Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 370-382). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Inaug-diss.--Greifswald. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. vii-ix.

Thesis--Princeton University. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1949. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 2002. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2943. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-53).

This thesis proposes a new constitutional framework for ownership and control of natural resources in the federation of Nigeria. It identifies exclusive federal ownership of natural resources as a tool of ethnic domination by Nigeria’s three dominant ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo against the oil-producing minorities of the Niger Delta region. It is argued that the inextricable link between federal ownership of natural resources and the economic and political interests of the major ethnic groups denotes that the current system of natural resource ownership has become a divisive and destabilizing feature of Nigerian federalism. Considering that Nigerian multi-ethnic federalism is designed primarily to prevent the domination of one ethnic group by another and also encourage each constituent unit of the federation to develop at its own pace, it is arguable that exclusive federal ownership of natural resources negates these underlying principles of Nigerian federalism by entrenching the domination of the Niger delta oil-producing minorities and depriving the oil-producing states of the right to develop at their own pace. These circumstances have triggered waves of ethnic nationalism and armed insurgency in the Niger delta region with grave implications for national stability. The thesis argues therefore that only a new system of natural resource ownership which recognizes both national and regional interests in natural resource ownership and development can conduce to peace in the troubled Niger delta region of the federation. It proposes constitutional devolution of ownership rights over onshore natural resources from the federal government to the constituent units of the federation under an arrangement whereby the federal government retains its legislative and regulatory powers. It is argued that this framework, among other benefits, will preserve the underlying principles of Nigerian federalism and halt the drift toward instability in Nigeria’s Niger delta region.

The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, the role of party politics in provision of public goods within a federal economy is analyzed. The public goods, which have inter-jurisdictional spillover effect, are locally produced with federal transfers and local revenues. The federal government can not commit to the level of transfers. The direction and magnitude of federal fund flows are influenced by local revenues as well as the re-election probability of the parties in power at the federal and provincial levels. Under such a scenario, politically motivated grants alter the incentive for raising local revenues. If votes swing heavily in favor of either the incumbent or the challenger in the provincial elections and/or if the coefficients for absolute prudence from the utility of public good are low enough, then grants are designed in such a way that the incentive for increasing revenues is lower in the province where the party identity is similar with the federal government. If these conditions are not met, such incentive is higher in the politically favorite regime. This result is generalized over different combinations of ruling parties in different seats of government. / In the second essay, the issue of dynamic public good provision within a federation is analyzed. Provinces lobby for more federal funds to produce a pure, dynamic public good such as an improvement in environmental quality. Allocation of federal funds is dictated by the level of lobbying. Consumers' welfare equals utility from the public good, net of lobbying cost. For symmetric provinces, the steady state lobbying level and stock of public good may be greater in the case when lobbyists are non-benevolent and captures a part of the federal grant as private rent. Second, with a rent-appropriating lobbyist, the welfare of the consumers may be higher under non-cooperative lobbying protocol. In case of asymmetric provinces, welfare may 'flow' from the less efficient province to the more efficient province, violating equalization principle within a federation. / In the third essay, the disciplinary role of elections is discussed. The incumbent politician in a province, with locally procured taxes, provides a local public good and appropriates some private rent. The incumbent's reputation decreases with the amount of rent. Voters may judge the performance of the incumbent in two ways: either his absolute performance matters or his performance is compared with that of the neighboring provinces' incumbent through yardstick competition. In a static setting, the unitary evaluation fares better than relative evaluation in restraining the politician. However, in a dynamic setting, when the stock of reputation increases through time, a relative evaluation imposes higher discipline on incumbent politician.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Cover title. "August 2005." Includes bibliographical references.