Abstract Not Available.

No description available.

No description available.

Art has a definite place in our culture and it plays a significant role there. Yet all the continuing efforts in analytic aesthetics to define art have failed, leading to an impasse. So, we still do not know how to define art. In order to overcome the impasse I argue that a change of philosophical perspective is necessary and I suggest a confrontation between Continental and analytic perspectives on defining art. In Part One I deal with analytic aesthetics. I single out Danto's theory of art as the paradigmatic analytic theory of art. I call attention to the fact that Danto defines art by means of language, a theory of art which is a discourse on the language of art. I show the impact of Danto's theory on the rest of analytic aesthetics. First, I present Dickie's theory of art of and show how he draws from Danto but departs from him later on. Then, I present Tilghman's critique of Danto, and I stress the point that in Tilghman's view the problem with Danto's theory is linguistic in nature. I identify Danto's understanding of language as the source of the problems recent analytic aesthetics has with the definition of art. In this way I locate the current impasse in analytic aesthetics and I claim that the underlying analytic understanding of language is too narrow in order to define art. I show the evolution of Danto's views and I discuss his attempt to enlarge his understanding of language with history. In Part Two I try to suggest a way out of the impasse. I shift the perspective and turn to phenomenology and Ingarden's theory of art. I call attention to the role of language in his philosophy and present his approach as quasi-analytical. Specifically, I interpret Ingarden as the continuator of Twardowski and not of Husserl in his understanding of language. I point to the fact that Ingarden's non-phenomenological view of language is a view that allows of seeing language not only as a container of ideas but also their shaper. I show that Ingarden attributes to language an attentional mode of being, and that he treats it as a means of communication. He exposes its cultural nature and enlarges its understanding with the notion of society. I claim that such a broader understanding of language may help analytic aesthetics overcome the present impasse. In Conclusion, I argue that supplementing the notion of language with the notion of history, as Danto does, or society, as Ingarden does, provides a fuller understanding of language, and consequently of art. Hence, it makes possible the overcoming of the impasse in analytic aesthetics. At the same time, however, I show that the very project of defining art has to be relativized in terms of understanding and responding to the significance of art.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Il y a une certaine ambivalence, dans les écrits de Platon, au sujet de l'art. D'une part, le philosophe se montre très sévère envers les artistes, voyant en eux des virtuoses de l'apparence, étrangers au savoir et inutiles à tout point de vue. Le philosophe se montre toutefois, dans certains textes, très favorable à l'art, au point même de lui confier une grande partie de l'éducation des gardiens 1 . Comment expliquer cette ambiguïté de Platon devant les beaux-arts? Cette ambiguïté peut être réduite si l'on considère la fonction de l'art dans la Cité: l'art est, chez Platon, un instrument au service de l'État. Ce que Platon condamne n'est pas que l'art soit incapable d'atteindre la vérité, mais qu'il puisse servir à transmettre des opinions et des habitudes contraires au Bien de l'État. En épurant l'art de son contenu nocif, il devient toutefois possible, pour le législateur, d'utiliser l'art à des fins éducatives: l'art sert à créer, chez les jeunes, de bonnes habitudes intellectuelles et affectives.

Summation. A specifically modern approach to the interpretation of art is distinguished, rooted in the insight that cognitivity in interpretation must be oriented by sensitivity to the subject-object paradigm. It is shown that specific modern theory of interpretation has become established in twentieth-century theory and practice. That theory is demonstrated to be a set of interpretative rules. The hidden dependence of those rules on specific conceptions of the nature of a work of art (qua hermeneutic entity) is revealed. Three such conceptions of the work of art that are basic to modern art history are articulated and critically examined by careful attention to actual works. Interpretation is shown to exceed the strictures of each model, with the specific consequence that the meaning of the work of art in modern times is systematically narrowed. Motives for that narrowing are discussed. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)