Research on Voluntary Information Disclosure (VID) has been of interest in several disciplines including, but not limited to, entrepreneurship, accounting, finance, law, and marketing. Although there has been extensive research on VID aimed at financial market investors, scant research in marketing exists on VID targeted at prospective business partners that can influence firm future performance significantly. Financial and marketing disclosures have been advocated for by investors and public policymakers as they mitigate the adverse selection problems between the firm and its stakeholders (e.g., investors, customers, and prospective channel partners). Managers are, however somewhat skeptical about its outcomes because of the cost of disclosures (i.e., ex-ante costs of collecting, processing and disseminating the information, ex-post costs of conflicts and litigations, competitive position and proprietary costs). My dissertation consists of three essays on voluntary disclosure of performance metrics in marketing channels and aims to enhance our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of such VIDs. The first essay examines the antecedents of ex-ante VID for standardized contracts in marketing channels. Prior literature in accounting, entrepreneurship, and marketing has investigated drivers of information disclosures to analysts, investors, and customers. Nonetheless, this study bridges the gap in examining why some firms disclose information to prospective channel partners when it cost them to do so and makes the firms vulnerable to competitors. If the disclosure is a signal of quality, we are also interested in knowing whether it is a substitute for other signals of quality or a complement. I draw on signaling and institutional theories to develop a theoretical framework and empirically test it through econometric analyses of multi-sector panel data for the U.S. franchising industry. The results suggest that firms (e.g., franchisors) make such disclosures to prospective business partners (e.g., franchisees) in order to signal profitability of partnering, to attract financial and managerial resources, and develop their entrepreneurial networks. This study contributes to signaling theory literature by investigating organizational quality signaling, providing empirical evidence for drivers of multiple signaling and shedding light on the conflicting views on substitutability or complementarity of multiple quality signals. The study has implications for managers who wish to attract potential business partners through signaling profitability of their business. Furthermore, there are some insights for regulators on the debate on making voluntary disclosures mandatory. The second essay examines the performance consequences of i) signaling through ex-ante voluntary disclosure of performance metrics and ii) screening through selection standards, in the formation stage of new partnerships in marketing channels. It is essential for many entrepreneurial business networks to expand their channel by attracting business partners while still preventing low-quality partners from joining the network. However, information asymmetry between the two parties introduces a double-sided adverse selection problem to the relationship. In other words, the heterogeneous quality - the ability to perform the job - of each party (i.e., the focal firm or the prospective partner) is unknown to the other party. To date, most of the empirical studies have addressed the issue from only one side, either from the perspective of the buyer or the supplier, and have assumed that the other side is open to the relationship. However, in a selective inter-firm relationship that both parties have the option to select the other party, adverse selection problems should be resolved for both of them to enhance the performance of the partnership. To bridge this gap in the literature (i.e., to mitigate double-sided adverse selection problems), I propose a novel framework based on signaling and transaction cost theories. This study suggests and empirically examines a complementary effect of the simultaneous use of signaling and screening on the firm performance. I integrate secondary data from various sources to shape a unique multi-sector panel data set that allows for assessment of the effects of these predictors on firm performance over time through a rigorous econometric model. Contrary to some claims in the extant literature, the results demonstrate that rigorous screening process hurts the firm performance unless it is combined with a proper quality signaling mechanism. This study contributes to the B2B marketing literature and provides implications for practitioners by shedding light on the performance implications of channel governance mechanisms such as signaling and screening. Further, it provides empirical support for the effects of B2B marketing strategies on firm sales revenue growth. The third essay looks closely into the voluntary disclosure of performance metrics. In the previous studies, the decision to disclose is operationalized as a binary variable of whether a firm discloses or not. In the absence of comprehensive regulation, disclosure strategies are subject to significant variation amongst firms, but can also vary over time within an individual firm. Through a content analysis of disclosure documents and scrutiny of the different components that comprise them, I explore the impact of disclosure content on firm performance. This study attempts to reconcile conflicting views of managers, investors, analysts, and regulators. On the one hand, VID should positively impact firm performance through mitigating information asymmetry. On the other hand, skeptical managers make the argument that VID negatively impacts a firm’s performance through costs of preparation, dissemination, potential litigation, and competition. Using a sample of publicly traded restaurant chains in the U.S., I empirically assess firm performance as a function of the disclosure strategy and its interactions with the firm’s characteristics and governance mechanisms. I collect independent variables from the firms’ disclosures through content analysis of public documents and obtain performance metrics of the firms in the stock market from Compustat. This study provides a novel context within which to investigate whether and how financial markets look at the firm’s disclosure behavior in dealing with its prospective channel partners, and it contributes to marketing-finance interface literature. My dissertation is positioned in the marketing strategy-entrepreneurship interface domain and is a multi-faceted study that looks at the phenomenon of VID from different angles and provides implications for several stakeholders. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Distribution channel strategy has a long-term effect on firm performance, is associated with considerable irreversible costs, and can constitute a sustainable asset and competitive advantage for firms. Information asymmetry among the distribution channel members has been known as the basis of opportunistic actions in such exchange relationships. My dissertation research investigates drivers and consequences of information disclosure strategies and is focused on the firms’ voluntary disclosure of performance metrics at the inter-firm relationship formation stage of developing marketing channels. This dissertation consists of three inter-related essays. In the first one, I study drivers of voluntary information disclosures to prospective channel partners. Then, I investigate the performance consequences of such disclosures and their interactions with channel governance mechanisms such as screening, in the second study. Since firms are heterogeneous in the content of their disclosures, in the third study, I conduct a content analysis of the firm’s disclosures to understand its influence on firm performance. Based on Organizational Economics theories and Institutional Theory, I develop my theoretical frameworks and test them empirically using archival data. The empirical context for my work is the franchising industry because it is the most common type of partner-based retail system and is a significant component of the US economy as well as other developed countries and emerging economies. The research findings offer both theoretical and practical implications for researchers and practitioners and contribute to the literatures on signaling and transaction cost theories as well as information disclosure and franchising.