The essay at hand pursues the question as to how the German philosopher and poet Novalis has been able to characterize the whole of philosophy as a longing for home. In succession to a historic contextualization and research background there follows a presentation of certain ideas in Kant and Fichte. This aims to build the historico-philosophical ground for thinking the philosophy of Novalis as such a longing. A close reading of Novalis work Fichte-studies is the main justification for this interpretation. In accordance, Novalis understands philosophy as a longing for home arisen from the factual experience of the I. Feeling links this experience to theabsolute, thus providing the foundation for philosophy. Thus in thinking, this absolute ground can be set only relatively and indirectly. Philosophy can never establish direct contact with the absolute, but must be driven infinitely by thinking, through feeling, towards it. This drive shall be understood as a longing. Longing arrives through what is absolutely given in feeling. Longing moves towards re-establishing the given which thinking has lost. The I is understood as where being dwells. Herein the I's feeling of direct experience of its existence is reached — as a belonging to the world. Such a feeling of belonging is destined to evaporate with thinking. Nevertheless, thinking hopes to come home — it dreams this future. Hence we arrive at philosophy thought as a longing for home. In the end, we conclude with Novalis that philosophy thought this way must be procured by poetry.

This dissertation offers a re-interpretation of Novalis' Fichte Studien. I argue that several recent scholarly readings of this text unnecessarily exclude "organicism," or a panentheistic notion of the Absolute, in favor of "nonclosure," or the endless, because impossibly completed search for knowledge of the Absolute. My reading instead shows that, in his earliest philosophical text, Novalis makes the case for a Kantian discursive consciousness that can know itself, on Jacobian grounds, to be the byproduct (or accident) of a self-conditioning being or organism, and even more specifically a byproduct of God's panentheistic organism, at the same time that Novalis does not allow the possibility of discursive immediacy with that absolute standpoint; the epistemic consequence is that, while empirical science can proceed in the good faith that it makes valid reference to being, nonetheless it can never know its description of being to be final or complete. I call this position "organic nonclosure," and argue that Novalis holds it consistently throughout his very brief philosophical career. The keys to understanding Novalis' reconciliation of organicism and nonclosure are contextual and textual. Contextually, Novalis appreciates the inadvertent organicism in Jacobi's metacritique of Kant and also applies Jacobi's organicist metacritique to Fichte as well, with the result that Novalis' position in the Fichte Studien bears much resemblance to Herder's panentheistic ontology and modest epistemology. Textually, Novalis engages in a polysemy in the fragments of his Fichte Studien that performs the dependence of the sphere of empirical consciousness on a higher, intellectually intuitive being (a being that could only be a divinely creative intellection), and, simultaneously, the impossibility of presenting that identity in discursive terms. In other words, for Novalis, human knowledge of the existence of the organicist Absolute is enabled by, but also limited to, the merely contingent, empirical, and private experience of the dependence of the human subjective standpoint on an objectivity simply given to it.