Since 1987, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has implemented a zero-tolerance policy for Listeria monocytogenes (Lm) in ready-to-eat (RTE) meat and poultry products, which culminated with the implementation of the Listeria rule in 2003. While researchers have extensively examined human listeriosis and its causative agent, Lm, there remained a significant gap in the current literature regarding how, singly or in combination, establishment size, RTE product type, Listeria alternative used, and FSIS district of production predict compliance with the Listeria rule. Therefore, the purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate the relationship between establishment size, RTE product type, Listeria alternative used, FSIS district of production, and compliance with the Listeria rule. The deterrence theory was used to explain the relationships and associations between variables. Archival Lm sampling data collected between 2012 and 2015 by FSIS was used to analyze the relationships. Chi-square tests showed no significant statistical relationship between establishment size, Listeria alternative used, FSIS district, and compliance, but they did show a significant association between compliance, RTE salt-cured products, and fully cooked products. Additionally, logistic regression analysis showed that the odds of an Lm-positive sample was higher for salt-cured products than for fully-cooked products. This study's findings indicate the need for a reevaluation of FSIS Listeria prevention policy, with a focus on salt-cured products. These results can influence positive social change if used in a targeted public health outreach/education program that focuses on the food safety risks associated with salt-cured products.

There is no known cure for the family of diseases known as Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. These include the infamous Mad Cow disease-technically known as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)--as well as its human form, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although BSE was initially diagnosed in Britain in 1986, the first U.S. regulation to prevent BSE was not enacted until three years later. This delayed reaction proved to be a trend amongst the regulatory agencies responsible for keeping the U.S. food supply safe and BSE-free. The focus of this study is to delineate the degree of U.S. government liability in the event of a BSE outbreak. This study takes into account the various aspects of administrative law as it relates to liability, along with the numerous medical and scientific documents from domestic as well as international authorities, to determine governmental liability. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the U.S. regulatory agencies concerned with food safety have created legislation consistently favoring industry concerns over those of public health. The legal system of a truly civilized society should be derived from ethical principles, which are then applied to institutions like the economy. When the process is reversed, when laws are based on industrial or economic concerns, ethics becomes an after-thought. This thesis sheds light on the government's handling of the threat of BSE: its shortcomings, competence, failures and successes. - ---