Prior research has shown that even the most subjective fair value estimates are value-relevant (Song et al. 2010, Kolev 2009, Goh et al. 2009) and that managers appear to use Level 3 valuations opportunistically (Valencia 2011, Fiechter and Meyer 2009). However, the association between “traditional” measures of aggressiveness in financial reporting and biased estimates of fair value has not been previously studied. I test whether aggressiveness, as measured by discretionary accruals, real activities manipulation, and meeting-or-beating analysts’ consensus estimates, is positively associated with realized and unrealized gains and losses on Level instruments. Overall, I find limited support that aggressive firms opportunistically use fair value measurements to overstate earnings. Inferences remain the same whether only the unrealized component of gains/losses are examined and whether firms are classified into “suspect” or “non-suspect” groups.

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 sparked a debate over the usefulness of fair value accounting. Many banks and other financial institutions claim that the strict rules of fair value accounting exacerbated the financial crisis. To fix the problem of fair value accounting, FASB issued FAS 157-4, FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2. These Staff Positions relax the rules for fair value accounting by providing entities more flexibility in fair value estimates and OTTI reporting. This study explores the merits of these changes to fair value accounting and analyzes whether they will improve banks’ financial reporting. First, I examine the role of fair value accounting in the recent financial crisis. Next, I evaluate whether these Staff Positions result in more useful information to investors and other decision makers. I find evidence that suggests that fair value accounting had a limited role in the financial crisis and did not contribute to banks’ financial burdens. These findings bring into question the purpose and necessity of FAS 157-4, FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2. Furthermore, my analysis shows that these Staff Positions do not enhance the usefulness of information to decision makers. In fact, they appear to weaken the usefulness of financial information.