Since the late 1990s, local governments in China have been relying heavily on land, which is a state-owned asset in urban area, to generate a significant amount of extra-budgetary revenue. Whilst this striking phenomenon has attracted numerous academic attentions, not many literatures shed the light on the process of central-local interactions. Adopting the procedural approach, this study examines the central-local fiscal and policy relations in the context of land finance. Taking the evidence from Guangdong province, this study understands the central-local relations as a process of policy interactions. After the central’s attempt to recentralize the fiscal resources of local governments in the mid-1990s, localities have been facing fiscal stress, which led them to rely heavily on land conveyance income, an extra-budgetary revenue in order to complement the fiscal shortage in budgetary account. However, a series of socioeconomic consequences of local fervent land development have attracted frequent central interventions. The most noticeable example is the housing macro-regulations introduced in light of the soaring housing prices. The example of the housing macro-regulations rejected the classic centrist model of the central-local relations in China, which implies a zero-sum game. On the contrary, in face of an issue influencing the conflicting core interests of both actors, both the powers of central and local governments were intensified to the extent that no one single actor will totally win over another. The powers of the central and local governments were also mutually transformed in the course of the game. It is argued that local governments display a sense of resistance against the central interventions as they have strong interests in land and real estate industry after tax sharing reform. On the other hand, it is unlikely for the central government to give concession to local governments as the failure to alleviate the consequences of land finance may cause public discontent and even political crises. The possible outcome is either a “win-win” situation or loss for both actors. To avoid a negative-sum outcome, collaboration and compromise are recommended. The centre is urged to address the root problem of misalignment of revenue and expenditure and to institutionalize the relationship between the centre and subnational governments. / published_or_final_version / China Development Studies / Master / Master of Arts in China Development Studies

prepared by Chu Yan-kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 125-145). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Acknowledgments --- p.iii-iv / List of Tables and Figures --- p.vii-ix / List of Abbreviations --- p.x / Abstract --- p.xi-xiv / Chapter Chapter One: --- Introduction --- p.1-39 / Chapter 1.1 --- Scope and Purpose --- p.1-2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Literature Review --- p.3-18 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Public Budgeting Researches in Hong Kong --- p.3-4 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- On-Hand Budgeting Theories --- p.5-12 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- Neo-Institutional Approach --- p.13-18 / Chapter 1.3 --- Conceptualization --- p.19-27 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Premises of the Explanatory Model --- p.19 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Rationale of the Model --- p.20-27 / Chapter 1.4 --- Operationalization --- p.28-36 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Working Definitions --- p.28-29 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Operationalization of the Research --- p.29-32 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Indicators and Hypotheses --- p.32-34 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- Methodology --- p.35-36 / Chapter 1.5 --- Organization of the Research --- p.37 / Notes --- p.38-39 / Chapter Chapter Two： --- The Background --- p.40-69 / Chapter 2.1 --- Characteristics of the Colonial Public Finance System & Marco-Economic Context for the Public Finance System --- p.40-47 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Revenue Aspect of the Public Finance System --- p.40-41 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Expenditure Aspect of the Public Finance System 42- --- p.47 / Chapter 2.2 --- Macro Economic Context for the Two Institutional Levels from the 1970s to the 1990s --- p.48-53 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Financially Non-Stringent & Stringent Periods for the First Level Institutions --- p.48-50 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Non-Hostile & Hostile Periods for the Second Level Institutions --- p.51-53 / Chapter 2.3 --- Composition and Characteristics of the Actors in the Two Institutional Levels --- p.54-59 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Actors in the First Level Institutions and the Second Level Institutions --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Superior Position of the Policy A ctors / the Star Chamber over the Administrative Departments in Public Finance --- p.54-59 / Chapter 2.4 --- Institutional Setting in the First Level Institutions and the Second Level Institutions --- p.59-62 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Institutional-Setting of the First Level Institutions --- p.59-61 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Institutional-Setting of the Second Level Institutions --- p.62 / Notes --- p.63-69 / Chapter Chapter Three: --- Analysis of First Level Institutions --- p.70-84 / Chapter 3.1 --- Crown Land Leasing Manipulation --- p.71-75 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Official Depiction by the Policy Actors --- p.71-72 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Temporal Land Sale Patterns --- p.73-75 / Chapter 3.2 --- Manipulation on the Operation of Colonial Taxation System --- p.76-83 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Adherence of How Tax Regime --- p.76-78 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Manipulation of the Content of Tax Reform by the Policy Actors --- p.79 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- "The Importance of Indirect Tax, Fees & Charges and Fund Recovery in Government Revenue Extraction" --- p.80-83 / Notes --- p.84 / Chapter Chapter Four: --- Analysis of Second Level Institutions --- p.85-114 / Chapter 4.1 --- "Budget Patterns of the Delivery Agency, the Regulatory Agency & the Delivery / Trading Agency" --- p.87-96 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Budget Patterns of the Delivery Agency 一 LD --- p.87-89 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Budget Patterns of the Regulatory Agencies ´ؤ TDD and PD --- p.90-92 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Budget Patterns of the Delivery / Trading Agency - HA &HD --- p.93-96 / Chapter 4.2 --- "Budget Patterns of the Taxing Agencies - FR, IRD, R&V, TR and AD" --- p.97-102 / Chapter 4.3 --- "Budget Patterns f or the Transfer/Regulatory Agency, the Servicing Agency and the Trading Agency" --- p.103-112 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- "Budget Patterns of the Regulatory / Transfer Agencies - PELB & WB, TB and HB" --- p.103-105 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Budget Patterns of the Servicing Agency - HRD --- p.106-107 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Budget Patterns of the Trading Agency - LDC --- p.108-112 / Notes --- p.113-114 / Chapter Chapter Five: --- Conclusion & Discussion --- p.115-120 / Appendices --- p.121-124 / Chapter I. --- Profile of Interviewees --- p.121 / Chapter II. --- Interview Questions for the Land & Housing Administrative Departments --- p.122 / Chapter III. --- Interview Questions for Finance Committee of the LegCo --- p.123 / Chapter IV. --- Interview Questions for the Housing Branch --- p.124 / References --- p.125-145 / Chapter A. --- "Economy, Society and Politics of Hong Kong" --- p.125-128 / Chapter B. --- Government Document and Interview Material --- p.129-132 / Chapter C. --- Local Budgetary Researches and Local Public Finance Material --- p.133-137 / Chapter D. --- Budgetary Theories and Neo-Institutionalism --- p.138-145

