polar tension is found in his ontology, Christology, and history of religion. The importance of Jewish prophetism, rooted in historic Judaism, would have made it difficult for Tillich to eliminate the Jewish roots of Christianity, compared to the so-called ‘German Christians’ prevalent in Weimar and Nazi Germany. Chapter 7 concludes with a criticism and defence of Tillich’s method. Tillich’s idea of Judaism is inadequate for interfaith dialogue, because it fails to address the fullness of Judaism’s own self-understandings, and is limited to the prophetic aspect. However, the prophetic aspect ensures that the critical and existential aspects of any religion endure in a transformation to a more adequate expression of the divine. Tillich’s ‘religion of the concrete spirit’ not only preserves the importance of Jewish prophetism, but opens the door to dialogue with non-theistic religions, such as Buddhism.

This dissertation critically reconsiders the dichotomy drawn in modern philosophy between faith and reason, especially as formalized by the German Idealists. The latter, I suggest, continue to influence how the philosophy of religion is conceived and what it is considered to be capable of accomplishing. Though originally used to reconcile religious faith with the philosophical reason that had animated forceful skepticism, this dichotomy also underscores a tension between the conceptualization of a rational public good and private religious values within pluralistic societies. I focus on the efforts of Kant, Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling to develop a philosophy of religion that distinguished philosophical reason and religious faith as distinct sources of theory while nevertheless establishing meaningful dialogue between each. The first chapter surveys Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of religion and argues that they struggled to maintain the otherness of religious faith relative to philosophical interpretation. The subsequent chapters each focus on a period of Schelling's intellectual development — his early criticisms of Kant, his mature rejection of German Idealism's subjective metaphysics, and his late philosophy of religion — as he developed an alternative philosophical approach to religion. This provides a means of exploring the challenges that a philosophy of religion must navigate to move beyond the problematic opposition of faith and reason. I conclude by considering the university as a promising context for reformulating this problematic dichotomy central to the philosophy of religion. The professional division of faculties embodies the abstract delineation of faith and reason and indicates the social and political dimension of such academic efforts. I argue that Schelling's contributions to the philosophy of religion point to the idea of the university as a vital framework for both reconsidering the opposition of faith and reason and moving beyond this schema in order to conceptualize effectively the contemporary conflicts between rational and religious authority within pluralistic societies.

Ce présent travail entend montrer comment Heidegger, à partir de 1927, renonce progressivement à toute pensée transcendantale, afin d’élaborer la conception d’un ethos fondamental. Nous insistons dans cette évolution sur le rôle de sa lecture de Schelling et en particulier des Recherches philosophiques sur l’essence de la liberté humaine en 1936 (mais aussi en 1927/28 et en 1941), lecture elle-même à concevoir dans le prolongement de son interprétation de la Métaphysique Θ 1-3 d’Aristote en 1931. Le premier pan de notre étude décrit et retrace les différentes étapes de l’abandon du transcendantal jusqu’à la fin des années 1930 : du pouvoir-être transcendantal à l’indigence transcendantale (fin des conditions de possibilité), puis de l’être comme possible à l’être comme im-possible (découverte du pouvoir (δύναμις) inhérent à l’être et fin de toute possibilisation). Dans un second pan, nous développons une partie plus systématique qui se conçoit comme un dialogue – et non comme une comparaison – établi entre les pensées médianes et tardives de Heidegger et de Schelling. Nous décelons en cela une convergence entre les deux auteurs dans leur conception d’un ethos, qui désigne une manière de séjourner au monde reposant sur la correspondance (Ent-sprechung) entre l’amour serein de l’homme et l’élément originaire de l’amour (l’être dans un cas, le Seigneur de l’être dans l’autre). Cet ethos est un ethos de l’im-possible, dans la mesure où s’il advient, il ne se laisse ni prévoir, ni programmer et ne répond à aucun horizon d’attente. C’est en cela qu’il permet le laisser-être de tous les étants comme ce qu’ils sont en propre. / In this dissertation I would like to show how Heidegger beginning in 1927 gradually distances himself from transcendental thought in order to work out the conception of a fundamental ethos. In this development in Heidegger’s thought I emphasize the role of his Schelling interpretation, specifically his lecture course on the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom from 1936 (but also from 1927/1928 and 1941). This reading of Schelling can be understood in relation to his 1931 interpretation of Metaphysics Θ 1-3 of Aristotle. The first part of my investigation describes and sketches out the different stages within the abandonment of the transcendental until the end of the 1930s : from the transcendental ability-to-be to the « transcendental neediness » (the end of the conditions of possibility), and from Being as possible to Being as im-possible (the discovery of the capability (δύναμις) that underlies Being ; the end of any enabling). In the second stage of the investigation I develop a more systematic part as a dialogue – as opposed to a comparison – between the middle and late thought of Heidegger and Schelling. Through this dialogue I show a convergence of both philosophers in their conceptions of ethos : ethos is a habitation in the world, which is based on the « correspondence » between the released love of humans and the primordial element of love (which is on the one hand Being and on the other hand the « Lord of Being »). This ethos is an ethos of the Im-possible, because, if it occurs, it cannot be anticipated or planned out and it is not inscribed in any horizon of expectation. It thereby discloses the letting-be of beings as their own.