This thesis uses synthetically created variance swaps on VIX futures to quantify the variance risk premium in VIX options. The results of this methodology suggest that the average premium is -3.26%, meaning that the realized variance on VIX futures is on average less than the variance implied by the swap rate. This premium does not vary with time or the level of the swap rate as much as premiums in other asset classes. A negative risk premium should mean that VIX option strategies that are net credit should be profitable. This thesis tests two simple net credit strategies with puts and calls, and finds that the call strategy is profitable while the put strategy is not.

Over the Past two and a half years banks have failed at the fastest pace since the Great Depression. These rapidly mounting bank failures have rekindled a debate surrounding the use of fair value accounting, with many arguing that fair value has exacerbated the severity of the recent financial crisis through asset devaluation and the forced sale of assets in an effort to meet capital requirements. This paper seeks to test if an entity’s exposure to fair value which includes assets available-for-sale, trading assets, and loans held-for-sale as a percent of total assets increases the probability of bank failure through testing different prediction models of bank failure that use ratios generated from publicly available Call Report data. Two models are generated from these ratios, one to determine the significance of an entity’s fair value exposure in predicting risk of failure, and the other to determine if a better model can be generated in the absence of the Fair Value Exposure/Total Assets ratio. The first model shows that Fair Value Exposure/Total Assets is a statistically significant ratio, and that the model employing Fair Value Exposure/Total Assets has greater bank failure predictive power than the second model that excludes this ratio. Contrary to expectations, the study determines that greater fair value exposure actually decreases a bank’s risk of failure, rather than increases it. A number of possibilities as to why this may be are presented in the conclusion of the paper.

The purpose of this study was to determine what the critical factors are to an airline’s financial turmoil, leading ultimately to a bankruptcy filing. Over the past decade, the airline industries’ performance has been dismal, leading to 20 bankruptcy filings. As competition increases, it is crucial for airlines to know which core business areas are essential to success. This paper identifies 8 specific industry metrics that are used to compare airlines, revealing where certain airlines falter and others shine. Some of these metrics are later applied to a case study examining Trans World Airlines (TWA) and American Airlines (AA), highlighting the factors leading to TWA’s bankruptcy filing during the same time period American Airlines remained profitable. The results show that the labor inefficiency, operating inefficiencies, unsuccessful fuel hedging programs, and high long-term debt are critical factors leading to an airlines bankruptcy. Four recommendations for airlines are provided, namely: 1.) The cross-utilization of employees, 2.) Maintain Cost Discipline, 3.) Focus on Breakeven Load Factor, and 4.) Do not neglect the intangibles such as brand reputation.

I examine investors’ reaction to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry from 2002 to 2008. Over this period, investors anticipate the announcements, as demonstrated by the fact that the cumulative abnormal returns are not statistically significant. In addition, I test to determine the effect of excess capacity on investors’ reactions. From 2002 to 2004, investors do not recognize acquisitions as a response to excess capacity, as the excess capacity measures utilized have no effect on the size of the cumulative abnormal return. From 2005 to 2008, however, excess capacity measures have a positive effect on cumulative abnormal return, indicating that investors started to recognize the threat of excess capacity and acquisitions as a response to that threat.

Little research has been done into implied correlations, and the small literature grows even smaller when referring to currency options. The existing literature has established that implied correlation is a good if not the best forecaster of future realized correlation, and that this ability to forecast is not necessarily universal. This paper will establish that the forecasting ability of implied correlations in currency options varies across currency pairs, thus proving that not all implied correlations are created equal. Using two different proxies for the quality of the forecaster, the paper attempts to explain which characteristics of an option on a currency pair affect the variation in forecasting ability.

This paper analyzes the performance of Indian banks over the period of the last ten years. It uses the CAMEL Framework to determine the performance of public and private banks in India. The paper also conducts an empirical analysis to determine the share price performance of Indian banks relative to the share price performance of banks in Hong Kong, Europe and the US. This paper finds that private banks perform better than public banks overall based on the CAMEL Framework. In addition it also finds that the Indian banks share price performance is dependent on the share price performance of Hong Kong and European banks, and it has a significant positive relationship with the overall Hong Kong stock market, and this relationship strengthens after 2007. On the whole, this paper seeks to offer as comprehensive a perspective as possible upon the conduct, structure and performance of the banking industry of India.

On a brisk fall night in Detroit, after watching the San Francisco Giants celebrate the 2012 World Series championship live, baseball agent, Michael Moye, hailed a cab for the airport – the post season had ended and free agency was underway. Moye, who had years of experience managing players, knew that this off-season would be different from the rest. He was heading to Westlake, Texas, to meet his star client, outfielder Josh Hamilton, who had entered free agency after five years with the Texas Rangers.

