Abstract This thesis examines the raison d�etre of the Australian Senate, the upper house of the Australian bicameral parliament, established in 1901. It explores the literature that might have influenced its establishment and structure, and the attitudes, ideals, experience and expectations of the men (and they were all men) who initiated its existence and designed its structure during the Federation Conventions of the 1890s. It goes on to study whether similar western and British influenced institutions were seen as models by the designers of the Senate, followed by an examination of its architecture, d�cor, and procedures, to determine the major influences at work on these aspects of the institution. The study was undertaken in view of the paucity of studies of the history and role of the Senate in relation to its powerful influence on the Government of Australia. Its structure can allow a minority of Senators to subvert or obstruct key measures passed by the lower house and is a serious issue for Governments in considering legislation. Answers are sought to the questions of how and why it was conceived and created and what role it was expected to play. The study does not extend beyond 1901 when the Senate was established except to examine the Provisional Parliament House, opened in 1927, which realised the vision of the Convention delegates who determined that the Senate was the house we had to have. The research approach began with an exhaustive study of the Records of the Federal Conventions of the 1890s, where the Constitution of Australia was drawn up, along with contemporary writings and modern comment on such institutions. A study of the men who designed the Senate was carried out, augmented with field visits to the Australian State Parliaments. Research was also conducted into upper houses identified by the delegates to the Australian Federal Conventions, to consider their influence on the design of the Senate. The conclusion is that the Senate was deliberately structured to emulate the then existing British system as far as possible; it was to be an august house of review and a bastion against democracy, or at least a check on hasty legislation. The delegates showed no desire to extinguish ties with Great Britain and their vision of an upper house was modelled directly on the House of Lords. The vast majority of delegates had cut their teeth in colonial upper houses, which were themselves closely modelled on the Lords. To not establish a Senate would have been to turn their backs on themselves. The Senate then, is not a hybrid of Washington and Westminster: the influence of the United States was limited to the composition of the Senate and its name and mediated through the filter of its British heritage. The example of other legislatures was unimportant except where it solved problems previously experienced in the Colonial Councils and which might have otherwise occurred in the Senate. The Senate was the upper house we had to have; it was a decision that was taken before the delegates even met.