A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Commerce. Johannesburg 1993. / This is an exploratory report. It addresses the impact that the quality of the annual report has on the institutional investor's perception of the image of a company and how such quality influences their investment decisions. The resaarch methodology is based upon interviews in which a structured questionnaire was used as a data gathering mechanism. The portfolio managers who responded to the questionnaire are responsible for the combined management of financial funds amounting to R12biliion. The main conclusion reached in this report is that while elle annual report plays a meaningful role in the investment decisions of portfolio managets, it competes with other sources of infornlationwhich are used to make investment decisions. While the preparers of the annual reports have an understanding of the informational needs of institutional investors, it is suggested that greater emphasis should be placed by the preparers on the presentation of future orientated financial information. / AC2017

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Köln.

Thesis--University of Florida. / Description based on print version record. Typescript. Vita. Bibliography: leaves 166-174.

M.Com. (Accounting) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

I investigate the association between rent extraction and qualitative/quantitative characteristics of 10-K filings (i.e. readability, financial statement comparability and earnings transparency), subject to existing monitoring constraints. This study focuses on one type of such rent extraction – investment inefficiency (i.e. overinvestment or underinvestment), as extant research provides evidence that it provides personal benefits to managers, often at the expense of shareholders. Managers have incentives to invest inefficiently but such behavior may be undesirable and result in negative consequences to the manager, such as turnover. Therefore, I expect that managers are likely to obfuscate information in order to make it difficult for investors to detect investment inefficiency, although monitoring over financial reporting may limit their ability to do so. I test whether monitoring over financial reporting reduces information obfuscation. Last, I study the joint effects of investment inefficiency and information obfuscation on CEO turnover and compensation. I expect that investment inefficiency is positively associated with information obfuscation but this relation is weaker for firms with effective monitoring mechanisms over financial reporting. Further, I examine how these factors affect CEO disciplining. Managers get disciplined for inefficient investment decisions. Obfuscating information makes it difficult for investors to evaluate managers’ investment decisions. Therefore, I examine whether information obfuscation prevents managers from being disciplined as a result of inefficient investment behavior. I find that investment inefficiency is positively associated with information obfuscation. Managers are more likely to obfuscate information for overinvestment type of inefficiency as opposed to underinvestment. Further, the results suggest that, while internal monitoring does not reduce information obfuscation, external monitoring constrains information obfuscation. I find that external monitoring (i.e. auditors) provide more stringent monitoring by reducing information obfuscation. I do not find support for my last prediction that information obfuscation prevents disciplining of CEOs. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Thesis (MRek)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

M.Comm. (Accounting) / Please refer to full text to view abstract.

M.Com. (Financial Management) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

M.Comm / The international financial reporting arena has undergone considerable changes in recent years. The recognition, measurement, presentation and disclosure requirements have increased significantly over the past two decades. Standard setters around the world have justified the more stringent reporting requirements on the grounds of the changes in the international business and economic landscapes as a result of globalisation. These increased financial reporting requirements placed a tremendous burden on Small and Medium-sized Entities (SMEs). As a result, the need for differential reporting has been identified. The notion of differential reporting acknowledges that the users of the financial statements of SMEs have different needs compared to those of public companies. Stakeholders and users of financial statements of SMEs are generally in a position to acquire information additional to that disclosed in the financial statements. Financial information presented in the financial statements is therefore not required to be exhaustive. The users of public company financial statements on the other hand, generally do not have access to any additional information, other than that presented in the financial statements. The information required to be presented in the financial statements, must therefore be extensive in order to allow the user to make informed decisions based on the information. Various countries around the world have responded to this cry for differential reporting, and standard setters have adopted differential reporting in one form or the other. This study discusses the need for differential reporting and outlines the developments of differential reporting internationally and in South Africa, by means of a literature review.

This study extends previous work which attempted to describe why different managers use different accounting techniques (for financial reporting purposes only). The focus is accounting changes, specifically depreciation changes, both to and from accelerated methods. Seven hypotheses are proposed. Three of them predict a negative relationship between a manager's use of accelerated depreciation and (1) the firm's debt/equity ratio, (2) the existence of a bonus plan based on accounting income and (3) the potential impact of a depreciation change on earnings. These three hypotheses are referred to as H(D/E), H(BONUS) and H(IMPACT), respectively. The other four hypotheses predict a positive relationship between a manager's use of accelerated depreciation and (1) firm size, (2) the degree of voting control exercised by insiders, (3) the strength of current earnings relative to the preceding year's, and (4) industry-wide barriers to entry. These are referred to as H(SIZE), H(CTRL), H(EPS) and H(BTE), respectively. Designating accelerated as A and straight-line as S, the (tax/book) depreciation changes studied are the switch from S/S to A/A in 1954 and the switches from A/A to A/S in 1968 and 1969. All seven hypotheses were jointly tested with respect to the A/A to A/S changes in 1968 and 1969. The 1968 multivariate results indicate varying degrees of support for all the hypotheses except H(BTE), while the 1969 multivariate results support only H(D/E), H(BONUS) and H(SIZE). Only five hypotheses were jointly tested with respect to the change from S/S in 1954 (not H BONUS or H BTE ). Support is offered for H(SIZE), H(D/E) and H(CTRL), but not for H(EPS) or H(IMPACT). Further, the 1954 support is strongest when the 1968/1969 "switchback" firms are excluded from the analysis; that is, when the sample includes only firms which consistently used S as opposed to A for book purposes both before and after 1968-1969. Additional analyses used 1968 data for firms which switched from A/A to A/S in 1969. These "prior year" analyses reveal little new information except to suggest that the D/E ratio of the 1969 "switchers" rose significantly in 1969 from its 1968 level.