The South African mariculture industry is developing the rearing technology of indigenous fish species. Dusky kob (Argyrosomus japonicus) has high-quality flesh and a good market demand. Research is needed to determine the environmental requirements under which growth of dusky kob is optimised. This study assessed the effect of temperature, light intensity, feeding frequency and stocking density, respectively, on growth, feed conversion ratio (FCR) and survival of juvenile dusky kob within a weight range of 10-60 g fish⁻¹) in a series of four growth trials. The effect of temperature on growth and FCR was assessed at 14 temperatures from 17 to 28°C. The temperature for best growth was estimated to be 25.3 °C, while 21.4 °C was the temperature at which the best FCR was achieved. A growth trial testing the effect of light intensity on growth showed that light intensity did not affect growth in the range of 23 – 315 lx. Fish fed a restricted ration of 3.6% body weight per day (chapter 2) or 3.41% body weight per day (chapter 4) had a better FCR than fish fed to satiation. A trial to assess the effect of feeding frequency on growth and FCR showed that fish fed both two or three times daily grew better than those fed once daily. FCR was best in fish that were fed once or twice daily. Preliminary analysis of the results from a stocking density trial showed that stocking density in the range of 10 – 50 kg m⁻³ did not affect growth of juvenile dusky kob. It is recommended to culture dusky kob at a temperature of 25.3 - 21.4 °C at stocking densities up 50 kg m⁻³ to maximise growth. However, a study is needed to determine the environmental conditions needed to maximise profit under commercial conditions. The results allow the South African industry the opportunity to assess the culture potential of this species. In addition, the results will help develop protocols that can be used in other South African candidate aquaculture species such as silver kob, yellowtail, white-stumpnose and sole.

The main objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the economic logic behind fisheries policy and redistribution in South African. An examination of the institutional and organizational evolution reveals that South African fisheries policy followed the world trend in the movement toward quota management systems. However, it is argued that due to the peculiarities of the Apartheid political system, South Africa developed a unique and persistent structure of individual fishing rights that resulted in a transfer of power from the fisher to monopsonistic, and subsequently vertically integrated, fish processing companies. Problems, however, arose with the need to redistribute fishing rights to previously repressed racial groups. It is proposed that, within a specific form (TAC), the structure of individual fishing rights can be decomposed into four operational rules, namely, the right of participation, asset size, tradability and duration of term. Policy design is restricted to a feasible set of rules that impact on the flexibility of the system, the incentives facing private fishing companies and fishers, the efficiency of the fisheries management plan and finally the effect it has on a redistribution strategy. Within this analytical framework, South Africa's policy yields a very flexible system favourable to monopsonistic industrial organisation. However, by adding a redistribution constraint, this structure has a number of important effects. First, as new quota holders are added the information costs for effective fisheries management increase exponentially. Second, the transaction costs to private fishing companies are increased. Third, only the resource rent is redistributed (weak redistribution). Next, the micro to small vessel fisheries, the medium vessel fisheries and the large vessel fisheries are examined separately. The major aim is to determine, within the available data, the effect that a weak redistribution policy (redistribution of the resource rent), has on strong redistribution (redistribution of fishing capital and skills). The evidence definitely supports the analytical framework and suggests that fundamentally the structure of individual fishing rights, which evolved in response to a monopsonistic industrial organisation during the apartheid era in South Africa, works against strong redistribution. Also, that different fisheries face different constraints and that these should in certain instances be treated separately.