In the first part of this century, the traditional common law jurisdiction of England and Wales and the civil law jurisdiction of Taiwan simultaneously gave increased legal recognition of the homemaker’s non-financial contributions to the marriage relationship, albeit using quite different mechanisms to achieve this. Family law in both jurisdictions has faced the issue of whether it should adapt to changed social norms by better reflecting the equal partnership discourse of marriage in the value that should be given to non-financial contributions typically made by women, such as housework and childcare, both during the marriage and on divorce. Yet, whether and how to do this has been the subject of much debate in both jurisdictions. This thesis therefore considers how the laws in these jurisdictions assess the value of non-financial contributions, before, during and after marriage (i.e. on divorce). It explores the extent to which they meet the aim of achieving substantive gender equality by weighing their achievements against the principles of gender mainstreaming. In order to evaluate this in the context of Taiwan where a gender mainstreaming approach was employed to frame the recent legislative reforms, a qualitative empirical research study was undertaken. The study also considers how social and cultural norms operate alongside or in opposition to the intended effects of legal developments in this field and argues that at the very least, stronger legal provisions going beyond gender neutral laws are needed to remove the traditional gendered assumptions about the low value of non-financial contributions. Therefore, this study intends to explore the problems which result from these socio-legal phenomena and, drawing on the strengths and weaknesses identified in the comparative study of Taiwan and England and Wales, put forward possible legal solutions. These, it is argued, involve a reconceptualisation of the value of non-financial contributions to marriage.

This dissertation addresses the economic behavior and political influence activities by lobbyists today by examining the existence, mechanisms, and welfare implications of commercial lobbying activities and their optimal regulation. In the second chapter of this dissertation, a novel model of lobbying is presented that explains the behavior of commercial lobbying firms (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups, commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy outcomes. They are hired by citizens to advocate policy proposals to politicians that are beneficial to the citizens but also have social implications. Using a model with a market for lobbying services and agency relationships between lobbyists and policymakers it can be shown why commercial lobbying firms exist. It can also be shown that self-interested policymakers, who observe lobbying activities, may employ commercial lobbying firms in a socially inefficient manner. In the third chapter of this dissertation, the analysis examines the effective regulation of commercial lobbying activities and focuses on the endogenous choice of regulatory institutions. The analysis uses the model of commercial lobbying presented in the second chapter. I derive the institutional conditions under which a market outcome can be first-best as well as the conditions under which a first-best institution will be self-stable. One result is that current regulations may fail to be effective and cannot limit lobbyists' and policymakers' incentives to substitute financial contributions for the socially beneficial acquisition of information. Additional results explain why endogenous reforms may or may not occur. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, the analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying with lobbyists who undertake unobservable investigation efforts and promise financial contributions. It is shown that repeated relationships with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information and contracting problem and help policymakers to escape a "cheap talk" lobbying game. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers' information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem may actually improve welfare outcomes. Similarly, financial contributions may also improve welfare outcomes. This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material.