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

本文考察了中央地方財政自主性的變化，地方政府日益增長的對土地相關收入的依賴以及中國社會總體穩定程度，三者之間的因果關係。使用24個省、市、自治區，跨1998年至2006年的面板數據的回歸模型結果顯示地方政府從土地和房地產相關產業發展上獲得的收入顯著的惡化了以來信來訪數量衡量的社會穩定程度。而地方財政自主性的增強則可以抑制地方政府謀取壟斷地租所導致的信訪數量的增加。 / 本文認為，信訪量的持續攀升與拆遷征地糾紛不斷的直接肇因是1994年開始實行的一系列稅收改革所改變的中央地方政府之間的稅收分配以及稅收結構。地方政府近乎掠奪性的征地拆遷以囤積土地獲得壟斷性租金收入的做法都與該變化有關。但同時，上述現象也受到了以信訪為代表的黨政糾紛解決渠道與以訴訟為代表的司法糾紛解決途徑在威權政體等級制度中的局限性的影響。在等級制度中，中央和地方政府因自身利益不同而存在博弈關係，在各級政府之間還存在權力與相應社會責任分配上反向的 “差序格局“。層級越高的政府，掌握越多的政治權力以及相應的可供其用來“尋租“的政治與經濟資源，卻承擔越少的社會責任和風險。 / My dissertation investigates the causal mechanisms among three factors, the relative change of the central-local fiscal autonomy after 1994 fiscal reform, the increasing of local land derived-revenue in recent years, and the variations in the general level of social stability. Using a panel data set covering 24 provincial level administrative units in China during 1998-2006, the study suggests that the income local governments earned from land and real estate developments substantially and significantly threaten social stability. It also reveals that more fiscal autonomy of local governments does help restrain rising level of instablity caused by local governments' incentive to capture monopoly rent from land. / The findings are consistent with the argument that the fiscal rearrangement and restructuring provide incentives to local governments to practice fierce land requisition and house demolition in order to get monopoly rents through land hoarding. Yet the general level of social stability is also affected by the restrictions of disputes resolution channels lie within authoritarian hierarchical structure. The study highlights how two of the most important disputes resolution channels in China, i.e. petition and litigation, reflects the different incentive structure of central and local governments. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 韓佳. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-201) / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Han Jia. / 目錄 --- p.12 / 致謝 --- p.8 / 圖表索引 --- p.16 / Chapter 第一章 序言 --- p.20 / Chapter 1.1 --- 問題緣起 --- p.20 / Chapter 1.2 --- 文獻回顧 --- p.30 / Chapter 1.3 --- 實證材料來源說明 --- p.33 / Chapter 1.4 --- 章節小節 --- p.36 / Chapter 第一部份 --- p.38 / Chapter 第二章 --- 中央地方財政關係影響下信訪數量變化 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.1. --- 计量模型及变量描述 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 計量模型 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 變量描述 --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2 --- 統計模型與實證結果 --- p.57 / Chapter 2.3 --- 章節小節 --- p.61 / Chapter 第三章 --- 土地財政及其對國家社會關係的影響 --- p.64 / Chapter 3.1 --- 中央地方相對財政自主性 --- p.70 / Chapter 3.2 --- 土地開發和房地產開發：地方政府的第二財政 --- p.79 / Chapter 3.3 --- 由土地開發引起的糾紛：以白虎頭村土地維權事件為例 --- p.94 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 廣西北海市白虎頭村土地維權事件 --- p.95 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 導致糾紛的原因 --- p.108 / Chapter 3.4 --- 章節小節 --- p.115 / Chapter 第二部份 --- p.116 / Chapter 第四章 --- 土地征用糾紛的解決途徑比較 --- p.116 / Chapter 4.1 --- 當土地征用糾紛遭遇司法途徑 --- p.117 / Chapter 4.2 --- 信訪途徑與法治途徑？一個實證分析 --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 弱化信訪途徑即等於強化法治途徑嗎？ --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 計量模型，變量描述和數據介紹 --- p.127 / Chapter 4.3 --- 實證結果和穩健性檢驗 --- p.132 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 實證結果 --- p.132 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 估計結果的穩健性檢驗 --- p.135 / Chapter 4.4 --- 章節小節 --- p.136 / Chapter 第五章 --- 權力互動：信訪制度的歷史分析 --- p.138 / Chapter 5.1 --- 信訪現狀：以土地信訪為例 --- p.138 / Chapter 5.2 --- 信訪制度演進的理論分析架構 --- p.145 / Chapter 5.3 --- 信訪制度的歷史演進 --- p.152 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- 毛澤東時期的信訪制度 (1950-1976年) --- p.154 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- 鄧小平時期的信訪制度 (1978-1993年) --- p.164 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- 江澤民時期的信訪制度 (1993-2003年) --- p.172 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- 胡锦涛時期的信訪制度 (2003年-至今) --- p.178 / Chapter 5.4 --- 章節小節 --- p.188 / Chapter 第六章 --- 結論 --- p.190 / 參考書目 --- p.196