This study examines the differential effect of each of the ten largest bank failures on shareholders' wealth of non-failed banks over the period from 1973 through 1984. It examines how contagion and information effects of major bank failures have changed over time. FDIC policy for settling failures has important implications for system stability, and has changed over time. This study's purpose is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of FDIC policy. The FDIC's handling of the Penn Square failure signaled a policy shift and offers a unique opportunity to examine changes in market reactions to large bank failures. The literature on the capital market effects of major bank failures provides limited evidence on the impact of bank failures and related FDIC policy. Most fail to discriminate between contagion and information effects, and conduct analysis on one (or a few) bank failure(s) in the mid-1970s using traditional event study methodology. This study considers multivariate regression (MVRM) an appropriate methodology for bank failures which are likely to have simultaneous impact on non-failed banks. MVRM, which accounts for contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence of residuals, has three advantages over standard residual analysis: no "event clustering" problem, multiple hypotheses tests, and computational efficiency. This study uses daily stock-return data for fifty-one non-failed commercial banks. For each bank failure, the non-failed banksare grouped into three portfolios: "information-related," "large," and "small." The impact on each portfolio is tested for an average effect and joint hypotheses on excess return. This study offers evidence on no contagion effects and lack of information effects before Penn Square, strong information effects since Penn Square, contagion effects in post-Penn Square failures, and capital market discipline on large banks since Penn Square. There has been a change in the nature of the impact of bank failures since Penn Square.

Cette thèse cherche à intégrer une conception riche de l'information à l'étude des ruées bancaires et de la contagion informationnelle. Elle s'intéresse à la détection de l'insolvabilité bancaire et à l'initiation des procédures de résolution. Le premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature sur les ruées bancaires s'intéressant du modèle "canonique" de Diamond & Dybvig (1983, J Pol Econ 91 (3): 401-19) et ses alternatives. Le second chapitre traite des théories de la contagion financière. Puis, la thèse propose une réinterprétation de ces deux littératures s'intéressant aux propriétés qualitatives de l'information produite par l'apprentissage endogène. La seconde partie est consacrée aux conséquences de cette réinterprétation pour le droit bancaire. D'abord, des parallèles sont tracés entre les ruées bancaires et le modèle de la "négociation des créanciers" de la théorie de l'insolvabilité. L'analyse positive suggère qu'il satisfait mieux la littérature empirique, et l'analyse normative que les "négociations des créanciers" sont mieux gérées par les institutions de la faillite d'entreprise plutôt que par les résolutions administratives. Ensuite, ces apports sont utilisés pour une analyse comparative institutionnelle des régimes de faillite des grandes institutions financières non bancaires américaines s'appuyant sur les principes de la Robust Political Economy. La thèse présente deux résultats principaux. Les crises informationnelles bancaires produisent l'information nécessaire à leurs résolutions. L'initiation des procédures de résolution de l'insolvabilité par le débiteur peut être un mécanisme robuste dans certains des cas étudiés. / This dissertation seeks to integrate a rich conception of information in the study of bank runs and informational contagion. In particular, it is interested in the detection of bank insolvency and the initiation of insolvency resolution procedures.The first chapter is a review of the literature on bank runs focused on the "canonical" model of Diamond & Dybvig (1983, J Pol Econ 91 (3): 401-19) and its alternatives. The second chapter deals with the theories of financial contagion. Then the dissertation proposes a reinterpretation of these two literatures focusing on the qualitative properties of the information produced by endogenous learning.The second part deals with the consequences of this reinterpretation for banking law. First, parallels are drawn between bank runs and the "creditors' bargain" model of bankruptcy theory. The positive analysis suggests that it better satisfies the empirical literature, and normative analysis that "creditor bargains" are better managed by the institutions of corporate bankruptcy than administrative resolutions. Then, these contributions are used for a comparative institutional analysis of bankruptcy regimes large US non-bank financial institutions based on the principles of Robust Political Economy.The thesis has two main results. Informational banking crises produce the information necessary for their own resolutions. The initiation of insolvency resolution procedures by the debtor can be a robust mechanism in some of the cases studied.