One outcome of ever increasing competition and consolidation in the financial services industries has been the declining significance of the mutual organizational form in the U.S. life insurance industry. The process of converting from a mutual to a stock company gives rise to a variety of issues. The first three essays in this dissertation focus on the growing movement toward demutualization in the U.S. life insurance industry where essay one discusses industrial organization background. In essay two, I improve on the existing literature regarding the determinants of life insurer demutualizations by investigating an expanded data set and utilizing more robust econometric techniques to allow for different forms of demutualization. I also model the demutualization process as a two step process to account for the timing of demutualization, time-varying covariates, and censoring. These models yield results that strongly support the access to capital hypothesis. In essay three, I examine changes in risk management and investment strategies of demutualizing life insurers following conversion. The empirical tests reveal that demutualizing life insurers increase total risk after conversion consistent with their increased abilities and incentives for risk taking. They achieve this increase by hedging interest rate risk and increasing their core-business risks as proxied by investments in various illiquid asset classes. The final essay is on diversifying mergers and acquisitions. Conventional wisdom suggests diversification reduces risk. However, the change in the riskiness of the firm after diversifying acquisitions has not been directly tested in the literature. Using a sample of diversifying M&As, I find that total firm risk does not decrease significantly after these transactions. I then show that while total firm risk does not change, core-business risk increases significantly after the diversifying M&A transactions. I also find that capital expenditures in the acquirers’ core business segments increase significantly more after diversifying transactions relative to that of non-diversifying transactions. Overall, the evidence in this essay adds to the risk management literature that says hedging is a means of allocating risk rather than reducing risk and offers an alternative explanation for why firms diversify.

This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover from an internal capital allocation perspective. We test whether new CEOs make different divisional investment decisions than their predecessors, and if yes, how would this difference affect firm performance. We find that segment investments respond to factors, such as segment investment opportunity, segment cash flow, and other segments’ cash flows, differently after CEO turnover. Evidence also indicates that new CEOs adjust the segments’ previous over-investment /under-investment status to match industry average investment level, and they adjust the relative investment preference among divisions. These findings support the argument that different CEOs have their own set of skills and incentives, which directly affect their internal capital allocation decisions after they take over the office. We also examine the affiliation relationship between certain divisions and new CEOs, and find that new CEOs do not make capital allocation in favor their affiliated divisions. Furthermore, the analyses on firm-level internal capital allocation sensitivity do not support the literature about positive relationship between firm performance and the “Q-sensitivity”. But, our analyses do find a positive and robust relationship between changes in firm performance and changes in the “cash flow-sensitivity”. This suggests that new CEOs making internal capital allocation in favor of their “cash cow” segments are more likely to improve firm performance after CEO turnover.

Essay 1: The Determinants of the Convexity in the Flow-Performance Relationship There is substantial evidence that the flow-performance relationship of mutual funds is convex. In this work, I empirically investigate the determinants of such convexity. In particular, I study the impact that fund fees (marketing and non-marketing fees) and the uncertainty related to the replacement option of fund production factors (managerial ability and investment strategy) have on the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. I also analyze the impact of the priors about managerial ability and idiosyncratic risk on such convexity. The evidence suggests that marketing fees are positively related to the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. In addition, non-marketing fees do not have a negative impact on this convexity. The evidence associated with the value of the managerial and investment replacement option is mixed. Consistent with investment restrictions being relevant in explaining investors’ allocation decisions, sector, index, and hedge funds exhibit lower convexity in their flow-performance relationship than respectively diversified, non-index, and mutual funds. Finally, the dispersion of the priors about managerial ability and idiosyncratic risk are positively related to the convexity in the flow-performance relationship. Essay 2: Implicit Incentives and Tournament Behavior in the Mutual Fund Industry The convexity of the flow-performance relationship in the mutual fund industry produces implicit incentives for mutual fund managers to modify risk-taking behavior as a function of their prior performance (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)). Rather than focusing only on tournament behavior, I investigate the link between the determinants of the convexity in the flow-performance relationship and the inter-temporal risk-shifting behavior of a fund’s manager. Hence, I examine how the sources of implicit compensation incentives shape tournament behavior. The evidence indicates that the relationship between changes in managers’ relative risk choices and mid-year performance is non-monotonic (U-shaped). Higher convexity in the flow-performance relationship increases the convexity of the U-shaped tournament behavior. For extreme performers, an increase in the convexity of the flow-performance relationship directly translates into higher risk-taking incentives. For average performers, the incentive to increase risk produced by the convexity in the compensation schedule is counterbalanced by an increase in the risk of termination. I find that the uncertainty about managerial ability, marketing efforts, and the size of family complexes affect the convexity of the U-shaped tournament behavior. These results are robust to the consideration of termination risks due to funds’ organizational form, investment objectives, or past performance. My results suggest that the risk strategies of younger funds, funds spending more on marketing, funds belonging to smaller families, sector funds, funds that are team-managed, or funds that have experienced consistent poor performance are more sensitive to intermediate performance.